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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Judicial Review in State and Federal Courts-
Determination of Validity of Rules and Regulations Before Their
Application in Specific Cases
Whether or not administrative rules and regulations may be re-
viewed by the courts at the instance of one who is either directly or
indirectly affected by them but to whom they have not been applied is a
question that has not been presented to the courts very often. The
North Carolina Supreme Court considered this question in Duke v.
Shaw1 and decided that the statute under which the plaintiff proceeded
did not give him the right to have the court determine the validity of
these regulations. However, an examination of federal and state
authorities reveals several possible remedies not considered in the North
Carolina case.
In the Duke case the complainant, a hotel operator, filed a petition
for review asking the court to proceed under G.S. §§ 143-306 to -3162
and declare invalid regulations issued by the Commissioner of Revenue
which determined that sales of supplies and equipment to hotels, motels,
and others renting rooms were sales to consumers and therefore subject
to the sales tax. The Commissioner demurred on the ground that the
petition did not state a cause of action since it did not allege the payment
by or assessment of any taxes against the petitioner. The trial court
sustained the demurrer and the supreme court affirmed. In effect the
court held that there could be no judicial review under this statute of
administrative regulations prior to their application in a specific case.
The state law on this point is conflicting. The collected cases involve
"erules," "regulations," "orders," and "resolutions" of administrative
agencies, but the designation is of no importance since the substance is
the same.
Some of the more liberal states have adopted section 6 of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.4 That section provides that one
1247 N.C. 236, 100 S.E.2d 506 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1957). These statutes will be
discussed later herein.
'Cf. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 224 N.C. 293,
29 S.E.2d 909 (1944), a case decided before the passage of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1957). The supreme court held that the appellants were
not entitled to appeal to the courts from the action of the Commission in adopting
and promulgating an amended rule. The court said that no appeal could be taken
from an order by which the Commission adopts a general regulatory rule of super-
visory nature.
' 9C UrEoRm LAws ANN. 179, 181 (1957).
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may petition for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of any rule
when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights
or privileges of the petitioner. Wisconsin,5 California,6 and Missouri7
have adopted this section of the act, and although no Wisconsin case
interpreting the section was found, the Missouri and California courts
have interpreted it liberally."
In Butler v. Rude" the Kansas Supreme Court allowed plaintiff, a
licensed embalmer, to maintain an action to enjoin the State Board of
Embalming from enforcing a rule made by the Board though he alleged
ohly that he was informed that the Board intended to enforce the rule.
The court said that plaintiff was not compelled to await action by the
Board suspending his license, or refusing to issue or renew his license,
in order to test the Board's power to adopt the rule.
The North Dakota Court justified a contrary decision'0 with the
"general rule that an injunction will not be granted to stay criminal
or quiasi-crimifial'proceediihgs'. " In" that case plaintiff prayed that
an order of the Board fixing a schedule of minimum prices be declared
void and' that the Board be enjoined from enforcing or attempting to
enforce the order. The statute under which the Board acted gave it
power" to issue rules, orders, etc. with criminal sanctions. The court
said that plaintiff, had an adequate remedy at law since he could use
the alle'ged invalidity of the order as a defense to any prosecution against
him uider the act.
In Zangerle v. Evatt12 the Ohio court declined to review at the in-
stance of county auditors a rule for the classification of property used
in the refining of petroleum. The Tax Commissioner had adopted the
rule and the plaintiffs had had it reviewed by the Board of Tax Appeals.
"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.05 (1955). CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11440 (1955).
'Mo. ANN . ST'AT. § 536.050 (Vernon 1953).
8 Harney v: Contractor's State License Bd., 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
Plaintiff, an engineering contractor, sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity
of a regulation of the Contractor's State License Board requiring a separate license
for each of thirty-one different classes of specialty work. The court held that,
under the statute, the allegation was sufficient to allow plaintiff to contest the
regulation. For a discussion of the case and code sections involved see Note, 41
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1953). See also Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d
485, 234 P.2d 26 (1951).
In King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947), plaintiffs joined a
union-in violation of a rule of the Board of Police Commissioners and sought a
declaratory judgment that the rule was unconstitutional and an injunction restrain-
ing defendants from instituting disciplinary action against them. Although no action
had been taken against them at the time, the court held that the validity of the
rule could be determined.8 162 Kan. 588, 178 P.2d 261 (1947).
"°Williams v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 75 N.D. 33, 25 N.W.2d 282
(1946).
" Id. at 36, 25 N.W.2d at 284.
12 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
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Plaintiffs contended that the court had jurisdiction to review under a
constitutional provision which provided that the court should have
"such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers
as may be conferred by law."'1 3  The court held that "proceedings"
meant judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, pointing out that no
concrete application of the rule was involved in the case.
In Peters v. New York City Housing Authority1 4 the plaintiffs at-
tacked a resolution of the Housing Authority as unconstitutional and
sought to enjoin its enforcement. The resolution required residents of
federally-aided housing projects to sign a certificate of non-membership
in organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney General of
the United States. Those who refused were to be evicted. The cer-
tificates had been issued for signing but no further action had been
taken when petitioner brought the action. The New York Court of
Appeals refused to decide the case on the constitutional ground because
there were two other possible grounds of decision: (1) that the Au-
thority, in adopting the resolution, acted in excess of statutory authority;
and (2) that the resolution was an incorrect interpretation of the
statute. Since the lower courts had not considered these questions,
the court of appeals remitted the case to the special term for their de-
termination. In effect this amounted to a holding that the plaintiffs
could contest the resolution. 15
At least two states, Minnesota and New Jersey, have held that their
Declaratory Judgment Acts permit judicial review of administrative
regulations prior to their application to specific parties. In Minneapolis
Federation of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ.16 the defendant Board
passed a resolution requiring all teachers to sign a written contract for
the ensuing year. Some individual plaintiffs had acquired a tenure
status and objected to signing such a contract. They sought injunctive
relief to preserve the status quo of the parties before they were asked
to sign the contracts. The Board contended there was no justiciable
controversy. The court held the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory
judgment although no relief could be claimed beyond that of declaring
plaintiffs' rights so as to relieve the 'uncertainty. They had a judicially
protectible right that was being placed in jeopardy by the ripening seeds
of an actual controversy.
13 OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2 (1912).
14307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954).
But cf. Kent Stores, Inc. v. Murdock, 278 App. Div. 946, 105 N.Y.S.2d 111
(2d Dep't 1951). The facts of the case were not set out, but in a memorandum
decision the court said that the purpose of the proceeding was to obtain an opinion
essentially of an advisory nature and that neither the Board nor the courts had
jurisdiction to entertain such a proceeding.1238 Minn. 154, 56 N.W.2d 203 (1953).
1958]
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The New Jersey case of Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts17
involved a ruling by the Motor Fuels Tax Bureau to the effect that the
issuance of S & H discount stamps by gasoline retailers constituted a
violation of a statute. Plaintiff was in the business of licensing retailers
to use its stamps. The superior court held that plaintiff was entitled
to maintain the action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, saying that
there was a "concrete, contested issue" and that there existed a "justici-
able controversy." The supreme court affirmed' s without discussing the
right of plaintiffs to maintain the action.19
The Supreme Court 6f the United States has been increasingly lib-
eral in allowing judicial review of administrative regulations before their
application to definite parties in specific factual situations. A leading
case is Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States.20 The Federal
Communications Commission promulgated regulations which purported
to require the Commission to refuse to grant a license to any broad-
casting station which entered into certain defined types of contracts with
any broadcasting network organization. A supplemental "minute" of
the Commission allowed stations to contest the validity of the regula-
tions without danger of losing their licenses.
The complaint alleged that many stations, fearing the loss of their
licenses, were refusing to negotiate for or renew affiliation contracts
and threatened to cancel existing affiliation contracts containing the for-
bidden provisions, and that as a result plaintiff was going to suffer great
financial loss.
The Court held that the Commission's action was an "order" within
the meaning of section 402(a) of the Communications Act of 193421
and therefore reviewable under the Urgent Deficiences Act 22 and that
this plaintiff had stated a cause of action in equity. The theme of the
Court's reasoning was that in view of the irreparable injury with which
plaintiff was threatened the plaintiff's right to intervene in a proceeding
upon an application for a license by a station was not an adequate
remedy.
It should be noted that the regulations did not in terms apply to any
network and had not been applied to any station. The Court said that
these facts did not affect plaintiff's standing to maintain the suit in equity,
"'25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A.2d 706 (Ch. 1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A,2d
310 (1954).
1815 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
19 See Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 19 N.J. Super.
408, 88 A.2d 632 (App. Div. 1952), which involved a regulation of the New Jersey
State Board of Optometrists. The plaintiff's right to contest the regulation was
not questioned, though it did not appear that the plaintiff had violated the regulation
or that the Board had taken steps to enforce it.20 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
2148 STAr. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1952).
2 38 STAT. 219, 220 (1913).
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that it was enough that the regulations purported to operate to alter and
affect adversely its contractual rights and business relations with station
owners.
Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Reed and Douglas in a
dissent based on the absence of any immediate, direct effect of the regu-
lations on the plaintiff or station owners. He distinguished the cases
relied on by the majority on the ground that in each of those cases
criminal prosecution, injunction, or fine could be used immediately to
enforce the command of the administrative agency. He was of the
opinion that even irreparable loss was not a sufficient ground for judicial
review.
23
Several cases decided since the CBS case have extended that de-
cision. In FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.2 4 the Supreme Court,
in a unanimous decision, did not consider or question the plaintiff's right
to sue to enjoin and have set aside regulations of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission which interpreted a statute prohibiting the broad-
casting of so-called "give away" programs. The Commission was to
refuse any station's application for a construction permit, license, etc.,
if it broadcast the forbidden programs. The plaintiff was a network
that made such programs available to stations for broadcast.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act carriers of agricultural com-
modities were exempt from the requirement of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. Frozen Food Express v. United States25
was an action to enjoin and have set aside an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission that listed agricultural and nonagricultural com-
modities. Although the Interstate Commerce Act provided criminal
and other sanctions for violation of the act, the order did not command
compliance with the order or the act. The Commission merely threat-
ened to enjoin transportation of the commodities which plaintiff claimed
were agricultural. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to main-
tain the action under the Administrative Procedure Act.26 The reason-
ing of the majority in the CBS case was relied upon in part.
The problem in Frozen Food Express closely parallels that in the
principal case, where the opposite result was reached. The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of any agency
action by any person suffering legal wrong or who is adversely affected
or aggrieved by such action.27 Agency action is defined to include
21 For a more exhaustive consideration of this and other cases and closely related
matters, see DAvis, ADMI1SWRATIVE LAW 640-63, 676-80 (1951); Davis, Ripe-
ness of Governmental Action for .udicial Review, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1326 (1955).24347 U.S. 284 (1954).
25351 U.S. 40 (1956), 70 HARv. L. REv. 156 (1957).
21 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
J60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
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agency rules and orders.2 8  The North Carolina statute29 provides for
judicial review at the instance of any person aggrieved by any final ad-
ministrative decision. "Administrative decision" is defined as any de-
cision, order, or determination rendered by an administrative agency
in a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of spe-
cific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after opportunity for agency hearing.3 0 "Administrative decision" as
thus defined appears to cover determinations which are judicial in nature
rather than regulations. 31
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.3 2 was decided a short time
after the Frozen Food Express case. The regulations in that case pro-
vided that licenses for broadcasting stations would not be granted if
the applicant had an interest in other stations beyond a limited number.
Plaintiff sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act8 3 and
the statute (hereafter referred to as section 1034) that was the successor
to the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 34  In holding that Storer had standing
to sue, the Court relied on the CBS, ABC, and Frozen Food Express
cases. The decision emphasized that "the Rules now operate to control
the business affairs of Storer.
'3 5
The Court cited the Administrative Procedure Act"0 for the proposi-
tion that this was final agency action and went on to justify review
under section 1034. justice Harlan dissented on the ground that Storer
was not a party "aggrieved" by a final "order" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1034. He did not discuss the review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.3 7  He distinguished the CBS holding that the chain
broadcasting regulations were an "order" on the basis of the "coercive
effect" of those regulations. He said: "The holding of the Court today
amounts to this: that regulations which impose no duty and determine no
rights may be reviewed at the instance of a person who alleges no in-
2860 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).28N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (Supp. 1957).
oNX.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 (Supp. 1957).
31 This conclusion seems to be strengthened by another factor. At the same
session and in successive chapters of the session laws, the legislature passed N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1953) and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150-9 to -34
(1953). The latter sections regulate licensing boards. G.S. § 150-32 provides
that one may petition for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of any
rule adopted by any of the boards covered by the statute when it appears thit the
rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to inter-
fere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. The fact that
such provision was included in the latter act but not the former seems significant.
For an explanation of G.S. § 150-32, see JOENSTON, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEURE
124-26 (1953).
2 351 U.S. 192 (1956); 44 CALIF. L. REv. 938, 70 HARV. L. REv. 156 (1957).
"360 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009(a), (c) (1952).
"64 STAT. 1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1034 (1952).
35351 U.S. at 199.
"'60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001(c), (g) (1952).
8160 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
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jury, to settle whether a future application of the regulations that may
never occur would be valid."'38 This statement seems to be an accurate
appraisal of the decision.
The great difference in the position of the plaintiffs in the several
cases becomes obvious when one considers the possible harm that might
result to each while waiting for the regulations to be applied. The
CBS decision was based on the irreparable injury that plaintiff would
suffer by reason of contracts lost on account of the regulation.3 9 The
Storer case seemed to require no threat of irreparable injury in order
to justify judicial review of a regulation, but merely that the regulation
control the business affairs of the party seeking review. Thus the
Supreme Court has become increasingly liberal in allowing direct review
of administrative regulations without waiting for them to be applied.
The cases from the other states reveal that some of the successful
plaintiffs asked for an injunction or a declaratory judgment. No North
Carolina case was found in which the plaintiff asked for either of these
remedies in seeking review of an administrative regulation. The New
Jersey court granted relief to the Sperry & Hutchinson Company
40
under the New Jersey Declaratory judgment Act.41 The Minneapolis
Federation of Men Teachers 42 also got relief under the Minnesota act.43
The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act44 does not differ in any
material particular from the acts of those states. It might be that a
contrary decision would have been reached if the plaintiff in the Duke
case had sought a declaratory judgment under the North Carolina act.
WILLIAM G. RANSSDELL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Congressional Investigations-
Contempt of Congress
Defendant, an instructor at Vassar College, was subpoenaed to
appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and was
asked by the Committee a series of questions tending to elicit from him
whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party and
whether he knew that one Crowley, who had identified defendant as a
member of a communist group while the latter was a student and in-
structor at the University of Michigan, had been a member of the
"351 U.S. at 212.
"See Justice Harlan's dissent in the Storer case, 351 U.S. at 211.Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A.2d 706 (Ch.
1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
'
1N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :16-52 (1952).
"Minneapolis Federation of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ., 238 Minn. 154,
56 N.W.2d 203 (1953).
"MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01-.15 (1947).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 and 1-256 (1953).
1958]
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Communist Party. Defendant refused to answer these questions on the
grounds that such interrogation violated the first' and fifth2 amend-
ments. He was convicted3 of contempt of Congress 4 and the court of
appeals affirmed. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals, 6 and remanded the case "for considera-
tion in light of Watkins v. United States."7 On remand, in the case
of Barenblatt v. United States,8 the court of appeals again affirmed the
conviction.
In the Watkins case, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt
conviction of Watkins, a labor organizer, who had testified freely and
fully about his own past Communist activities, but who refused to
answer questions as to whether he had known certain other persons to
be members of the Communist Party. The Court found that Watkins
was not given sufficient information as to the pertinency of the ques-
tions to the subject under inquiry and held that he "was thus not
accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his
rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
The Barenblatt case is one of several recent cases involving prosecu-
tions for refusal to answer questions propounded by congressional in-
vestigating committees which were pending in the federal courts when
the Watkins decision was rendered. Some of these cases have since
been decided.10 It seemed apparent, in view of the strong language"'
'Defendant maintained that the first amendment prohibition against congres-
sional lawmaking involving the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly includes a
like prohibition against any form of congressional intrusion in these areas. The
Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957), seems to apjrove
this contention when it says, "Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command
that the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or
assembly. While it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and that an
investigation is not a law, nevertheless an investigation is part of lawmaking.
It is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process. The First Amend-
ment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or
by lawmaking."
'Defendant maintained that an indictment under 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C.§ 192 (1953), the contempt statute, was void because the contempt statute, when
applied to the Committee's authorizing resolution, is void for vagueness and thus
in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Defendant did not
rely on the provision against self-incrimination.
'United. States v. Barenblatt, Criminal No. 1154-54, D.C.D.C., March 15, 1956.
"52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1953).
' Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
'Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957.).
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
9354 U.S. at 215.
"0 Sacher v. United States, 252 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affirming 240 F.2d 46(D.C. Cir. 1957) on remand it 354 U.S. 930 (1957) (refusal by lawyer to tell the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee whether he was or had been a member of
the Communist Party) ; Singer v. United States, 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
reversing on rehearing 244 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (refusal by teacher to
(Vol. 36
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used by the Court in Watkins concerning the House Un-American
Activities Committee Charter,12 that the decision therein would have
an important effect on all pending and subsequent prosecutions for con-
tempt of Congress. Apparently the Court itself considered Watkins to
have such an effect for the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judg-
ments of the court of appeals, and remanded, for consideration in light
of Watkins, the Barenblatt,'3 Sacher,14 and Flaxer,15 cases, the only
three contempt cases then pending before the Supreme Court. Two of
these three cases have been reheard and decided after remand, yet in
both rehearings the court of appeals affirmed its earlier decisions sup-
porting conviction.' 6
In Barenblatt, the court was asked to acknowledge that "the Supreme
Court in Watkins struck down the resolution creating the Standing
Committee on Un-American Activities . . . and that prosecution based
on refusal to answer questions asked by the Committee or a Subcommit-
tee questioning thereunder must necessarily fall in that the resolution on
which the indictment is based fails to meet the requirements of due
process; and second, assuming this was not the case, that part of the
opinion in Watkins relating to pertinency is dispositive of the present
identify for the House Un-American Activities Committee the names of others with
whom he had participated in Communist activities) ; United States v. Peck, 154
F. Supp. 603 (D.C.D.C. 1957) (refusal by newspaperman to identify for the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the names of others with whom he had
participated in Communist activities); United States v. Lorch, - F. Supp. -
(S.D. Ohio 1957) (refusal by teacher to tell the House Un-American Activities
Committee whether he had been a Communist at a certain time in the past).
11 "An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities
Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance
between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of citizens
to carry on their affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference. It
is impossible in such a situation to ascertain whether any legislative purposejustifies the disclosures sought and, if so, the importance of that information to the
Congress in furtherance of its legislative function. The reason no court can make
this critical judgment is that the House of Representatives has never made it.
Only the legislative assembly initiating an investigation can assay the relative
necessity of specific disclosures." 354 U.S. at 205-06.
1 "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2)
the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda
that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3)
all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary
remedial legislation." H.R. REs. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. RFc. 18, 24
(1953).
" Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957).
, Sacher v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957).
'" Flaxer v. United States, 354 U.S. 929 (1957) (refusal by union president to
produce union records, including a membership list, for the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee).
" Flaxer v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1958), affirming 235 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
affirming 240 F.2d 875 (D.C Cir. 1957).
1958]
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case."' 7 The court held that Watkins did not strike down the resolu-
tionl8 because 1) the Court would have said so explicitly if it had
intended to do so; 2) the Court would have reversed on the authority
of Watkins rather than remanded for consideration in light of Watkins;
and 3) the Court did not repudiate other convictions under the same
charter to which it referred in Watkins. The court then goes on to hold
that Barenblatt had been made fully aware of the subject under inquiry
and was thus able to see the pertinency of the questions thereto, the
court considering the questions to be pertinent. By rejecting the argu-
ment as to the effect of Watkins on the resolutions and by deciding the
case on the basis of pertinency to subject matter, the court implies that
all Watkins requires is that the questions be pertinent to the subject
matter under inquiry and that the witness be informed of the subject
matter in one of five ways' 9 so that he can gauge the pertinency of the
questions thereto. But a careful reading of the Watkins opinion seems
to indicate that the Supreme Court is saying a good deal more than this.
First, the Supreme Court seems to say that the congressional in-
structions to a committee, which are embodied in the authorizing reso-
lution,20 must spell out that group's jurisdiction with sufficient par-
ticularity2' to enable the courts to ascertain dearly that Congress ordered
the specific investigation and desires the particular information which
the witness refuses to divulge.2 2 This point is especially crucial because
if it were decided that Congress had authorized the committees to com-
pel answers to such questions as are involved in these cases, the courts
might find it necessary as a last resort to declare unconstitutional the
authorizing resolutions as being violative of the first amendment" as,
indeed, several Justices have implied.24  To avoid this extremity, the
" 252 F2d at 130.
"8 "We are of clear opinion that Watkins did not void [the resolution]." 252
F.2d at 132.
" (1) The authorizing resolution; (2) the opening remarks of the chairman,
members, or counsel of the committee; (3) the nature of the proceedings; (4) the
questions themselves; and (5) the chairman's response to an objection on per-
tinency. 354 U.S. at 209-14.
20 "Those instructions are embodied in the authorizing resolution." 354 U.S. at
201.2 Ibid.
The importance of this prerequisite to a valid committee use of the subpoena
power is emphasized by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Watkins,
354 U.S. at 217. The authorizing resolution in Barenblatt and United States v.
Lorch, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Ohio 1957), is the same as that in Watkins. As
Judge Youngdahl lucidly shows in United States v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603
(D.C.D.C. 1957), the authorizing resolution of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, through which the Internal Security Subcommittee derives its authority,
is rife with the same vagueness and ambiguity which the Court vigorously con-
demned in Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201-06. This is the same authorizing resolution
as is involved in Sacher and Flaxer, which the Court remanded for consideration
in light of Watkins.23 See note 1 supra.2 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 196-98; See also Sweezy v. New
[Vol. 36
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Court has announced that "whenever constitutional limits upon the in-
vestigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this Court, it ought
only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness
of what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious
limits. ' ' 25 If the Court in Watkins did not expressly say that it struck
down the resolution there involved for vagueness, it went to great
lengths in citing vaguenesses for naught. It is possible that the reason
the Court did not hold so explicitly is that the Court was obeying the
doctrine that required it to decide a case on the constitutional issue only
as a last resort. In the Watkins case the Court was able to show that
the witness had not been apprised even of what the Committee considered
to be the subject under inquiry and was thus not accorded due process.
Another explanation is offered by Chief Judge Edgerton in his Baren-
blatt dissent when he argues that when "there are two grounds, upon
either of which an Appellate court may rest its decision and it adopts
both, the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the judgment of the
court and of equal validity with the other. And even if the Supreme
Court's demonstration that-the Committee on Un-American Activities
had no authority to compel testimony were obiter, this court should
defer to it."2 6 But the clear meaning of the Court's words in Watkins
is that the resolution is void for vagueness whenever a criminal prose-
cution is based upon it. In remanding instead of reversing the Bareg-
blatt, Sacher, and Flaxer cases, the Court was following the practice- of
allowing lower courts to rectify their own mistakes, as Chief Judge
Edgerton points out in his vigorous dissent in Barenblatt.27
Secondly, the Supreme Court has indicated that the subject matter
of the investigation must be clearly within the congressionally authorized
scope of inquiry.28 "
Thirdly, the Court says that the questions asked by the committee
must be pertinent to the validly authorized subject of inquiry.29 Finally,
the Court requires that the witness be given such information as will
indicate "what is the topic under inquiry" and must have explained to
him "the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate
to it."30 In the Barenblatt case, the court found that the statement of
committee counsel had informed the defendant of the subject of the hear-
ings and that, therefore, the defendant could gee the obvious pertinency
of the questions to the announced subject.3 ' The court did not discuss at
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) ; id. at 261 (concurring opinion) ; United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1953) (concurring opinion).
" United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
20 252 F.2d at 138. 27 Ibid.
"United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
.- 354 U.S. at 208. 30 Id. at 215.
31252 F.2d at 136.
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all the question of whether the committee-determined subject falls within
the scope of the authorization given the committee by the House of
Representatives. By thus placing the entire emphasis of the Watkins de-
cision on the application of the pertinency of questions to subject matter
requirement, the court of appeals makes it possible for a committee to
define its investigation in whatever terms it wishes and then to ask
questions pertinent to this self-established subject. This is precisely the
evil practice the Court proscribes in Watkins.P2
Hence, it would seem that, given the decision of the Court in
Watkins and the obvious fact that the Court saw a clear connection be-
tween that case and the three remanded cases, the court of appeals might
have found one of the following: 1) the witness had not been informed
of the subject lawfully under inquiry,3 3 2) the specific questions in-
volved were not pertinent to the lawfully authorized'inquiry, 3) the sub-
ject under inquiry was not within the Committee's scope of authority,84
4) the resolution authorizing the investigation was void for vagueness,
this being a criminal prosecution based thereon, as being violative of the
fifth amendment, or 5) the resolution authorizing the investigation was
void as a violation of the first amendment. Although the Supreme Court
in Watkins pointed in the direction of the third or fourth choice, the
court of appeals, en banc, held in Sacker and implied in Barenblatt that
the resolutions involved were sufficiently definite to authorize the in-
vestigations. It would seem that having found in both cases that the
questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry, the court would
have been obliged to discuss the question of whether the subject under
inquiry was within the committee's authority. The disposition of these
two cases seems to be inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Watkins and, indeed, with the per curiam reversal in light
of Watkins by the same court of appeals of its decision in the Singer
case.25
In summary, it would seem that Barenblatt ignores the Watkins
requirements for a valid prosecution for contempt: (1) a constitutional
grant of authority explicitly inclusive of the investigation rather than
simply not exclusive of such investigation ;36 (2) a specific investigation
within the grant of authority; (3) questions clearly pertinent to such
investigation, the relevance to which must be determined as of the time
3 354 U.S. at 205.
" This was the express holding in Watkins.
' This was the holding in the Rumely case. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
" Singer v. United States, 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957), reversing 244 F.2d349 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This case has the identical fact situation as does Watkins.
The other cases differ in that the information refused was of the defendant's own
activities. A careful reading of Watkins reveals that the Court did not consider
this point sufficiently important to qualify its decision by making such a dichotomy.
31 354 U.S. at 204.
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when asked and not "looking backwards from the events that tran-.
spired" ;37 and (4) a witness being fully apprised of the way in which
the questions are pertinent. If the main emphasis of Watkins is not
placed on the requirement of explicit congressional authorization, then
that case tells us nothing new other than listing five ways by which a
witness may be informed of the subject under inquiry 38 The require-
ments of pertinency of questions to subject matter 9 and of pertinency
of subject matter to congressional authorization40 have long been de-
clared to be essential. To read the Watkins decision in any other light
removes from that case the vital impact the case was expected to have4 '
on the entire practice of congressional investigations. 42
JOEL L. FLEISnXAN
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Conviction of Murder in the
First Degree After Reversal of Conviction of Murder in the Second
Degree
In Green v. United States' .the petitioner had been indicted in the
District of Columbia for first degree murder. Upon a verdict of guilty
of murder in the second degree, he appealed and obtained a new trial.2
On remand he was again tried for first degree murder, and this time
convicted of that charge and sentenced to death. The United States
Supreme Court held that the second trial for first degree murder put
the petitioner in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the
Federal Constitution.3
The reasoning of the Court was that the petitioner was not required
to -waive former jeopardy as to the charge of first degree murder in
order to have a new trial of his conviction for second degree murder.
The effect of this decision is that when an accused is tried for first degree
'
7 Ibid.
38 See note 18 supra.
"McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927).United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
"As Justice Clark says in his dissent in Watkins, "As I see it the chief fault
in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of
the Congress." 354 U.S. at 217.
"Cf. United States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126 (D.C.D.C. 1957) (in con-
victing the President of Western Teamsters Conference for refusal to produce
union records subpoenaed by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Gov-
ernment Operations Committee, the court sustained the Committee's power to see
the records in order to check the truthfulness of reports filed by the union with
the Department of Labor); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Cohn, 154 F.
Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (court held that the F.C.C. had been given sufficient
power by Congress to subpoena financial records of television finances in an in-
vestigation of radio and television networks).
1355 U.S. 184 (1957).
'218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cr. 1955).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part, "[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... .
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murder, but is convicted only of second degree murder or manslaughter
and obtains a new trial, that trial must be limited to the offense of
which he was convicted in the first trial. A second trial of the higher
offense of first degree murder places him in double jeopardy.4
Although the cases are distinguishable, the Court had previously
reached the opposite conclusion in Trono v. United States,5 saying that
when a defendant at his own request "has obtained a new trial he must
take the burden with the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole
case." 6 This holding had been regarded as binding by the lower federal
courts.7
North Carolina has an interesting history regarding this question.8
Prior to 1948, there were eight instances in which a defendant in such
a situation appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.9 In only one
of these, State v. Groves,'° was the appeal successful and a new trial
granted. In that case the defendant made no objection on the ground
of double jeopardy, and the court simply said, "The case goes back for
This fact situation must be distinguished from onre where the defendant has
been convicted of the same offense for which he was indicted. In the latter case
it is conceded that he waives his defense of former jeopardy if he is granted a new
trial. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). This situation must also be
distinguished from one where the defendant, charged under an indictment with
two or more counts, is only convicted on one count. In that case North Carolina
holds that if he is granted a new trial, he may be retried on all the counts. State
v. Beal; 202 N.C. 266, 162 S.E. 561 (1932). As to mutually exclusive counts, see
Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 84 (1957).
199 U.S. 521 (1905). The Tr6tio case arose in the Philippine Islands shortly
after they were annexed by the United States. On a charge of first degree murder
the defendants had been convicted of assault. They appealed to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines. That court, exercising the jurisdiction possessed by it
at the time, reversed the judgment of the trial court and convicted the defendants
of second degree murder.
Although the Green case does not expressly overrule Trono, but limits it to its
facts, certainly it overrules it in effect, for in the Trono opinion the Court said,
"We may regard the question as thus presented as the same as if it arose in one
of the Federal courts in this country .... " Id. at 530.
old. at 534.
Carbonell v. People of Porto- Rico; 27' F.2d 253 (1st Cir. 1928); United
States v. Gonzales, 206 Fed. 239' (W.D. Wash. 1913).
8 Although there is no express double jeopardy provision in the North Carolipa
Constitution, it is prohibited under the "law of the land" clause. N.C. CoNsT. art.
I, § 17, State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954).
'State v. Davis, 175 N.C. 723, 95 S.E. 48 (1918) ; State v. Matthews, 142 N.C.
621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34 S.E. 706 (1899) ; State
v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898) ; State v. Groves, 121 N.C. 563, 28
S.E. 262 (1897); State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27 S.E. 72 (1897); State v.
Bridgers, 87 N.C. 562 (1882) ; State v. Grady, 83 N.C. 643 (1880). In connec-
tion with these cases it should be noted that in North Carolina it is not necessary
that the indictment specifically allege first degree murder in order that the accused
may be convicted of that offense. N.C. GmE. STAT. § 15-144 (1953), State v.
Kirksey, 227 N.C. 445, 42 S.E.2d 613 (1947). Rather, he is indicted for murder,
and the jury determines in its verdict whether it is in the first or second degree.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-172 (1953), State v. Bagley, 158 N.C. 608, 73 S.E. 995
(1912).
10121 N.C. 563, 28 S.E. 262 (1897).
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trial de novo for the offense charged in the bill of indictment."' 1  In
five of the seven cases in which the appeal was unsuccessful, the court
expressed the opinion by way of dicta that had a new trial been awarded,
the defendant could be lawfully convicted of first degree murder.12
Finally in 1948 the issue was for the first time put squarely before the
North Carolina court. In State v. Correll'3 the defendant had been con-
victed of manslaughter on an indictment for murder and had obtained
a new trial. In the second trial he was convicted of second degree
murder, and again he appealed, this time on the theory that he was
put in double jeopardy. Relying on assorted dicta in its previous cases
and the Groves case (in which the defendant had not raised the ques-
tion), the court said, "It appears . . . from former decisions of this
Court that it is an accepted principle of law in this State that when on
appeal by defendant from judgment on a verdict of guilty in a criminal
prosecution a new trial is ordered, the case goes back to be tried on the
bill of indictment as laid."'1 4 Thus there has evolved in North Carolina
a holding which is directly opposed to that of the Green case.15
There is no clear majority rule regarding the question presented
by the Green and Correll cases.' 6 One of the earliest decisions in-
1 Id. at 568, 28 S.E. at 264. The court relied on State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601,
27 S.E. 72 (1897). In that case the defendant was not granted a new trial, but
there was dictum that had he been, it could have been for the greater offense.
" State v. Davis, 175 N.C. 723, 95 S.E. 48 '(1918) (concurring opinion) ; State
v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34
S.E. 706 (1899); State v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898); State v.
Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27 S.E. 72 (1897).
13229 N.C. 640, 50 S.E.2d 717 (1948).1 Id. at 641, 50 S.E.2d at 718. The court cited State v. Matthews, 142 N.C.
621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) ; State v. Gentry, 125 N.C. 733, 34 S.E. 706 (1899) ; State
v. Freeman, 122 N.C. 1012, 29 S.E. 94 (1898) ; State v. Craine, 120 N.C. 601, 27
S.E. 72 (1897). But in none of these was a new trial awarded. The court also
cited State v. Bridgers, 87 N.C. 562 (1882), and State v. Grady, 83 N.C. 643
(1880). In these two cases, not only was a new trial not granted but the court
expressly refused to state an opinion on this question. Finally, the court cited
State v. Beal, 202 N.C. 266, 162 S.E. 561 (1932), and State v. Stanton, 23 N.C.
424 (1841). These two cases involved the situation where a defendant, indicted on
several counts, is convicted on one or more but not all of them. Therefore they
are distinguishable. See note 4 stpra.
15 The Correll case was followed in State v. Chase, 231 N.C. 589, 58 S.E.2d
364 (1950).
"3 The opinion has been expressed that murder and manslaughter are different
crimes. In Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442 (1855), the court said, "Although both
are within the general term homicide, yet, legally speaking, they are not different
degrees of the same offense, because one is not murder at all ... ." Supra at 451.
The Maryland court seems to have missed the point. Homicide is not necessarily a
crime. It may be justifiable, Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 41 So. 761 (1906),
or excusable, Gill v. State, 134 Tenn. 591, 184 S.W. 864 (1916). The crime is
felonious homicide, and it may be either murder or manslaughter, People v. Austin,
221 Mich. 635, 192 N.W. 590 (1923), the difference being that malice is an essential
element for a killing to constitute murder, State v. Baldin, 152 N.C. 822, 68 S.E.
148 (1910). Blackstone put it, "Manslaughter (when voluntary) arises from the
sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Black-
stone, Commentaries *190.
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volving this problem was a Louisiana case decided in 1845.17 By dictum
that court took the view represented by the Green case; a year later a
federal court in United States v. Harding'8 took the side of the Correll
case. Thus the question was weaned on conflict, and the situation is no
different today. In at least sixteen states the holding of the Green case
prevails, 19 but another sixteen are in accord with North Carolina.20
Of all the decisions adopting the North Carolina rule, perhaps the
6lassic case is Brantley v. State.21 There the defendant contended that
the verdict in the first trial finding him guilty of manslaughter had the
Jegal effect of finding him not guilty of murder, and that therefore he
could not be tried for murder at the second trial without being put
in double jeopardy. The court said that one may waive his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy by obtaining a new trial, and that
in this situation the waiver is not limited to the offense for which he was
convicted, but extends to the entire offense for which he was indicted.
A verdict, the court said, is single, and the defendant cannot divide it
into that which favors him and that which does not. Had he allowed
it to ,stand, he,,could have claimed any legal results flowing from it,
including the implication that, as he..was only convicted of manslaughter,
he was not guilty of the higher offense of murder. But as the court
pointed out, once he causes the conviction to be set aside, the implica-
tion is left without a basis aild so nrust fail with the convictioA.22
State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 583, 41 Am. Dec. 314. (La. 1845).26 Fd. Cas. 131, No. 15301 "(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846).19Rigbell v. .State, 8 Ala. Apjp. 46, 62 So. 977 (1913) ; Hearfi v. Stae, 212 Ark.
360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947) -.People v. Hulntifigton, 8 Cal. App. 612, 97 Pac. 760(1908) ; State v. Naylor, 28 Del. 99, 90 At. 880 (1913) * McLeod v. State, 128Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1957) ; People v. Newmah, 360 Ill. 226, 198 XE. 645 (193 ) ;
State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 285 N.W. 269 (1939) ; State v. Wooten, 136 La.
560, 67 So. 366 (1915) ; People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N.W. 440 (1906) ;
State v. Welch, 37 N.M. 549, 25 P.2d 211 (1933) ; State v. Wilson, 172 Ore. 373,
142 P.2d 680 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 At. 275 (1908) ;
Reagen v. State, 155 Tenn. 397, 293 S.W. 755 (1927); Taylor v. Commonwealth,
.186 Va. 587, 43 S.E.2d 906 (1947) ; State v. Foley, 131 W. Va. 326, 47 S.E.2d 40(1948) ; Radej v. State, 152 Wis. 503, 140 N.W. 21 (1913).
"oYoung v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac. 1011 (1913) ; Brantley v. State, 132
Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909) ; State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931) ;
State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144, 72 Pac. 554 (1903) ; Hoskins v. Commonwealth,
152 Ky. 805, 154 S.W. 919 (1913); Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265(1926) ; State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1, 64 S.W.2d 643 (1933) ; Pembroke v. State,
119 Neb. 417, 229 N.W. 271 (1930) ; State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657(1948) ; People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92 (1911) ; State v. Robinson,
100 Ohio App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956); Turner v. Territory, 15 Okla. 557,
82 Pac. 650 (1905) : State v. Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487 (1906) ; State v.
Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 Pac. 293 (1897) ; State v. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 At.
238 (1895) ; State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226, 60 P.2d 71 (1936).2 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909).22 There is another view which concurs in the result reached in the Brantley
case, but which is based on different reasoning. In a dissenting opinion, justice
Holmes said, "It seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said
to be more than onc6 in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be
tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end
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In the Green case the Court said that if the waiver extends to the
whole offense for which the defendant was indicted, then he is faced with
a dilemma.23  In order to gain a chance to have corrected what he con-
siders an erroneous conviction of a lesser offense, he must run the risk
of conviction of an offense which may be punishable by death. This
gives him no meaningful choice. Accordingly, those decisions which are
in line with the Green case limit the extent of the waiver to the offense
of which he was convicted. He is deemed acquitted of any greater
offense by the first verdict.24
From the foregoing it is seen that there are two opposing camps
regarding the question presented by the Green case. The two are ap-
proximately equal in number and can possibly be equally well supported
by logical argument. The danger is that well reasoned logic may obscure
the point in conflict. Perhaps the answer to this problem is more a
matter of policy than of logic. Justice Holmes said that "in this country
there is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will
be subjected to tyranny."25 Yet, in the orderly administration of justice
that balance is likely as equal as laws can devise. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the holding of the Green case exemplifies the spirit, if not
clearly the letter, of the prohibition against double jeopardy.2
R.ICHARD C. CARMICHAEL, JR.
Criminal Law-Obstructing Justice-Interfering With a Police Officer
Statutes imposing criminal sanctions for obstructing justice' coritain
such descriptive words as obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, interfere,
hinder, prevent, intimidate and impede. The question raised is should
of the cause." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904). No cases in
support of this theory have been found.
233 55 U.S. at 193.2
'Hearn v. State, 212 Ark. 360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 AtI. 275 (1908).
" Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
"The holding of the Green case will affect only the federal courts, as the
double jeopardy prohibition contained in the fifth amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not apply to the states. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319(1937). However, an interesting sidelight of the Green case is the fact that the
majority opinion was written by Justice Black, who has insisted that the four-
teenth amendment due process clause incorporates the entire Bill of Rights so as
to make its provisions binding on the states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court has always refused
to accept this idea. For a discussion of the majority view, see Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinions in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945),
and Adamson v. California, supra at 59.
'ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 402 (1940); Aliz. REv. STAT. ANt. § 13-541 (1956);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1005 (Burns 1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 135, § 21(1954); MiNir. STAT. ANN. § 613.56 (1947); Nan. REv. STAT. § 28-729 (1948);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1953); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:99-1 (1953); TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 39-3104 (1955) ; W. VA. CODE; ANN. § 6015 (1955).
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these words be interpreted as including conduct which did not involve
the use of force or threats to use force and which could not have incited
a riot.
In Andersen v. United States2 a police officer was issuing a double
parking ticket to another party when Andersen, a bystander, protested
the officer's authority to issue the ticket. The officer, in arresting Ander-
sen for being disorderly, tore Andersen's shirt. Andersen in turn
pushed the officer but then submitted to the arrest. Andersen admitted
in the trial court that he protested the officer's right to issue the parking
ticket but denied being disorderly or interfering with the officer. For
the act of pushing the officer, Andersen was convicted of assault.8 He
appealed on the ground that he had not committed the misdemeanor of
interfering with or obstructing justice and for that reason he was justified
in using reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest. Although there
was no indication in the report that Andersen was indicted for inter-
fering with a police officer, the court said it appeared from the de-
fendant's admissions in the trial for assault that he had committed the
misdemeanor of interfering with a police officer 4 as a matter of law;
therefore, his arrest was lawful and his resistance unjustified.
Should an orderly protest to a police officer be an obstruction of
justice? An annotation 5 and the treatises6 take the position that remon-
strating with an officer on behalf of another or questioning an officer
while he is performing his duty does not constitute an obstruction,
hindrance or interference.
From a general search of the annotated state statutes on obstructing
justice, no other case was found where a court had interpreted its statute
so liberally. On the contrary citizens were found not guilty of obstruct-
ing justice where they merely questioned, commented to, or remonstrated
with police officers concerning arrests.
In People v. Magnes7 the defendant asked why certain persons were
placed in custody. A lower New York court found that the inquiries
propounded in a gentlemanly manner did not amount to an interference
2 132 A.2d 155 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955).
' D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1951): "Assault or threatened assault in a inen-
acing manner. Whoever unlawfully assaults or threatens another in a menacing
manner, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not
more than twelve months or both."
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505(a) (Supp. VI 1958): "Assault on a inember of
police force. (a) Whoever without justifiable and excusable cause, assaults,
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any officer or member of
any police force operating in the District of Columbia while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both."
Annot., 48 A.L.R. 753 (1927).
'39 Am. Jum., Obstructing Justice § 10 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S., Obstructing
Justice § 2 (1950). See also 6 ARK. L. REv. 46 (1951).
'187 N.Y. Supp. 913 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1921).
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with a police officer. The court went on to say that the defendant had
a perfect right to make the inquiries of a police officer. In Chicago v.
Brod8 the defendant at the scene of another's arrest commented, "Well,
he [referring to the arresting officer who had his gun in hand] doesn't
have to shoot him."9  The court, reversing the conviction for inter-
fering with justice, asked: "If this pronouncement of the trial judge is
sustainable, where are our boasted liberties? Must the citizen be be-
holden to the whim and humor of the police for his freedom ... ?"10 In
District of Columbia v. Little" the defendant refused to unlock the door
of her home for a health officer and remonstrated on constitutional
grounds. The defendant's actions were held not to be an interference.
The court said that although force or theatened force is not always an
indispensable ingredient of the offense of interfering with an officer in
the discharge of his duties, mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an
officer are not usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference.
In People v. Pilkington,12 while the police officer was putting prisoners
into the patrol car, the defendant advised the prisoners to keep their
mouths shut and a lawyer would soon be on the way. The court held
this not to be a violation of the city ordinance which states that it is
unlawful to harm, obstruct, or resist any officer in the performance of
his duties.
Under the court's interpretation in the principal case, a police officer
cannot be questioned by an innocent bystander. The statute 3 so inter-
preted makes orderly protests to a police officer punishable as a matter of
law by $5,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both.
NICK J. MILLER
Domestic Relations-Custody-Contests Between Parent and
Nonparent
Probably one of the most important and yet most unsettled areas of
the law today is that of custody of children, particularly in a contest
between a parent and nonparent. As early as 18761 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred when he was of the
opinion that in law the mother had a primary right (as against the
1141 Ill. App. 500 (1908).
9Id. at 501. 'ld. at 502.
11339 U.S. 1 (1950). Although not squarely in point, this case was included
because it arose in the same jurisdiction. Also, it should be pointed out that in
1953 D.C. CODE § 22-505(a) (1951) was amended; the phrase, "personal violence
upon an officer," was deleted, and the phrase, "assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates or interferes with any officer," was inserted. D.C. CoDE § 22-505(a)
(Supp. VI 1958).
2 199 Misc. 665, 103 N.Y.S.2d 64 (County Ct. 1951).
1 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505 (Supp. V 1956).
'Spears v. Snell, 74 N.C. 210 (1876).
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child's uncle) 'to the custody of the child. On the other hand, as recently
as 1949, the court in the case of In re Cranford2 held that "where the
fitness of the petitioner [mother] is unchallenged the natural right of
the parent to the custody of the child cannot be denied because a more
suitable custodian or a more advantageous environment is available..
and that "the question of unsuitability is one which must be advanced
and shown by the [nonparent] respondent."3  Since this decision there
have been three rather significant opinions indicating that the court is
abandoning the rule of the Cranford case and returning to its 1876
position. These culminate in the principal case of In re Gibbons.4
The first of these cases is Wall v. Hardee,5 in which the mother
sought the custody of her six year old illegitimate son from the child's
aunt. The trial court found the mother to be of good moral character
and to bear a good reputation at that time. The trial judge concluded
that as the natural mother of the child, she had the primary, natural,
and legal custody and control of the child and that the burden of showing
her unsuitability was on the aunt. Since the aunt failed to sustain the
burden, the court awarded the child to the mother. The supreme court
remanded the case to find further facts, citing the rule in In re Cranford,
but adding: "This rule is not absolute. There have been, and will be,
cases where the best interests of the bastard child required that its
custody be taken from the mother, and placed elsewhere. While the
courts are reluctant to do this, for reasons real as well as apparent, they
do not hesitate, where it clearly and manifestly appears the best interests
and welfare of the child demand it."'0 Thus the rule set out in In re
Cranford was substantially weakened.
The second of these cases, Holmes v. Sanders,7 came about one year
later. The father sought the custody of his minor child from the child's
maternal grandparents. The supreme court in a per curiam opinion
affirmed an award of custody to the grandparents without requiring the
grandparents to establish the unsuitability of the father. In fact, no
mention was made of the suitability or unsuitability of the natural
parent.8
The third and'principal case, In re Gibbons, hat been before the
supreme court two times.a Both trial judges made detailed findings
2231 N.C. 91, 56 S.E.2d 35 (1949), 28 N.C.L. REv. 323 (1950).
3 Id. at 95, 56 S.E.2d at 39. 4247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957).
240 N.C. 465, 82 S.E.2d 370 (1954), 33 N.C.L. REV. 193 (1955).
Id. at 466, 82 S.E.2d at 372.
7243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955), 35 N.C.L. REV. 225 (1956).
s The court in its two sentence opinion stated it is a "well settled principle in
North Carolina that in matters pertaining to their custody, the welfare of children
is 'the polar star by which the discretion of the courts is to be guided' . . . " Ibid.
' The case was first reported in 245 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955). It was
remanded because the trial judge privately examined several of the witnesses, in-
cluding the child, and refused to allow the child to be examined in open court.
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of fact which showed that the respondent and his wife adopted the
child in April 1949. One month later respondent's wife died. The
child after several months was placed with petitioners, a college professor
and his wife who had no children of their, own. The child remained
with them until August 1954,10 when the respondent forcibly took the
child from a Sunday school room which resulted in his trial and con-
viction for disturbing religious worship. From the time of the death of
his first wife until his remarriage in 1952, the respondent was excessive
in his use of alcohol. . After his remarriage he began to control his
drinking but occasionally he would drink excessively. B6th trial judges
found both respondent and petitioner' fit, and proper persons to have
the custody of the child. After finding the facts, the trial judge in the
principal case concluded that this is "'a contest between one who has
the legal custody, and one who does not, and the rule of law in such
cases is that it must appear that the welfare of the child clearly requires
that he be taken away from the one who has the legal custody.' Upon
the foregoinig facts the court is of the opinion that it does not appear that
the best interests of the child clearly require that he be taken away from
respondent who has legally adopted him."'1
On appeal the supreme court reversed. One basis 12 for the reversal
was the feeling "that the learned Judge felt so 'cramped by his opinion
that in law' the respondent had a primary right to the custody of the
boy, that he overlooked the interest and welfare of the boy."'13 Had the
10 One factor on which the supreme court relied in its decision in the principal
case was that the parent voluntarily permitted the child to remain continuously
in the custody of others in their home for such lengths of time that "the love and
affection of the child and the foster parents have become mutually engaged, to the
extent that a severance of this relationship would tear the heart of the child, and
mar his happiness." 247 N.C. at 280, 101 S.E.2d at 21. In the past the North
Carolina courts seem to have considered only the question of whether the child
had been abandoned, but the view in the principal case seems more in line with
the modern trend in custody controversies. Brickell v. Hines, 179 N.C. 254, 102
S.E. 309 (1920) ; Newsome v. Branch, 144 N.C. 15, 56 S.E. 509 (1907) ; Latham v.
Ellis, 116 N.C. 30, 20 S.E. 1012 (1895); 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child § 12(e)
(1950).1247 N.C. at 277, 101 S.E.2d at 19.
The second was that there was nothing in the record of the findings of fact to
indicate that the trial judge gave any consideration to the wishes of the child.
There have been many cases touching on this point in North Carolina, and there
is no set age limit at which a child may or may not be heard, but its age and
intelligence go to the weight of the evidence. Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 97
S.E.2d 782 (1957) ; James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955) ; Harris
v. Harris, 115 N.C. 587, 20 S.E. 187 (1894) ; Spears v. Snell, 74 N.C. 210 (1876).
13 247 N.C. at 282, 101 S.E.2d at 23. "It is an entire mistake to suppose the
court is at all events bound to deliver over a child to his father, or that the latter
has an absolute vested right in the child. Doubtless, parents have a strict legal
right to have the custody of their infant children as against strangers. However,
courts -will not regard this parental legal right against strangers as controlling,
when circumstances connected with the present and prospective welfare of the
child clearly exist to overcome it, or when to enforce such legal right will imperil
the personal safety, morals or health of the child." Id. at 278, 101 S.E.2d at 20.
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supreme court followed the Cranford rule, it undoubtedly would have
held otherwise as to this point, since the nonparent had not proved the
parent to be unsuitable. In fact, the trial court found the parent to be
suitable.
Two justices dissented in that they believed a correct statement of
the governing law is found in James v. Pretlow,14 which is interpreted
by them to mean "that a parent, who has legal responsibility for his
child and who is a fit and proper person to have custody, is entitled to
custody unless for the most substantial and sufficient reasons the interests
and welfare of the child clearly require that custody be awarded to
another."' 5
The gist of the majority opinion in the Gibbons case seems to be to re-
tain the distinction between custody controversies involving only parents
and those involving parents and nonparents. It still recognizes the right
of a natural parent to his child but makes the custody determination on
the basis of what will be in the best interest and welfare of the child.
This is a fine distinction, but one which is made according to the mod-
ern American rule.1 6  The common law right 17 of the parent to the
primary consideration is thereby changed to a lesser consideration as a
basis for a custody award as between a parent and a nonparent.
This modern American rule has been stated by the courts in at least
three different ways. Some courts describe the parent as "prima facie
entitled to custody of his minor child."'18 Others say that "although it
is presumed the child's welfare will be best subserved in the care and
-1242 N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955) (a controversy between the natural
mother and a stepmother of 16 year old twins). The case stated the following
rule: "Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right
to the custody and control of their minor children. This right is not absolute,
and it may be interfered with or denied but only for the most substantial and
sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and
welfare of the children clearly require it." Id. at 104, 86 S.E.2d at 761. Both
the majority and the dissent in the Gibbons case cite and rely to a great degree
upon this statement.
15247 N.C. at 285, 101 S.E.2d at 25. It is interesting to note that neither
the majority nor the dissent cite the Cranford case. This could indicate that none
of the justices desire to follow the Cranford rule any longer.
"°Armstrong v. Green, 260 Ala. 39, 68 S.W.2d 834 (1953) ; Dunavant v. Duna-
vant, 31 Tenn. App. 634, 219 S.W.2d 910 (1949); Note, 19 So. CALIF. L. Ray.
72, 73 (1945).
"' EvERSLEY, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 412 (5th ed. 1937) states: "By the common
law of England, the father had the right to the custody of his infant children
as against third parties, and even as against the mother, though the child were
an infant at the breast." However, in 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AiERICAN
LAw § 205 (Lacy's rev. ed. 1889), it is said: "The strict custody of the father
at common law was later modified so that the courts of justice may, in their sound
discretion, and when the morals, or safety or interests of the children strongly
require it, withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or mother, and
place the care and custody of them elsewhere." See also United States v. Green,
26 Fed. Cas. 30, No. 15, 256 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) ; State v. Smith, 6 Greenleaf 462
(Me. 1830).
SIn re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 397, 190 P.2d 426, 431 (1948).
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custody of a parent the presumption is rebuttable."'19 Still other courts
make no finding of the parent's fitness or unfitness but award the custody
of the child on the basis of its welfare and best interests. 20  On the whole,
the courts today seem to be carefully weighing the facts, giving some
consideration and weight to the fact that one party is a parent, and
then making a decision as to what is best for the child, as in the principal
case.
In view of the full and complete findings in the principal case by the
trial courts and the discussion and application of the modern American
view of custody controversies between parent and nonparent by the
supreme court, it is hoped that the common law view of the primary right
of a parent to his child (which must prevail unless the parent is shown
to be unsuitable) is now overruled in North Carolina.
FRANCIS 0. CLARKSON, JR.
Domestic Relations-Divorce-Abandonment as a Defense to Divorce
on the Ground of Two Years Separation
In order to illustrate clearly one problem in North Carolina divorce
law, this hypothetical situation is posed: a married man living in North
Carolina decides that he can no longer live with his wife in harmony,
although she has not been guilty of any misconduct which would be
grounds for divorce. He desires a divorce but his wife is not willing
to give him one. Could this husband separate from his wife for a period
of two years, continue to support her throughout this period, and then
obtain a divorce on the ground of two years separation under G.S.
§ 50-6?1
The legislative history of divorce on the ground of two years separa-
tion in North Carolina seems to demonstrate that the legislature intended
to authorize a divorce by either party upon living separate and apart for
a period of two years irrespective of how the separation came about.
2
10 Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 1348, 72 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1955).
20 Henry v. James, 222 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.2d 285 (1953) ; Prince v. Carrington,
62 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952) ; Holmes v. Sanders, 243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955).
This has led at least one writer to say, "Moreover, a divorced spouse would do
well not to allow the children to become overly fond of the baby sitter." Note, 7
ARK. L. Rav. 405, 408 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950) provides: "Marriages may be dissolved and
the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of
either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for
two years, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the
State for a period of six months. This section shall be in addition to other acts
and not construed as repealing other laws on the subject of divorce."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(4) (1950), originally enacted in 1907, authorizes
divorce upon a separation for a specified period, but the court has held that the
plaintiff had to establish that he was the injured party. Sanderson v. Sanderson,
178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919). Then in 1931 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950)
authorized divorce on the basis of separation without mentioning that the plaintiff
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The court has not so interpreted G.S. § 50-6. It has held that a party
should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and that,
therefore, the plaintiff will be denied a divorce if it is established that
he has abandoned the defendant.3
Inasmuch as the court was restricting the broad language used by
the legislature in G.S. § 50-6 when it held that a plaintiff who abandoned
a defendant would be denied his divorce, would it not have been reason-
able to assume that "the-court would require the abandonment to be
criminal in nature ?4 The earlier cases of Hyder v. Hyder and Byers
v. Byers indicated that the court did mean criminal abandonment, but
the more recent case of Pruett v. Pruett indicates that something short
of criminal abandonment will suffice.
The question in the Hyder case was whether the jury had been
properly instructed as to the elements of criminal abandonment. The
court held that the charge was correct and the divorce was properly
denied because the defendant had abandoned the plaintiff in the criminal
sense and that he could not take advantage of his own criminal mis-
conduct. This case clearly indicates that anything short of criminal
abandonment would not have been a defense, since otherwise there would
have been no need for the supreme court to consider the correctness of
the lower court's charge as to criminal abandonment. It would have
been much easier to state that any abandonment would be a valid de-
fense.
had to be the injured party. This tends to indicate that the legislature desired
to authorize the divorce irrespective of how separation came about.
This 1931 statute provided, in part, that there could be a divorce on the applica-
tion of either party if there had been a separation of husband and wife, whether un-
der deed of separation or otherwise, and they had lived separate and apart for a
specified period. Our court, relying upon the words "under deed of separation or
otherwise," held that the separation had to be by mutual consent. Parker v.
Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936).
In 1937 the statute was amended so that the phrase "either under deed of separa-
tion or otherwise" was taken out and only the words "living separate and apart for
two years" were left. Thus it would appear again that by taking out of the
statute the words causing the court to hold that the separation had to be by
mutual consent, the legislature intended to authorize the divorce irrespective of how
separation came about.
' Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935). The effect of this interpretation of G.S. § 50-6
and its amendments seems to be to shift the burden from the plaintiff to the de-
fendant to show that the plaintiff is or is not the injured party. If the legislature
had intended this it would have been much simpler to amend G.S. § 50-5 (4) to add
that the burden is on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff is not the injured
party.
'N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-32 (Supp. 1957) provides that the two requisites for
criminal abandonment are a willful abandonment and a willful failure to provide
adequate support.
215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939).
m222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).
7247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).
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The Byers case also implies that criminal abandonment is required.
The court, citing the Hyder case, said:
[A] husband is not compelled to live with his wife if he provides
her adequate support. It must, therefore, be conceded that the
law under review does not contemplate, as essential to an effectual
separation under the statute, a repudiation of all marital obliga-
tions, which, of itself, would destroy his remedy.8
These two cases would indicate that the husband, in the facts sup-
posed at the beginning of this Note, could get his divorce since he has
continued to support his wife and is not guilty of criminal abandonment.
The more recent Pruett case indicates, however, that the husband
in the supposed situation could not get a divorce, and that a mere separa-
tion of the husband from his wife without just cause is sufficient to
defeat a divorce. In the Pruett case, the husband filed for divorce on
the ground of two years separation. The wife filed a cross-action for
divorce from bed and board. The jury found that the husband had
willfully abandoned the wife and failed to provide her with adequate
support and granted her a divorce from bed and board. Subsequently,
the case was calendared as an uncontested divorce action, and the court
granted the husband an absolute divorce without being aware of the
fact that the wife had already been granted a divorce from bed and
board in the same action. Thereafter the husband moved to have the
divorce from bed and board set aside because, among other things, the
wife had failed to allege that the failure to support had existed to her
knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of her pleadings.
The court refused to set aside the divorce from bed and board (but did
affirm the setting aside of the husband's absolute divorce because it had
been granted in the same action in which the divorce from bed and board
had been granted), stating that abandonment without a failure to sup-
port is sufficient to sustain a divorce from bed and board under G.S.
§ 50-7(1). ° Had the court stopped at this point, the rules set out above
as being supported by Hyder and Byers would not have been affected.
But, the court went on to say that the jury finding of abandonment by
the husband "defeated the plaintiff's action on the ground of such separa-
tion."'1 Since the court had said that the abandonment involved did not
8 222 N.C. at 304, 22 S.E.2d at 906.
'N.C. GEN. ST4 T. § 50-7 (1950) provides that a divorce from bed and board
may be granted "if either party abandons his or her family." There is no doubt,
from this wording,' that the legislature intended to authorize a divorce from bed
and board on the ground of abandonment without regard to a failure to support.
This does not, however, appear to indicate that abandonment in this sense was
intended to be sufficient to defeat an absolute divorce on the ground of two years
separation. It is generally held that a ground for limited divorce is not a recrim-
inatory defense to a ground for absolute divorce. MADDEN, PaERSONS AND Do msnc
RELATIo is § 91 (1931).10 247 N.C. at 23, 100 S.E.2d at 303.
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include a failure to support, the intimation is clear that the court con-
siders abandonment without a failure to support to be sufficient to defeat
a divorce on the ground of two years separation. This appears to be
an unfortunate extension of the Hyder and Byers rules, which limited
the abandonment that will defeat a divorce on the ground of two years
separation to criminal abandonment.
The policy of granting a divorce upon the ground of living separate
and apart seems to be that it is to the best interests of society and the
parties, where the marriage has factually ceased to exist and there is no
intention to resume it, to put an end to it legally. The number of
jurisdictions which have this provision has grown rapidly in recent
years. 1  In some states relief is denied the petitioner on account of his
wrongdoing, 12 but in several jurisdictions fault is not decisive.13
Arkansas has affirmed a decree in favor of a husband although he was
alleged to be a deserter living in open adultery.14 Apparently there is
a growing conviction in the United States that a marriage which has
ceased to exist as a fact does more harm than a divorce. 15
It is to be hoped that future decisions will settle the interpretation
to be given G.S. § 50-6. In view of the growing liberalization through-
out the country and the already liberal wording of the statute, it is
submitted that nothing short of misconduct in the criminal sense should
be allowed to defeat an action for divorce under this section.10
JESSE M. HENLEY, JR.
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 455 (3d ed., Moreland 1946). Nineteen
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico make living apart for a specified
period without cohabitation cause for divorce. Of these 21 jurisdictions, 6 have
statutes as broadly drawn as North Carolina. They are Arizona, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas.
'2 Gee v. Gee, 249 Ala. 642, 32 So. 2d 657 (1947) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 174
Md. 229, 198 AtI. 414 (1938) ; West v. West, 115 Vt. 458, 63 A.2d 864 (1949)
Powless v. Powless, 269 Wis. 552, 69 N.W.2d 753 (1955).
1" Cotton v. Cotton, 306 Ky. 826, 209 S.W.2d 474 (1948) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209
La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946). See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 336 (1944).
"Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944).
'
5 KEEzER, op. cit. supra note 10 § 455.
16 Either husband or wife may get a divorce two years after a divorce from
bed and board or two years after a separation agreement, for a separation coupled
with continued support under either of these circumstances is legal. Cameron v.
Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952). Why should there be a distinction
drawn between these "legal separations" and the one supposed at the beginning
of this Note, insofar as the husband's right to obtain divorce is concerned?
The answer to this is a practical one. In the cases first put the wife is probably
getting alimony and such alimony will survive a divorce decree, while in the latter
situation the wife cannot be awarded alimony incident to an absolute divorce. The
court seems to be trying to protect the wife's right to alimony in the face of
North Carolina's rule as to no alimony as an incident to an absolute divorce. See
Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1953), for a discussion of this point.
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Fair Labor Standards Act-Exemption of Agricultural Employees-
The "Area of Production"
Plaintiff, suing for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, was em-
ployed as a night watchman in a cotton warehouse located in a town
of 6,309 population in an area characterized by a large volume of cotton
production. Over ninety-five percent of the cotton regularly received
by the warehouse was grown within twenty miles of the warehouse.
The defendant, operator of the warehouse, claimed that the plaintiff was
exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act1 under section 13 (a) (10).2
This section of the act completely exempts from both the minimum
wage and the overtime provisions employees engaged in storing or
processing agricultural commodities within the "area of production."
And Congress conferred upon the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act the duty to define the "area of production. ' 3 Therefore,
in order to be exempt an employee must not only be engaged in one of
the operations enumerated in the act, but his place of employment must
fall within the Administrator's definition of "area of production.' 4
The Administrator defines tarea of production" as being in open
country or in a rural community. He further qualifies this by requiring
that in order for a business to be considered as within the "area of
production" ninety-five percent of its supply of commodities must come
from the immediate vicinity. In the case of cotton compressing, that
percentage must come from within a twenty mile radius of the place of
business. The most controversial qualification placed in the "area of
production" test involves the population of the place where the business
'Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1952). Sections 1-11 of the act generally provide that all employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods theref6r are entitled to a set
minimum wage and certain overtime benefits. The particular employees here in
question were found to be in the production of goods for commerce because their
occupations were directly essential and closely related to such production. See
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
SLovvorn v. Miller, 215 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1954). See text at note 10 infra.8 Fair Labor Standards Act § 13(a) (10), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 213 (a) (10) (1952), provides that the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the act shall not be applicable to "any individual employed within
the area of production (as defined by the Administrator), engaged in handling,
packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their
raw or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural commodities
for market, or in making cheese or butter or other dairy products."
' The reasons which prompted Congress to grant this power to define to the
Administrator were set out by Justice Frankfurter in the early case of Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944). "In view . . . of thie
variety of agricultural conditions and industries throughout the country the bounds
of these areas could not be defined by Congress. Neither was it deemed wise
to leave such economic determinations to the contingencies and inevitable diversi-
ties of litigation. And so Congress gave the Administrator power to assess all
the factors relevant to the subject matter." Id. at 614.
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is located. It is expressly provided that no establishment located with-
in a city or town of more than 2,500 population can be exempt.5
Tobin v. Traders Compress C0.6 was the first direct attack on the
Administrator's population test in the courts. In this case the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the definition was based on
relevant economic conditions. The court pointed out that a population of
2,500 is the popular dividing line between urban and rural communities
according to the Bureau of Census and other agencies. Although the
court took notice of the fact that over eighty percent of all the cotton-
compressing industry would fall outside the exemption because of the
population test alone, it ruled that the Administrator's definition is
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court granted that the test is not
perfect; however, it pointed out that no better criteria have been ad-
vanced and that the power to define was given to the Administrator and
not the courts.
In the Traders Compress case there was a strong dissent. 7 The
dissenting opinion takes the position that a test based on population
amounts to an unfair discrimination. It urges that too much emphasis is
placed on the mere location of the business establishment and not on
the character of the community which may surround it. The dissent
brings to light the very strong possibility that two identical agricultural
industries may be located not more than a mile apart, yet one might
get the advantages of being exempt from paying minimum wages and
overtime while the other could still be required to meet these standards.
It further states that the population of a town generally has nothing to
do with whether or not such town is within a particular "area of pro-
duction."
In Jenkins v. Durkin8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by
way of dictum, expressed the opinion that the population criterion of
the Administrator's definition is an invalid standard. The.conclusion of
this court is based completely on the reasoning set out by the dissent in
the Traders Compress case. 9 This dictum set the stage for the holding
of the same court of appeals in the case under discussion, LovVorn v.
-29 C.F.R. § 536.2 (1956).6199 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1952). The fact that the courts have the power to
declare a regulation of the Administrator to be in excess of the power delegated by
Congress was established in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S.
607 (1944). In that case the Court ruled that a provision in the Administrator's
definition requiring that an employer have no more than seven employees if he
was to claim the exemption was an arbitrary and capricious criterion for de-
termining "area of production." Having come to this decision, the Court announced
that it would refrain from enforcing any part of the regulation until the number of
employees test had been removed. The question of the population test was also
raised in this case, but the Court reserved any decision concerning it.
199 F.2d 8, 11 (10th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
8208 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1954).9 See note 7 supra.
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Miller.10 The court there found that the employer met all the qualifica-
tions for the exemption except for the fact that his business establish-
ment was located within a town of 6,309 population, greater than the
prescribed maximum of 2,500. The population criterion was held to be
a standard which discriminated among businesses located within a
single "area" of agricultural production. The court again cited with
approval the dissent in the Tenth Circuit case of Tobin v. Traders Com-
press Co. and held that the population criterion was arbitrary, capricious,
and invalid.
Within one year from the date of this decision the Fifth Circuit
was again faced with the same problem in Mitchell v. Budd." Relying
on its decisions in Jenkins v. Durkin and Lovvorn v. Miller, the court
again held that the Administrator's definition was invalid. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Budd case,' 2 because of conflicting de-
cisions in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits as to the validity of the popula-
tion test, and reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Court found that the
Administrator was compelled to draw "a line between agricultural
enterprises operating under rural-agricultural conditions and those sub-
ject to urban-industrial conditions,"' 3 that the Administrator had stayed
within the allowable limits after a reasoned and objective consideration
of all the factors involved, and that his definition was a valid one.
It is understood that prior to the holding of the Court in the Budd
case the Administrator was in the process of drafting a completely new
and different definition of "area of production." However, with the
coiing of this decision he was able to abandon this new plan and to con-
tinie to restrict the applicability of the exemption in those industries
storing or processing the products of local agriculture. The growths,
shifts, and changes in the population of this country in recent years
have affected the farming communities and the towns located in the
heart of agricultural areas. In the light of these changes, it seems
reasonable to suggest that what was once a proper measure of "area
of production" might now require some amending if the intended benefit
to the agricultural industry is not to be lost.
WILLIAM W. SUTTLE
20 215 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1954). See text at note 2 supra.
11221 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1955).
" Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956).
18 350 U.S. at 478.
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Labor Law-Pre-emption and State Injunctive Enforcement of the
"Right-to-Work" Law
When may a state court validly enjoin picketing that is peaceful in
its conduct but is intended to accomplish an unlawful purpose? This
is a question that has caused considerable confusion since the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947,1 which
specify that certain activity on the part of labor unions constitutes an
unfair labor practice. A state court judge who has a petition for an
injunction against picketing usually will have two difficult questions
to answer. First, assuming that the picketing is for an unlawful pur-
pose, is it protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Consti-
tution as a valid exercise of free speech ?2 Secondly, assuming that the
picketing sought to be enjoined is not protected by the free-speech
doctrine, is it conduct which amounts to an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA, thus leaving the state court without jurisdiction ?3
The North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the second
question of federal pre-emption in the recent case of Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. Local 379, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL.4
The plaintiff was engaged in the production of guided missiles under
a contract with the United States. The Company's plant was sur-
rounded by a chain link fence. The plaintiff company maintained control
of all entrances and exits to the tract because of its responsibility for
safeguarding secret information concerning its contracts. On the same
tract were buildings occupied by other contractors performing work for
the government. A construction firm had a contract with the Army for
the erection of buildings on the same tract. Defendant union established
picket lines at all the entrances to the tract of land occupied by the
plaintiff and its subcontractors. The plaintiff alleged that no labor
dispute existed between the construction company and its employees or
the plaintiff and its employees; that the picketing was the result of a
conspiracy intended to compel the plaintiff to deny admittance to the
grounds to non-union employees of the construction company, thereby
requiring the construction company to confine its employment to mem-
bers of defendant union in violation of the North Carolina "Right-to-
'49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952) (hereinafter
referred to as the NLRA).
See Local 695, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957), where
Justice Frankfurter summarizes the leading cases involving picketing and freedom
of expression. See also Forkosch, Picketing in Labor Relations, 26 FORDHAm
L. REv. 391 (1957).
' See Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versi" State .turisdiction, 42
A.B.A.J. 415 (1956), for a discussion of pre-emption problems arising from the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act; Note, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 329 (1957).
'247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).
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Work" law ;5 that many of plaintiff's employees had refused to cross the
picket line established by the defendant union, thus hampering the plain-
tiff in the performance of its contracts.
On the evidence and stipulation of the parties that plaintiff was en-
gaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the NLRA and
that the picketing was peaceful, a temporary restraining order was con-
tinued until final hearing. The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that under the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 6 the NLRA places
exclusive primary jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board7
in such a case and deprives the superior court of authority to issue the
restraining order. In view of its decision in J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v.
Local 755, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL8 and the
general tenor of its opinion in the Douglas Aircraft case, it would seem
likely that the North Carolina Supreme Court would have upheld the
restraining order if there had been no controlling decision of the United
States Supreme Court in point. After discussing the general case law
development of the federal-state jurisdictional question, the court con-
cluded its opinion by pointing to the case of Farnsworth & Chambers
Co. v'. Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL.9
Here the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld an injunction against picket-
ing which it found to be for the purpose of compelling a violation of
the Tennessee "Right-to-Work" law. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Tennessee court in a per curiam opinion.10 The North
Carolina Supreme Court said it could find no distinction in the facts
between the Farnsworth case and the case before it," and that "the
Court having final authority to ascertain congressional intent has de-
clared the law. s'2
The Farnsworth case further clarified the "penumbral area" in juris-
diction of labor disputes which the United States Supreme Court has
said "can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litiga-
'N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1950).0353 U.S. 969 (1957).
'Hereinafter referred to as the NLRB.8 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
'299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957).
"0 Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth
& Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957). Despite express congressional authoriza-
tion to the states to enact "Right-to-Work" laws (see note 14 infra), the Court
indicates that the states may be prohibited from exercising injunctive relief when
violations of such laws are also subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
" The only distinction that could be made in respect to the parties in the two
cases is that in Farnsworth the picketing was directed at the plaintiff, while in
the Douglas Aircraft case the picketing was primarily directed at a party other
than the plaintiff although the plaintiff was adversely affected by the picketing.2247 N.C. at 630, 101 S.E.2d at 808.
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tion.''1 3  How far has the Farnsworth case gone in determining the
effect of the pre-emption doctrine on state legislation forbidding or
restricting union-security agreements pursuant to section 14(b) of the
NLRA ?14 It is submitted that the case has answered the federal-state
jurisdictional question in the usual situation where a state court might
attempt to enjoin picketing on the basis of a state "Right-to-Work" law
but has not rendered the "penumbral area" completely clear.
The per curiam opinion in the Farnsworth case cited Garner v.
Local 776, Teamsters Union, AFL 5 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc.,16 which are the leading cases on federal pre-emption under the
NLRA. In Garner, the Court held that if the alleged conduct of a
party to a labor dispute was such that it would constitute an unfair labor
practice subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the state court was
without jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct, even though the conduct also
violated a state statute or judicial policy governing labor-management
relations. The Weber case further clarified the jurisdictional question
by holding that the rule of the Garner case would apply even if the
alleged wrongful conduct violated state law or policy in a field other
than labor relations.' 7  As pointed out by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the Douglas Aircraft case, "Neither the Garner nor the Weber
case dealt specifically with an act declared by Congress to be an unfair
labor practice, and by a State law authorized by Congress, also defined
as unlawful."'I s
The question presented in the Farnsworth case was whether section
14(b), in effect, ceded to state courts jurisdiction to enjoin the union's
peaceful picketing on an interstate employer's complaint that state
"Right-to-Work" laws are being violated even though such picketing con-
stitutes either protected activity under sections 7 and 13, or an unfair
labor practice under section 8 of the NLRA.' 9 The Court, by answering
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955).14 "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
' 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
16348 U.S. 468 (1955).
17 Even if the unlawful conduct is such as to subject it to the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, the state may still act under its police power to prevent violence or
mass picketing, Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942), and it may act through an ad-
ministrative body regulating labor-management relations, United Automobile Work-
ers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). However, any
injunction must be aimed at the violence or mass picketing complained of and to
the extent that an injunction prohibits all other picketing it enters the pre-empted
domain of the NLRB. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).18247 N.C. at 630, 101 S.E.2d at 808.
19 See 25 U.S.L. WFxzl 3309 (U.S. April 23, 1957) (No. 891).
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this question in the negative, merely indicated that where conduct violates
a provision of the NLRA the state court is without jurisdiction even
though a state labor policy is involved. This result seems completely in
harmony with and goes no further than the results in the Garner and
Weber cases. The decision did not in itself hold that picketing in viola-
tion or attempted violation of a "Right-to-Work" law would necessarily
constitute an unfair labor practice.20
Prior to the decision in the Farn-worth case, the decisions of the
various state courts were in conflict as to whether a state court could
enjoin picketing which it determined to be in violation of a state's
"Right-to-Work" law.2 ' In many of the cases upholding the authority
of the state courts, the question of interstate commerce was not raised
or the parties were obviously not engaged in interstate commerce and
therefore no question of pre-emption was present.22 Typically in these
0 For examples of areas where the state may exercise jurisdiction even if the
employer is in interstate commerce, see Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1948). The Court held that since
Wisconsin could deny the use of the union shop under the NLRA, it could impose
a less severe restriction such as requiring a two-thirds vote of the employees to
validate a maintenance of membership agreement. Wisconsin thus had jurisdiction
in a damage suit for discharge in violation of the state law regulating union-
security agreements. See also Local 232, Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), where the Court held that in-
termittent work stoppages and slowdowns were conduct neither prohibited nor
protected by the NLRA and subject to the jurisdiction of a state labor board.
2" State court held to have jurisdiction, International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL
v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954) (injunction against
peaceful picketing to obtain a closed shop agreement); Mascari v. Local 667,
Teamsters Union, AFL, 187 Tenn. 345, 215 S.W.2d 779 (1948) (injunction against
recognized union on strike to secure a union-security clause as part of a collective
bargaining agreement). Exclusive jurisdiction held to be in NLRB, Leiter Mfg.
Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL, 269 S.W.2d 409(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (injunction against discharge of employees because of union
membership) ; Texas Constr. Co. v. Local 101, Hoisting and Portable Engineers
Union, AFL, 178 Kan. 422, 286 P.2d 160 (1955) (injunction against picketing by
stranger union t6 compel employer to recognize union).
" In Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, AFL v. Graham, 345
U.S. 192 (1953), a labor union picketed a general contractor for the purpose (as
found by the Virginia court) of inducing the contractor to break contracts with
any of his subcontractors who did not employ all union labor. The Court did not
discuss the question of jurisdiction. The Court upheld an injunction issued by the
Virginia court on the ground that there was no undue restraint of freedom of
speech when the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. The dissenting justice
would have remanded the case for a specific finding of fact, stating, "The difficulty
here is that we have no finding of fact. We have only the recitation in the decree
that the picketing conflicted with the Virginia statute." Id. at 202-03. Apparently
the dissenter felt that if the Court was to allow the state to enjoin picketing in
violation of the Virginia statute, the decree should be limited to that purpose and
should not restrain picketing indiscriminately. See Schlossberg, Current Trends
in Labor Law it Virginia, 42 VA. L. Rv. 691, 696 (1956), where the author,
in discussing the Graham case, said, "While the work in question seems to have
been of such a nature as to have had an effect on interstate commerce, it is
significant that counsel for the union did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, nor
did counsel for the NLRB take part in the appeal." Since this case was decided
before the Garner case, it is doubtful if the same result would be reached if it
arose again.
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cases, the picketing was instigated by non-employees and the facts found
indicated that the majority of the employees of the picketed employer
were either opposed to any unionization in general or to unionization by
the union causing the picketing. The findings of fact led to the reason-
able implication that often the primary purpose of the picketing was not
to "educate" the employees but to compel the employer to recognize
the union with or without the consent. of his employees. In similar
cases, where the parties would have been affecting interstate commerce
so as to be under the jurisdiction of the NLRB if an unfair labor practice
were committed, state courts have often determined they had power
to enjoin the picketing. The courts seemed to reach their conclusion
by overlooking the immediate purpose of the picketing. Thus the
courts would look to the ultimate purpose of securing a union shop or
similar union-security agreement, which is not necessarily violative of
the NLRA, and would not sufficiently consider the immediate purpose
of the picketing to compel an employer to recognize the union and
coerce his employees into membership against their wishes, which under
section 8(b) (2)23 constitutes an unfair labor practice subject to the
jurisdiction of the NLRB.24
North Carolina would seem to be among those states which prior
to the Farnsworth case would have determined that the state court had
jurisdiction to enjoin picketing in a situation similar to that presented
2"National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1952).
24 While the Farn,sworth case indicates the Court is continuing to limit the
scope of state jurisdiction in the pre-emption field, the Court at the same time is
apparently giving the states greater freedom in regulating picketing where the
conduct does not affect interstate commerce so as to be subject to the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. Since Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), which held *a
state ban on picketing invalid as denying the right of free dissemination of in-
formation guaranteed under the Constitution, and AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941), where the Court said that organizational picketing per se could not be
enjoined, the Court has narrowed the scope of protected picketing activity by ex-
panding the unlawful purpose doctrine of Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949). In Local 695, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284
(1957), the Court upheld a state injunction against picketing that was conducted
by one or two pickets with no evidence of violence or intimidation, stating, "[T]he
circumstances set forth in the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court afford
a rational basis for the inference it drew concerning the purpose of the picketing."
Id. at 295. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the Vogt case was another
in a series of cases where "the state court's characterization of the picketers' 'pur-
pose' had been made well-nigh conclusive." Id. at 296. See Stern, Enioinable
Organizational Picketinq, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 12 (1957), where the author refers to
the Vogt case as providing a constitutionally protected "non-right" to stranger
picket for organizational purposes. See also Smoot, Stranger Picketing: Permanent
Injunction or Permanent Litigation, 42 A.B.A.J. 817 (1956). Some of the possible
ramifications of the Voot case are indicated by Daugherty v. Commonwealth,
100 S.E.2d 754 (Va. 1957), where the Virginia Supreme Court approved a statute
that prohibited all picketing by non-employees. The court further said there was
no question of pre-emption because the NLRA is limited to disputes between
employees and their employers.
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in the Douglas Aircraft case. In J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Local 755,
International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL25 the factual situation
was similar to that in the Douglas Aircraft case. The plaintiff con-
struction company alleged that the purpose of the picketing was to
coerce the plaintiff into compelling his subcontractors to hire only union
labor. The defendant union demurred to the jurisdiction of the court on
the basis that the conduct complained of would, if true, constitute an
unfair labor practice over which the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction
and filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint. The
demurrer was overruled and the restraining order continued, from which
the union appealed. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
order of the trial court without determining the question of jurisdiction.
The court said that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter was made as a demurrer and that in such a plea, the lack
of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint and may not be
raised by extrinsic facts. Since the complaint did not indicate whether
or not the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce, the alleged lack
of jurisdiction did not appear on the face of the complaint. The trial
judge, after continuing the restraining order, found the facts on which
the order was based at the request of the defendant. One of the
facts found, which plaintiff admitted, was that the dollar volume of
out-of-state purchases made by the plaintiff was in excess of the mini-
mum volume required by the NLRB before it will exercise jurisdiction.26
While deciding the Jones Construction case on the pleadings point,
it would seem doubtful in the light of the conceded volume of plaintiff's
interstate business found by the trial judge whether the court would have
allowed the injunction to stand on the pleadings point unless it thought
there was a reasonable basis to sustain jurisdiction of the state court,
even if the facts alleged in the complaint showed the plaintiff to be in
interstate commerce. 27  In the Douglas Aircraft case there were no
25 246 N.C. 48, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
" See 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 2-5 (1955). The NLRB will decline jurisdiction
unless the business of the employer involved affects interstate commerce in an
amount equal to or greater than specified minimum amounts. An employer who
does not meet the minimum requirements of the NLRB may still be subject to itsjurisdiction even though it declines to exercise it. The no man's land created by
the Guss case (see note 50 infra) would not be involved in the Jones Construction
case since the facts admitted by the employer show his business to be of such a
volume as to meet the NLRB's jurisdictional requirements.
-" The court in overruling the demurrer referred to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127
(1953), which provides: "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it
appears upon the face thereof . . . that: (1) The court has no jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant, or of the subject of the action . .. ." The court then
discussed Southerland v. Harrell, 204 N.C. 675, 169 S.E. 423 (1933), where a
demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter in a wrongful
death action was overruled on the ground that the complaint on its face did not
indicate the defendants regularly employed more than five employees so as to give
the Industrial Commission jurisdiction. This rule, while a proper procedural device
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allegations that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce,28 and
the trial court treated the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a
demurrer. It is difficult to distinguish the cases on any basis other than
that the court in the Douglas Aircraft case had the Farnsworth case
before it.2
How far then is the state's jurisdiction over injunctive enforcement
of "Right-to-Work" legislation limited by the Farnsworth case? As
a possible indication that it was not wholly in sympathy with what it de-
termined to be the United States Supreme Court's expression of con-
gressional intent in Farnsworth, the court in the Douglas Aircraft case
said, "Congress has... said the states might... outlaw union or closed
shop agreements . . . ,"0 and questioned whether Congress intended "to
deny to a state a power to enforce a law which it permitted that state
to enact?"31 In answer to its own question as to congressional intent
in enacting section 14(b) of the NLRA, the court said the NLRB "has
no authority to enforce the laws of North Carolina even though the laws
are enacted pursuant to congressional authority .... It seems patent
to us that Congress did not intend to authorize a state to enact a
statute and at the same moment prohibit it from enforcing the statute."
8 2
in. the ordinary civil action, seems rather a harsh one where the court is giving
equitable relief in the stringent form of an injunction granted well before final
hearing on the merits. The Southerland case was a wrongful death action and no
preliminary relief affecting the interests and rights of the parties was being
granted. The application of such a rule to the granting of a temporary injunction
as in the Jones Comtruction case, where the court had the relevant and conceded
jurisdictional facts before it, affects substantial interests of the parties. It is
questionable in the light of the Douglas Aircraft case whether the court would have
applied a technical procedural rule to the granting of an equitable remedy unless
it felt at the time that the court would have had jurisdiction even if the facts
outside the complaint were taken into account.
2s The only factual difference that might have been made between the two
cases is that in the Douglas Aircraft case the plaintiff had contracts with the
United States and the complaint so alleged. This fact alone, however, would not
seem to be sufficient to determine that the Douglas Aircraft Company was subject
to the jurisdiction of the NLRB from the face of the complaint.
" The only procedural difference between the Douglas Aircraft case and the
Jones Construction case that appears from the reports is that in the former the
trial court made the findings of fact before the order was made, and in the latter
the court made the appropriate finding of fact on motion of the defendant after
the order was made. In neither case were the jurisdictional facts disputed.
30 247 N.C. at 628, 101 S.E.2d at 806.
31 Ibid.
39247 N.C. at 628-29, 101 S.E.2d at 807. The Supreme Court of Kansas, de-
ciding a similar case atising after Farnsworth, expresses an attitude similar to
that of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Douglas Aircraft case. In
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Local 795, Teamsters Union, AFL, 317 P.Zd 349 (Kansas
1957), the plaintiff argued that § 14(b) of the NLRA granted the states power
to prohibit compulsory union agreements and that "as a necessary incident to the
full exercise of that power, states may enjoin conduct directed toward the illegal
execution . . . of such agreements in violation of state law." Id. at 359. The
Kansas Supreme Court said, "It would appear there is substantial merit in plaintiff's
assertion were it not for the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in ... International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A.F. of L. v. Farnsworth
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In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.3 3 the United
States Supreme Court said, "To the extent that Congress prescribed
preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner]
recognized the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same
end."'34  The Farnsworth case does not enlarge the Garner case but
rather clarifies it by implication. If a union is picketing an employer
to induce him to coerce his employees into joining the union, or to com-
pel him to recognize the union when it does not in fact represent a
majority of his employees, or some other purpose unlawful under the
NLRA, the state court may not assume jurisdiction because it finds
the additional unlawful purpose of violating a state law outlawing or
restricting union-security agreements.
The NLRA only permits union-security agreements3 5 where a labor
organization is the representative designated for collective bargaining
purposes by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit 6 and
where the affidavits and reports required by the act 37 have been filed.
The NLRA further provides that such union-security agreements, even
when valid under federal law, are not valid where they are prohibited
by state law.38  Thus, conduct subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB
which also frequently has a purpose in violation of a state "Right-to-
Work" law would be:
(1) Picketing to coerce employees to join a union, which is a viola-
tion of section 8(b) (1) as an attempt "to restrain or coerce ... em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 .
and Chambers Co...
"The opinions above referred to . . .require us to hold that a district court
lacks jurisdiction to enjoin conduct of a labor union directed toward the ultimate
purpose of compelling an employer engaged in interstate commerce to enter into
an all union agreement .... " Id. at 359-60. One justice in a concurring opinion,
questioning the soundness of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
legislative intent, said, "It is an unwarranted conclusion, denying the effect of§ 14(b), which permits the states to regulate or prohibit on the one hand, and
denies enforcement of such regulations or prohibitions on the other ....
". ...In this area the state acts under the auspices of federal power, and
not, as in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch . . . and in Garner . . . by attempting to pit
state jurisdiction against federal pre-empted jurisdiction." Id. at 363-64.
's347 U.S. 656 (1954). 3Id. at 665.
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
"Id., 9(a), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
'1Id., § 9(g), (h), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(g), (h)
(1952).
"Id., § 14(b), 61 STAT. 151 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
"Id., § 8(b)(1), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)
(1952). In Teamsters Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 33 (1957), the Board said there
was nothing in the language of § 8(b) (1) (A) that limited the words "coerce or
restrain" to direct application of pressure by a union on employees. The diminution
of the employee's financial security is not less damaging because it is achieved
indirectly by a preceding curtailment of the employer's business. See also Stacey v.
Pappas, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
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(2) Picketing to compel the employer (a) to coerce his employees
into union membership, or (b) to sign a union-security agreement with
a union that does not qualify as authorized to enter into such an agree-
ment under section 8(a) (3). This is a violation of section 8(b) (2) in
that it is an attempt "to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection[8] (a) (3) ... ._,,40
(3) Picketing one employer to induce his employees to refuse to
handle goods or perform services where the purpose is to compel a second
employer to recognize a union that does not represent his employees, a
violation of section 8(b) (4) (B) .41
After eliminating all the picketing that would amount to an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA, a meager area, if any, is left to state
jurisdiction. Assume a case where the picketing is for the purpose of
compelling an employer to sign a union-security agreement and the
union is the designated representative of a majority of the employees
and has otherwise complied with the NLRA.42  If the state where the
picketing takes place has legislation prohibiting union-security agree-
ments or permitting them only under certain conditions or within certain
limits, it is conceivable that under the Farnsworth case the picketing
might validly be enjoined by the state court since there is no specific
provision in section 8 of the NLRA making such conduct an unfair labor
practice. As the United States Supreme Court said in Local 232,
Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,43
there may be conduct that is "neither forbidden by federal statute nor
legalized and approved thereby."44
The state is not powerless to effectuate legislation invalidating union-
security agreements. As the court said in the Douglas Aircraft case,
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (2), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952). Picketing to compel an unlawful union-security
contract is a violation of § 8(b) (2). Medford Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council,
96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951). In Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 133 (1957), a union coerced a contractor into removing from a project
a subcontractor whose employees were members of a different union. The Board
said the prime contractor's succumbing to the union demands constituted a violation
of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) even though no employer-employee relationship existed
between the prime contractor and the employees of a subcontractor.
"'National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (B), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1952). This section makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to induce conduct by the employees of any
employer "where an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any other employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of Section 159 . . . ." In the Douglas Aircraft
case the North Carolina Supreme Court apparently determined that § 8(b) (4) (B)
had been violated rather than § 8(b) (2).
See notes 35-37 supra.




"Restraining orders are not the only remedies available to control
obedience to a valid statute. Criminal process and tort actions for
damages are also ... used for this purpose." 45 As the Laburnum case
points out, a state is not prohibited from providing a remedy for un-
lawful conduct. It is only when the state remedy duplicates the federal
remedy for the same conduct that the state remedy must give way. In
North Carolina, under the "Right-to-Work" law, a union-security agree-
ment is void and unenforceable. 46 A violation of the law is punishable
as a misdemeanor. 47  A person denied employment in violation of the
law has a cause of action for damages sustained by the denial of em-
ployment.
48
The problem of federal-state relations in labor disputes threatens
to be a continuing one. This Note has dealt with only one aspect of the
problem. State court injunctions against picketing have posed a dilemma
for the enjoined party who feels that the state court has acted errone-
ously and that a more favorable result would be available if the NLRB
had assumed jurisdiction. However, even if the enjoined party has a
valid argument that his conduct should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, there is no practical way at present to have the question
determined except by appealing through the state courts to the United
States Supreme Court.49  Often the issues are moot by the time of
final adjudication and even if decided in favor of the enjoined party
he will have nothing but a paper right, the purpose of the injunction
having been long since accomplished. On the other hand, if the
conduct is wrongful, as alleged, irreparable damage may be done to an
employer's business unless prompt relief is available. Picketing resulting
in a secondary boycott can sometimes drive a small employer out of
business while he is waiting for the NLRB to determine his rights, and
the state courts have often provided the only source of prompt relief.50
247 N.C. at 629, 101 S.E.2d at 807.
'
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-79 (1950), In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C.
395, 57 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
'
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-78 (1950), State v. Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d
858 (1947).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. J 95-83 (1950).
"In Capitol Service v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Court held that the
NLRB could request a federal court to enjoin a state injunction where the NLRB
deemed it necessary to protect its jurisdiction. But in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court held that while
the NLRB is authorized to apply to a district court for injunctive relief in certain
circumstances, this does not authorize private litigants to apply for such relief.
Since the NLRB will not assume jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice until
a complaint has been filed, a labor organization whose conduct has been enjoined
by a state court has no procedural method of getting the NLRB to exercise its
jurisdiction.
" Since the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957),
and companion cases, many a small business is left not only without an efficient
remedy against wrongful conduct by a labor union but without any remedy at all.
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Continued litigation in the courts apparently will prove a fruitless
method of solving the problem areas of the federal-state jurisdictional
question. The United States Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd.51 has indicated it will not step in to fill the no-man's land
left in the NLRA by the Congress. The ultimate solution will be for
Congress to express its intent as to the proper bounds of the NLRB's
jurisdiction.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
Liens-Mechanic's Liens-Acquisition and Priorities-Effect of
Regaining Possession
Since Johnson v. Yates' it has been the rule in North Carolina that
a mortgagor in possession with the consent of the mortgagee may subject
a mortgaged automobile to a mechanic's lien which will take priority
over the chattel mortgagee's interest. In that case it was decided that
the statutory term, "owner or legal possessor,"'2 included such a mort-
gagor, in whom the law implied authority from the mortgagee to con-
tract for necessary and reasonable repairs.
In Barbre-Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson,8 the chattel mortgagor
of an automobile left it with a mechanic under a contract for repairs at
a stated price. After the major portion of the work was completed, the
mechanic relinquished possession to the mortgagor with the understand-
ing that the automobile was to be returned for completion of repairs.
The automobile was subsequently returned and the repairs completed.
While it was in the shop for these latter repairs the mortgagor defaulted
In the Guss case the Court held that if a dispute affected interstate commerce so
as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the states were precluded from
acting even where the NLRB had announced in advance that it would decline
jurisdiction unless certain specified amounts of interstate commerce were involved.
See note 26 supra.
rx 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). "We are told . . . that to deny the State juris-
diction here will create a vast no-man's-land, subject to regulation by no agency
or court. We are told . . . that to grant jurisdiction would produce confusion and
conflicts with federal policy .... [B]oth may be right. We believe, however, that
Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress' power
in the area of commerce among the states is plenary, its judgment must be respected
whatever policy objections there may be to creation of a non-man's-land. Congress
is free to change the situation at will." See Henderson, The "No Man's" Land
Betweeit State and Federal Jurisdiction, 8 LAB. L.J. 587 (1957).
1183 N.C. 24, 110 S.E. 603 (1922).
I N.C. GEx. STAT. § 44-2 (1949). "Any mechanic or artisan who makes,
alters or repairs any article of personal property at the request of the owner or
legal possessor of such property has a lien on such property so made, altered or
repaired for his just and reasonable charge for his work done and material
furnished, and may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and
reasonable charges are paid ... " This statute further provides for enforcement
by sale.
247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E2d 381 (1957).
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and the mortgagee brought an action to recover it. The mechanic at-
tempted to assert a lien for the entire amount of the repairs. The
court held that by voluntarily surrendering the automobile, the mechanic
lost his lien for all work done prior to his subsequent reacquisition of
possession even though all repairs were made under one contract.
4
While the decisions following the common law tend to give the
artisan's possessory lien priority over a chattel mortgagee's interest,5
in some states, by express statutory provision, a duly recorded chattel
mortgage has priority over a later lien for repairs.e
In jurisdictions where the mechanic's lien prevails, if it is a lien
depending upon possession, it is lost when possession is lost.7 "At
common law, a lien (of this general description) is a right to retain.
Retention necessarily connotes possession. A lien depends upon an un-
interrupted possession, and is lost or waived when possession is vol-
untarily surrendered .... ,,8 The North Carolina statute providing for
a mechanic's lien9 has been construed as affirming the common law
rights with the addition of a remedy in the form of foreclosure by sale.10
As the court indicated in the principal case, there is a split of
authority as to whether a mechanic's lien is reacquired when possession
is regained." In Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co.12 the mechanic un-
lawfully retook possession of the automobile and then tried to assert his
"A lien is a right to hold goods until the payment of a debt due thereon. Any
agreement, therefore, which contemplates that the goods of the debtor are to be
delivered to him before the time of payment arises is inconsistent with and de-
structive of the lien in question." BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 110 (2d ed.
1955).
"Blackard v. City Natl Bank, 142 F. Supp. 753 (D. Alaska 1956); Annot.,
36 A.L.R.2d 198 (1954) (conditional sales); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 229 (1954)
(chattel mortgages).0 Ky. REV. STAT. § 382.610(4) (1953). "The mortgage provided for in this
section shall be a valid lien on the property therein described and conveyed and
-from the recording thereof shall be superior to the rights of all creditors of the
mortgagor and all subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, lienors and encumbrancers,
except the landlord's liens provided for in KRS 383.070 and 383.110." LA. REv.
STAT. § 9:4501 (1951) provides for a repairman's lien and then says, "This priv-
ilege has no effect against a vendor's privilege, a chattel mortgage previously re-
corded . . . ." S.D. CODE OF 1939 c. 39.0802 provides: "Such lien on personal
property shall be subject only to liens, mortgages, and conditional sales contracts
properly filed on or before the time that the property comes into the possession of
the lien claimant."T Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E. 461
(1929).
'Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co., 201 App. Div. 283, 194 N.Y. Supp. 200,
202 (4th Dep't 1922) (dictum).
o See note 2 supra.
"0 Johnson v. Yates, 183 N.C. 24, 27, 110 S.E. 603, 604 (1922) ; McDougall v.
Crapon, 95 N.C. 292 (1886); Notes, 1 N.C.L. Rrv. 127 (1922), 23 N.C.L. REv.
357 (1945).11Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 198 (1954) (conditional sales); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d
229 (1954) (chattel mortgages) ; Notes, 15 IND. L.J. 573 (1940), 26 TuL. L. REv.
258 (1951), 16 U. DEr. L.J. 202 (1953).1'201 App. Div. 283, 194 N.Y. Supp. 200 (4th Dept 1922).
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lien under a statute providing that the mechanic "may detain such motor
vehicle... at any time it may be lawfully in his possession .... ,"1 3 The
court held that by unlawfully retaking the automobile, the mechanic was
not within the provisions of the statute and the chattel mortgagee pre-
vailed. It was indicated, however, that had the retaking been lawful, the
mechanic's lien would have attached and prevailed. Commercial Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Hislop Garage Co.14 involved a fact situation similar
to that in the principal case. In this case, a conditional vendor brought
an action of replevin against a mechanic who had reacquired posses-
gion and claimed, under a single contract, a lien for repairs made both
before release to the conditional vendee and after the return of the auto-
mobile to the mechanic. The court held that the agreement to bring
the automobile back (with subsequent reacquisition) gave the mechanic
sufficient possession to preserve his lien. In Gordon v. Sullivan,16
under a single contract for repairs, the automobile was released to the
conditional vendee on his agreement to return it for completion of
repairs. It was then taken by the vendee to another garage and stored.
The mechanic, claiming authority from the vendee, paid the storage bill
and retook possession. The trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee brought
an action against the mechanic to recover possession of the automobile.
Under a statute providing that mechanics "may detain such motor
vehicles at any time they may have lawful possession thereof,"' the
court held that the mechanic's lien prevailed. "While a garage keeper's
lien partakes of the nature of a possessory lien because possession is
essential to its enforcement, it differs from the common law lien in that
its existence does not depend upon continuance of possession." 1
The court in Johnson v. Yates, in order to show that the mechanic's
possessory lien for repairs is an exception to the general rule that a lien
prior in time is prior in right,'8 placed great weight on an implied
"
8 N.Y. LiEN LAW § 184 (Supp. 1957). "A person keeping a garage . . .or
place for the ... repair of motor vehicles ... and who in connection therewith ...
repairs any motor vehicle .. .at the request or with the consent of the owner,
whether such owner be a conditional vendee or a mortgagor remaining in possession
or otherwise; has a lien upon such motor vehicle ... for the sum due ... and may
detain such motor vehicle ... at any time it may be lawfully in his possession until
such sum is paid, except that if the lienor, subsequent to thirty days from the
accrual of such lien, allows the motor vehicle . . . out of his actual possession the
lien provided for in this section shall thereupon become void as against all condi-
tional sales agreements or mortgages . .. executed prior to the accrual of such
lien .... "
1489 N.H. 45, 192 Atl. 627 (1937). 15 188 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
X D.C. CoDE § 38-201 (1951). "Garage keepers shall also have a lien for
their charges for storage, repairs ... when such charges are incurred by an owner
or conditional vendee of such motor vehicles, and may detain such motor vehicles at
any time they may have lawful possession thereof . . .17188 F.2d at 981.
18 United Tire & Investment Co. v. Maxwell, 202 Okla. 476, 215 P.2d 541
(1950) ; 33 Am. Jut., Liens § 33 (1941) ; 53 C.J.S., Liens § 10(b) (1948).
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authority from the mortgagee to the mortgagor to subject the automobile
to a mechanic's lien for all necessary and reasonable repairs. In the
principal case, the court did not mention the point that the repairs must
be necessary and reasonable, but if they were not, the priority of the lien
over the mortgage might be disallowed for this reason. 19
JEAN M. LucK
Military Law-Illegality of Orders
Under the Uniform Code of Military justice disobedience of an order
is punishable only if the order is legal.- Illegality, whenever found,
voids the order.2 This Note is intended to illustrate some of the con-
troversies that have arisen in this area.
Disobedience of an order which is palpably illegal on its face, such
as an order to commit murder or larceny, would not subject one to
punishment.3 Indeed, compliance with a palpably illegal order cannot
usually be justified; and in a trial by court-martial or a suit in damages
for an act done in obedience, the order will be admissible only in mitiga-
tion of the offense.4 However, an order not palpably illegal on its face
is usually presumed to be legal, and the risk of disobedience is the
personal responsibility of the recipient of the order.5
1 This question has received considerable attention in Indiana. See Campa
v. Consolidated Finance Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289 (1953) (could not
show necessity of repairs so as to raise implied consent of conditional sales vendor,
vendor won over repairman); Personal Finance Co. v. Fecknoe, 216 Ind. 330, 24
N.E.2d 694 (1940) (could not show necessity of repairs, mortgagee won over
repairman) ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 206 Ind. 296, 187 N.E. 382 (1933)
(repairman won over mortgagee). In the latter case the court said, "The repairs
for which the lien will be enforced must be necessary and add to the value of the
property; ... unless they are clearly beyond this requirement.. ." the mechanic's
lien will prevail. Id. at 302, 187 N.E. at 384.
'Article 90, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (Supp. IV,
1957).
"Any person subject to this code who-
"(2)willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer;
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at
any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may
direct."
Article 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (Supp. IV, 1957),
provides that any warrant officer or enlisted person who willfully disobeys the
lawful order of one senior to him shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (Supp. IV, 1957),
provides that any person subject to the Code who violates or fails to obey any
lawful general order or regulation shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
- AviNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 207 (1957).
'1 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 575 (2d ed. 1920).
'Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 266 (1878); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S.
(5 Otto) 204 (1877); United States v. Kinder 14 C.M.R. 742 (1954); State
v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627 (1864).
'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 169b. See United
States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953) ; United States v. Trani,
1 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952); United States v. Reese, 7 C.M.R. 292
(1953).
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In the recent case of United States v. Milldebrandt the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals was confronted with the problem of legality of orders
under article 90 of the Uniform Code. 7 In this case an enlisted man was
granted a leave in order to permit him to obtain civilian employment
and to clear up personal financial problems. The leave was conditioned
upon his making weekly progress reports of his financial condition to
the officer who authorized the leave. Upon failure to submit the ordered
reports, the leave was revoked. When he returned to his station he
was charged with willful disobedience of the order. The court held
this order to be illegal on the ground that it was too broad. The
court pointed out that under such an order a person might be prosecuted
for failure to disclose information of a confidential or incriminating
nature. Such orders, said the court, must be specific, definite, and
certain as to the information to be supplied so that they can be measured
for illegality. Otherwise, the only penalty that may be imposed for
disobedience is revocation of the leave.
A second question presented in the Milldebrandt case was whether
such an order had to be complied with during a period of authorized
leave. This question was before the court as a matter of first im-
pression. Judge Latimer concluded that when an enlisted man is on
leave, he should not be subject to orders requiring him to perform
strictly military duties unless such performance is compelled by the
presence of some grave danger or unusual circumstance. Judge Fergu-
son and Chief Judge Quinn concurred only in the result, the former
without opinion. The Chief Judge stated, without discussion, that he
had serious doubts about the validity of the implications of the opinion
as to military personnel on leave.8 As the case could have been decided
on the first point and two judges concurred in the result only, the
decision is not clear-cut as to military jurisdiction over personnel on
authorized leave.
An order given solely for the purpose of inflicting unauthorized
punishment is illegal. Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military
JusticeP is the only authority for imposing punishment without a trial.
Frequently it is contended that certain orders are an attempt to inflict
punishment without giving the recipient the benefits of article 15. It
is clear that a valid order to perform training can be given without pro-
ceeding under this article. The difficulty arises in determining whether
an order is for the purpose of inflicting punishment or for training pur-
poses.
8 8 U.S.C.M.A. 635, 25 C.M.R. 139 (1958).
" 10 U.S.C. § 890 (Supp. IV, 1957). See note 1 supra.8 8 U.S.C.M.A. at 639, 25 C.M.R. at -
'10 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. IV, 1957) (Formerly 64 STAT. 112 (1950), 50 U.S.C.§ 571 (1952).
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In United States v. Trani' a prisoner was ordered to perform close
order drill during normal duty hours until he "shaped up and got a
little better discipline [and] better control of himself."' 1 The Court of
Military Appeals was not convinced that the ordered drill was for
punishment purposes. The court said it did not wish to substitute its
judgment for that reasonably exercised by an officer in command of
personnel. However, the court pointed out that it would not hesitate to
declare unlawful the punitive use of close order drill or any other
military duty.
The result was different in United States v. Roadcloud,'2 where a
prisoner was ordered to drill at 10:30 p.m. because he had been dis-
obedient and uncooperativre. This drill was conducted when other
prisoners were not at work. The order was held to be punitive and
unlawful as there did not appear to be any fair and reasonable relation-
ship between the drill and rectification of any of the accused's deficiencies.
In United States v. Reeves's an enlisted man was "gigged" at
an inspection and placed on detail by his first sergeant. A noncom-
missioned officer in charge of the detail ordered him to mow the grass
in the company area. The order was held illegal as being fatigue duty
assigned as punishment and not classifiable as training or exercise.
It was also pointed out that only officers are authorized to administer
company punishment. Illegality has also been found in an order to
clean the barracks at 4:00 p.m. on Saturday,' 4 an order to take a para-
chute from room to room and put it down in the proper manner an-
nouncing to all present that this was the proper method of handling it,15
and an order for a one-day absentee to spend the night of his return
in a guarded cell. 16
As the foregoing cases indicate, it is often difficult to determine when
punishment is being inflicted. Changing a "K.P." or duty roster in
order to put a special burden on a man who has previously been in
trouble, or giving a reprimand because of acts which are a clear violation
of the Uniform Code would look Suspiciously like punishment. But
what if the commanding officer directs that these persons practice close
order drill during the week-end and claims that this special duty is im-
posed only to improve their efficiency?'7 The company commander
dearly has the authority to assign special training to improve efficiency.
10 1 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952).
11 Id. at 295, 3 C.M.R. at 27.126 C.M.R. 384 (1952).
'81 C.M.R. 619 (1951).
1'United States v. Robertson, 17 C.M.R. 684 (1954).15United States v. Raneri, 22 C.M.R. 694 (1956).
18 United States v. McCarthy, 23 C.M.R. 561 (1957).
1 7 EvEzETT, MILiTARY JusTiCE IN THE ARME FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
135 (1956).
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By taking this position, he has made difficult the burden of proving
illegality.
The question of whether or not an order is legal that requires a
serviceman to give evidence against himself has been very confusing.
The question must be determined under article 31(a) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 8 which provides that no person subject to
the Code shall compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer
any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. In
United States v. Eggers0 the court observed that Congress intended to
secure to persons subject to the Code the same rights against self-
incrimination secured to civilians under the fifth amendment.
Paragraph 150b of the Manual for Courts-Martial interprets the
prohibition of article 31(a) of the Code as being limited to compulsion
in obtaining verbal or other communications in which an individual
expresses his knowledge of the matter. According to this paragraph a
person may lawfully be ordered to try on clothing or shoes, to place
his feet in tracks, to make a sample of his handwriting, to utter words
for the purpose of voice identification, to submit to fingerprinting or
bloodtesting, or to expose his body for examination by the court or by a
physician who will testify to the result of his examination. However,
the court has disapproved some of these Manual provisions as being in
conflict with article 31(a). Thus, orders requiring a person to read
for voice,20 to give a sample of his handwriting,21 to print the alphabet,22
and to submit to a blood alcohol test2 have been held illegal.
The Armed Services have been plagued with narcotics cases, several
of which involve the legality of an order to the narcotic suspect to
furnish a urine sample and the subsequent use thereof as evidence against
him. In United States v. Williamson24 the court concluded that a
urine specimen obtained from the body of an unconscious suspect by
means of a catheter was admissible as evidence. In United States v.
Booker 5 it was held that a urine specimen obtained from a suspect
with his consent and full cooperation is admissible even though the
suspect had not been informed of the nature of the accusation and had
not been advised that he need not give the specimen. In United States
18 10 U.S.C. § 831 (Supp. IV, 1957) (Formerly 64 STAT. 118 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 602 (1952)).
193 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953).
2United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953).
2United States v. Eggers, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953).
"
2United States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953).28 United States v. Musquire, 23 C.M.R. 571 (1957) ; af'd, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 25
C.M.R. 329 (1958).244 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
254 U.S.C.M.A. 335, 15 C.M.R. 335 (1954). See also United States v. Barnaby,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 17 C.M.R. 63 (1954).
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v. Jones26 the specimen was held inadmissible because the sample was
taken by catheterization over the protest of the suspect after he had
tried but failed to comply with the order to furnish the urine sample.
After this decision the Services apparently felt that a direct order to
furnish a urine sample as evidence was illegal. They began following a
suggestion that, instead of an order to furnish a sample, the suspect
should be given an explicit order that, when next he urinates, he should
do so in a certain container. 27 This method was declared illegal in United
States v. Jordan.28 Thus it seems that all orders which require a per-
son to furnish a urine sample that will be used as evidence against him
are now illegal.
In United States v. Bayhand29 an order to the unsentenced prisoner
to stand in a muddy ditch and carry rocks with sentenced prisoners was
held to be illegal. The court, citing article 13 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,30 said a distinction must be made between unsentenced
and sentenced prisoners with respect to their treatment. The holding,
said the court, does not mean that unsentenced prisoners must remain
unemployed. They can be required to perform certain useful military
duties.31
In United States v. Zachery3 2 a six foot man disobeyed an order
to return to a six by six segregation cell after being permitted to leave it
temporarily. It was contended that this order was illegal under article 55
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,m which prohibits punishments
of a cruel or unusual nature. The court held that the cell was not so
small as to make confinement therein a violation of the article.
An order may also be unlawful because it does not relate to a military
duty. Orders which properly maintain discipline and insure efficient
discharge of the military mission are legal even though the prohibited
26 5 U.S.C.M.A. 537, 18 C.M.R. 161 (1955). See also, United States v. Speight,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 668, 18 C.M.R. 292 (1955).
" This suggestion was made particularly by Robinson 0. Everett, former Com-
missioner, United States Court of Military Appeals. See his book, MILITARY
JUSTIcE IN THE ARMAEn FORcES OF THE UNIT STATES 83 (1956).
"7 U.S.C.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957).
='6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 21 C.M.R. 84 (1956).
30 10 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. IV, 1957) (Formerly 64 STAT. 112 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
567 (1952)):
"Subject to section 857 of this title (article 57), no person while being held for
trial or the result of trial, may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than
arrest or confinement upon the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest
or confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances
require to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor punishment
during that period for infractions of discipline."
31 See also United States v. Hammond, 21 C.M.R. 422 (1956).
326 C.M.R. 833 (1952).
10 U.S.C. § 855 (Supp. IV, 1957) (Formerly 64 STAT. 126 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
636 (1952)).
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conduct is not criminal per se nor forbidden by law.84 But an order
which has as its sole objective the attainment of some private end,85 or
the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is
expected the accused may commit,8 6 is not lawful. 7
The order to be lawful must also be one which the superior officer is
authorized under the circumstances to give. This point has come up in
connection with orders that one expend his personal funds. In United
States v. GordonP it was held that a commanding officer had no right
to demand that an enlisted man expend his personal funds in moving
his personal belongings from his off post living quarters back to the post.
However, it was noted that an order to have a dirty uniform cleaned, to
get a needed haircut, and orders of a like nature would be legal even
though obedience required expenditure of persofial funds, provided com-
pliance did not depend on financial status. Orders tending to discourage
black market activities have been held to be legal even though they in-
volve limitations on the use of private property of a serviceman.8
An order is not authorized when the one to whom it has been given
is excused from such duty,40 or when such order is inconsistent with
an order previously given by a superior authority.41
It remains to be pointed out that even though the serviceman feels
that he is justified in refusing to obey an order, he should remember
that he is generally at a very considerable disadvantage. The presump-
tion generally will be in favor of the legality of the order and the reasons
upon which legality may hinge will often rest only in the possession
"United States v. Hill, 5 C.M.R. 665 (1952); United States v. Wilson, 4
C.M.R. 311 (1952).
r 10 U.S.C. § 3639, 8639 (Supp. IV, 1957) (Formerly REV. STAT. § 1232(1875), 10 U.S.C. § 608 (1953)). It is provided that no officer may use an enlisted
man as a servant.
United States v. Robinson, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 347, 20 C.M.R. 63 (1955), held that
Special Regulations 210-60-1, 7 December 1948, which permitted the use of enlisted
men in the officers' mess on a voluntary basis was not in conflict. The court said
that "servant" means one who labors or exerts himself for the personal benefit of
an officer. It was held here to be a benefit to the service rather than a benefit to
an officer personally. Judge Brossman, dissenting in this case, pointed out that
the enlisted man did not volunteer since he was offered the choice between service
in the officers' mess or being transferred to another and undisclosed military station.
" United States v. Stock, 2 C.M.R. 494 (1952). Here it was held unlawful to
give an enlisted man an order to go on "K.P." after the enlisted man had stated
to the officer giving the command that he would not go. But see United States v.
Buttrick, 18 C.M.R. 622 (1954), where an enlisted man had stated that he would
not salute an officer, because of his religious beliefs. An order to salute was held
lawful on the ground that the officer giving the order reasonably believed that the
enlisted man was attempting to bluff his way out of the impending overseas ship-
ment.
'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 169b.
83 C.M.R. 603 (1952).
"United States v. Martin, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 674, 5 C.M.R. 102 (1952); United
States v. Barnes, 12 C.M.R. 735 (1953).
o United States v. Whitaker, 5 C.M.R. 539 (1952).
"' United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
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of the superior who has given the order. It is usually safer and wiser
for the inferior to obey the order even though it is to his own detriment.
From the viewpoint of the Armed Services there could be no more
dangerous philosophy than that each serviceman should determine for
himself whether or not an order is legal, and then disobey it if, in his
judgment, the order is illegal.
RICHARD J. TUGGLE
Practice and Procedure-Pre-trial in North Carolina-The First
Eight Years
The information presented in this Note was obtained from the follow-
ing sources: communication by mail with the clerks of the superior court
in sixty-nine counties; communication by mail with the judge or re-
corder of twenty-one inferior courts possessing civil jurisdiction above
that of a justice of the peace; interviews with the clerk of the superior
court, a deputy or assistant clerk, or with a leading member of the bar
in twenty-two counties; communication by mail with all members of
the North Carolina Bar who submitted suggestions and criticism on pre-
trial to the Bar Association Committee on Improving and Expediting
the Administration of Justice; and communication by mail with nineteen
superior court judges. All opinions and conclusions contained herein
are a summary or digest of the ones gathered from these various sources.
The General Statutes require the clerk of the superior court to main-
tain a pre-trial docket." Yet a survey of the actual practice in the
various counties shows that, out of those contacted, fourteen maintain
such a docket, nine others have one that is never used, and fifty-four
do not even have a pre-trial docket. No information is available for
the remaining twenty-three counties. At the same time, it is clear that
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-169.1.-.6 (1953). For a digest of these provisions, see
A Survey of Statutory Changes it North Carolina in 1949, 27 N.C.L. REv. 405,
430-32 (1949). For comment on the early days of pre-trial in this state, see
Paschal, Pre-Trial inr North Carolina: The First Eight Months, 28 N.C.L. Rv.
375 (1950). For a detailed bibliography of material on pre-trial, see INSTIrUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN 2-U22, PRE-TRIAL RULES (Dec. 11,
1953). The most comprehensive general text available is Nims, PRE-TRIAL (1950).
For forms used in federal courts, see JoINER, TRIALS AND APPEALS 92 (1957). For
demonstrations of the pre-trial conference, see 11 F.R.D. 3 (1952). For other
material on pre-trial, including general discussions, forms, and demonstrations of
the conference, see the following: Kincaid, A Judge's Handbook of Pre-Tria Pro-
cedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955) (also prepared and distributed in pamphlet form
under the auspices of the Pre-Trial Committee, Section of Judicial Administration,
American Bar Association); Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure, 14 F.R.D. 417
(1954); SUPREME COURT OF NEWv JERSEY, MANUAL OF PRETRIAL PRACTICE (rev.
ed. 1955); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA MANUAL OF PRE-TRIAL
PROCEDURE (1956). A 16 mm. film entitled A Pre-Trial Conference, which demon-
strates an actual conference, is available for a rental fee of $4.75 plus postage from
the National Legal Audio-Visual Center, Indiana University School of Law,
Bloomington, Indiana.
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the absence of a separate docket is not the factor that limits the use of
pre-trial. Many clerks reported that at one time they had such a docket,
but that after several years of disuse it was abandoned. Over a third
of the clerks reporting indicated a procedure they used (or would use if
the opportunity presented itself) to handle pre-trial cases. Most of
these would place the case awaiting pre-trial on the civil issue docket.
Sixty superior court clerks reported the number of cases in which
the pre-trial hearing, as such, was used during the preceding year.2 Out
of this number, thirty-four (or fifty-six percent) did not have a single
case involving a pre-trial hearing within the year. Another eleven
counties (an additional eighteen percent) reported that they had from
one to five pre-trial cases. No county had over twenty cases.3
These figures speak for themselves. There is no widespread use of
pre-trial in North Carolina.
There are a few judges who consistently require pre-trial in all con-
tested civil litigation, but this number-small to start with-is steadily
decreasing. Several superior court judges stated that at one time they
had required pre-trial consistently, but that for one or more of the
reasons discussed below they havestopped this practice. Several clerks
in one district reported that a particular judge used to require pre-trial
frequently but that since he had left the district the practice had fallen
into disuse. There remain three or four judges whose names are
repeatedly connected with extensive and successful use of pre-trial.
A survey of the inferior courts exercising civil jurisdiction above
that of a justice of the peace shows that there are at least five such
courts that utilize the pre-trial powers given them under our statute.4 It
is reported that pre-trial has been very successful in some of these
courts; but since the problems involved in the inferior courts are not
the same as those encountered in the superior court, no details on the
procedure in these five courts will be considered here.
Answers touching the success of pre-trial when used vary greatly
according to the personal experiences of the person concerned, but the
general consensus of opinion is that very good results were usually
obtained. It is also interesting to note that the most favorable results
'This information was collected during the month of October 1957.
' The breakdown on these figures is as follows:
Number of Percent of
Pre-trial cases Counties counties reporting
0 34 56.7
1 to 5 11 18.4
6 to 10 7 11.6
11 to 15 6 10.0
16 to 20 2 3.3
Over 20 0 0
These figures include all of the larger counties.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-169.6 (1953).
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were reported by those who had used pre-trial-or had been connected
with its use-consistently over a period of time, rather than from those
who used it only occasionally.
The reasons given why pre-trial is not used more often seem to fall
into four general categories. Since opinions are so widely spread as to
the relative importance of each, there is no attempt here to attach to
one reason any more significance than to another.
Unfamilidrity and uncertainty. Most lawyers seem to be unfamiliar
with the procedure involved in pre-trial and uncertain as to the goals
to be sought. As a result the bar generally makes little or no effort to
push the use of pre-trial. Likewise, many judges are not sure how much
initiative they should take in requiring a hearing and they seem to be
unsure of their powers and duties when the hearing is held. judges
therefore generally do not encourage lawyers to use this procedure.
The result of this situation is that the bar waits for the bench to require
pre-trial, and the bench generally waits for the bar to request it.
Attitude. Some lawyers and judges simply do not want to change
the procedure they have been using for many years. This is not mere
unfamiliarity, but a "resentment" of new procedure and a "fear of
change." With this attitude present, it is clear that little can be ac-
complished by pre-trial. In addition, many lawyers do not want to give
up any chance of surprising their opponents and impressing the jury.
At the pre-trial conference, they will attempt to hold out information
and refuse to disclose their hands. They will concede nothing if they
can avoid doing so. Under the old idea that a trial is a game of wits
between counsel, they want to have as much to work with as possible
and therefore do not want to see anything settled prior to trial.
Lack of a satisfactory time for holding pre-trial. Pre-trial has
generally worked best when the conference could be held some two to
four weeks prior to trial, thus enabling counsel to prepare the case for
trial with the pre-trial order before him.5  This is nearly impossible
in most of the superior courts in this state under the present system.
In the small counties where only a few civil terms of court are held each
year, the conference must now either be held early in the term at which
the case is to be tried (whereby pre-trial loses much of its effectiveness
because there is insufficient time to take full advantage of its benefits)
or held at one term of court with a delay of four or six months before
trial can be had at the next civil term. Neither alternative is completely
satisfactory. Even in the larger counties where civil terms are held
frequently, the calendars are often so crowded that a long delay will
result after the case is put on the calendar before trial is had.0
' See note 1 supra for bibliography of materials on pre-trial.
N.C. GEN. 'STAT. § 1-169.1 (1953) provides that cases awaiting pre-trial shall
not be placed on the calendar until pre-trial is completed.
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At present, the first day of each civil term is the time designated
for pre-trial and other non-jury matters. 7 It has been the experience of
many of our judges that Monday is often needed to hear motions,
custody matters, and alimony citations made returnable before the judge
at that term. Thus there is little or no time for pre-trial on Monday,
and judges and lawyers find it understandably difficult to continue with
pre-trial conferences on Tuesday when there are other cases waiting for
trial.
Rotation of judges. Many proponents of pre-trial believe that the
same judge should hold the pre-trial conference and preside at the trial
of the case, since the trial judge is then familiar with all the issues and
facts of the case. This is virtually impossible with the rotation of
judges unless the pre-trial conference and trial of the case take place
during the same term of court. There are also some who think that
different judges should preside at pre-trial and at the trial of the case.
It is contended that lawyers would then be more inclined to admit weak-
nesses in their cases and would be more willing to make an honest effort
to settle. It seems clear that there are advantages in each system.
But aside from the advantages of having the same judge conduct
both the pre-trial and the trial, rotation of judges makes pre-trial more
difficult in another respect. Under our statute, the trial judge has the
final decision as to the effect to be given the pre-trial order, since it is
within his discretion to modify that order.8 Therefore, the judge con-
ducting the pre-trial hearing, not knowing in many cases which judge
will preside at the trial, has no assurance that full advantage will be
taken of his pre-trial labors. Such a situation is not likely to encourage
the use of pre-trial.
One superior court judge, when asked if he favored the use of pre-
trial, answered: "Qualifiedly yes, under our present system. Definitely
yes, if we should ever abolish rotation."
Many different ideas were proposed as means to get better results
from pre-trial. Those that were most often suggested or that seemed
to be most significant are put forth here.
Familiarization. One superior court judge stated frankly that "I
personally feel the need for instruction." Another suggested that it
would be most helpful if judges were furnished with a suggested "form"
to be used for the pre-trial order. Also, indications are that many mem-
bers of the bar need some guide to the procedure to be followed, out-
lining that which is expected of them. It is therefore submitted that a
brief guidebook on pre-trial in North Carolina for lawyers and judges,





Provide a time for holding pre-trial. There were many suggestions
that a special term of court be held at a stated interval prior to each
scheduled civil or mixed term. This special term would handle pre-
trial for all civil cases to be tried at the following regular term and
would also dispose of motions, custody proceedings, and all other mat-
ters not requiring a jury. Then at the regular term-three weeks or a
month later-the court could immediately begin trying cases which are
known to be ready for trial, thus expediting considerably the disposal of
cases during that term. Suggestions concerning which judge should
conduct this special term include: the same judge who is to hold the
regular term; the resident judge; a special judge who conducts only
non-jury terms; or any regular superior court judge to be assigned by
the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Of course, if
rotation of judges were ever abolished in this state, it would be much
easier to provide for a short non-jury term to precede regularly sched-
uled terms.
Make mandatory. Perhaps the most controversial question in the
field of pre-trial is whether or not it should be required in all contested
civil cases. There are some who say pre-trial is not necessary other than
in exceptional cases and that it would be a waste of time in all other
cases. To this argument the proponents of mandatory pre-trial answer
that it will save much time and expense in most cases, and in the
other cases little time will be required. A superior court judge stated:
"Actually it is not necessary in some cases, but unless required in all,
there is a tendency to say that it is not worthwhile in a particular case,
and thus pass over many."
It is also argued that most of the cases in our state courts involve
only small amounts, so that lawyers do not feel it necessary to have such
a conference prior to trial. To this argument another judge answered
that pre-trial "would be perfunctory in many cases, but it is impossible
to draw the line. Also, 'The littlest possums climb the highest trees.'
There is nothing like the $500 case to raise thorny legal problems."
Most of the lawyers and judges contacted agree with this statement.
Although several qualified their answers to be conditional upon the
solving of one or more of the problems raised above, most seemed to
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Property-Adverse Possession-Color of Title-Tax Foreclosure Deed
to Property Held by Tenants in Common
In Johnson v. McLamb1 the court reviewed the North Carolina law
with respect to deeds as color of title for purposes of adverse possession.
2
This case points out that in North Carolina any written instrument,
with one exception, is color of title which on its face professes to pass
a title but which fails to do so, either from want of title in the person
making it or from the defective mode of the conveyance employed.8
The only exception to the general rule set out above is that a deed
made by one tenant in common to the entire tract of land is not sufficient
to sever the unity of possession and does not constitute color of title as
against the cotenants.4 The registration of the deed in this case is held
'247 N.C. 534, 101 S.E.2d 311 (1958).
2 Adverse possession, to ripen into title within seven years, must be under color.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1953). Otherwise, a period of twenty years is required.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1953).
3247 N.C. at 536, 101 S.E.2d at 312; First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Parker, 235 N.C. 326, 69 S.E.2d 841 (1952) ; Lofton v. Barber, 226 N.C. 481, 39
S.E.2d 263 (1946) ; Perry v. Bassenger, 219 N.C. 838, 15 S.E.2d 365 (1941). The
topic of this Note is limited primarily to the question of whether or not a tax
foreclosure deed is good color of title as to the entire property where the fore-
closure proceeding was against only one of the cotenants. However, it should be
noted that there are certain requirements which must be met before any deed or
other instrument will be color of title against the nonparticipating cotenants, since
it is uniformly held that mere purchase of the undivided interest of one of the
cotenants does not amount to a disseisin of the other cotenants. In such a case,
the grantee is presumed merely to succeed to the title of his grantor. First, it is
required that the grantee take actual possession of the land purportedly conveyed
to him and that his acts be hostile to the rights of the other cotenants. Price v.
Whisnant, 232 N.C. 653, 62 S.E.2d 56 (1950) ; Lewis v. Covington, 130 N.C. 541,
41 S.E. 677 (1902). Second, notice, either actual or constructive, must be given
by the grantee to the cotenants of his adverse and hostile holding. In this respect,
North Carolina has said that ordinarily an unregistered deed is not color of title
as against parties claiming from the same source, except as between the original
parties. Eaton v. Doub, 190 N.C. 14, 128 S.E. 494 (1925). See also Justice v.
Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d 122 (1953) ; Janney v. Robbins, 141 N.C. 400,
53 S.E. 863 (1906) ; Austin v. Staten, 126 N.C. 783, 36 S.E. 338 (1900).
'247 N.C. at 536, 101 S.E.2d at 313. The theory of this exception is that the
grantee from one tenant in common takes only his share and "steps in his shoes,"
becoming a tenant in common in his stead; and that therefore it requires twenty
years adverse possession of the whole, under claim of ownership, to bar entry
by the other tenants in common. See also Cox v. Wright, 218 N.C. 342, 11
S.E.2d 158 (1940). North Carolina is the only state so holding. Other jurisdic-
tions hold that such a deed is color of title. See, e.g., Akley v. Basset, 189 Cal.
625, 209 Pac. 576 (1922) ; Cook v. Rochford, 60 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1952) ; Davis
v. Harnesberger, 211 Ga. 625, 87 S.E.2d 841 (1955) ; Whittington v. Cameron, 385
Ill. 99, 52 N.E.2d 134 (1943); Sams v. Sampson, 255 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1953);
Davis v. Gulf Ref. Co., 202 Miss. 281, 32 So. 2d 133 (1947), rehearing granted,
202 Miss. 808. 34 So. 2d 731 (1948); Stappenbeck v. Mather, 73 Misc. 434, 133
N.Y. Supp. 482 (County Ct. 1911) ; Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina,
353 Pa. 53, 44 A.2d 244 (1945) ; McIntosh v. Kolb, 112 S.C. 1, 99 S.E. 356 (1919) ;
Hood v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 532. 218 S.W.2d 71 (1948) ; Easterling v. William-
son. 279 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) ; Cochran v. Hiden, 130 Va. 123, 107




not to affect this exception.5 It has been the policy of the court, as
illustrated by the Johnson case, to confine the exception to this class of
cases.
In the Johnson case, there was a foreclosure sale to satisfy a judg-
ment lien obtained against a tenant in common for unpaid taxes assessed
against her interest in the property. The city secured the property
by bidding in at the foreclosure sale and executed a tax foreclosure deed,
which described the entire tract of land, to a stranger. Only the de-
faulting tenant was made a party to the foreclosure. The court held that
such a deed was color of title and that seven years adverse possession of
the entire tract, under claim of ownership, was sufficient to bar entry
by the other tenants in common who were not made parties to the pro-
ceedings.6
Another illustration of the policy to confine the exception is found
in a partition proceeding to sell land where less than the whole number
of tenants in common have been made parties. Here, too, a deed made
to a purchaser pursuant to an order of the court is color of title and
seven years adverse possession thereunder will -bar those tenants in
common who were not made parties and who were not under a dis-
ability.7
Although the policy of the court is clear, it may be useful to con-
sider other types of deeds in respect to color of title where the entire
tract of land is conveyed to a stranger s but not all of the tenants in com-
mon have joined in the conveyance or participated in the proceedings
from which the deed issues. North Carolina has not considered most
of these other types of deeds. There is a split of authority as to whether
or not a quitclaim deed purporting to convey the entire premises is color
of title where the grantor owned only an undivided portion, but there
was an entry and exclusive possession .by the grantee.9 The great ma-
'Bradford v. Bank of Warsaw, 182 N.C. 225, 108 S.E. 750 (1921); Hardee
v. Weathington, 130 N.C. 91, 40 S.E. 855 (1902).
'But cf. Bailey v. Howell, 209 N.C. 712, 184 S.E. 476 (1936), where it was
held that the title of tenants in common who are not made parties is not affected
by a tax foreclosure suit and commissioner's deed executed in pursuance thereof.
See also Howard v. Wactor, 41 So. 2d 259 (Miss. 1950), where one of the
cotenants purchased the tax title and then sold to a stranger and it was held that
the stranger became a cotenant
'Perry v. Bassenger, 219 N.C. 838, 15 S.E.2d 365 (1941) ; Roper Lumber Co.
v. Richmond Cedar Works, 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982 (1913) ; McCulloh v. Daniel,
102 N.C. 529, 9 S.E. 413 (1889).
' Somewhat different rules apply where one tenant in common is claiming title
to the whole as against his cotenants by adverse possession, or under color of
title where he purchased the land at some foreclosure or tax sale or from a stranger
to whom he had previously sold his interest. Williams v. Robertson, 235 N.C. 478,
70 S.E.2d 692 (1953); Ange v. Owens, 224 N.C. 514, 31 S.E.2d 521 (1944);
Winstead v. Wollard, 223 N.C. 814, 28 S.E.2d 507 (1944); Bailey v. Howell, 209
N.C. 712, 184 S.E. 476 (1936). The basic difference is in the presumption that
the cotenant is holding for the benefit of all of the cotenants.
' It was held color of title in the following cases: Cook v. Rochford, 60 So. 2d
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
jority of cases found hold that a foreclosure deed at an execution sale
purporting to convey land is color of title to the whole although in fact
the title of all the cotenants did not pass.10 Generally speaking, an
executory contract to sell land by one of the cotenants and entry and
possession of the same by the expectant grantee has been held to be
color of title1' except where a husband alone executes a contract to
convey property held jointly with his wife.12  Even a will may be color
of title. For example, a husband and wife purchased lands as tenants
in common and after the husband's death the wife remarried. She de-
vised the property in whole to her stepdaughter, the daughter of her
second husband by his first wife. It was held that the daughter acquired
title by adverse possession under color of title as against the heirs of
the first husband. 13 Generally, a mortgage deed to the whole by a tenant
in common who is the only one in possession is not color of title from
the time of the mortgage as against his cotenants and in favor of the
mortgagee who later enters into possession unless there is an actual
ouster of the other cotenants by the mortgaging tenant.14 However,
North Carolina seems to hold that in the latter case the mortgage deed
is not color of title as against the cotenants on the ground that the mort-
gagee when he does get possession has stepped into the shoes of the
mortgaging tenant.' 5 But a purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale
531 (Fla. 1952) ; Tillotson v. Foster, 310 Il. 52, 141 N.E. 412 (1923) ; Thurmond
v. Espalin, 50 N.M. 109, 171 P.2d 325 (1946) ; Morrison v. Hawksett, 64 N.W.2d
786 (N.D. 1954) ; Moore v. Slade, 194 Okla. 143, 147 P.2d 1006 (1944) ; Lloyd v.
Mills, 68 W. Va. 241, 69 S.E. 1094 (1911). Contra, Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650,
82 So. 735 (1919) ; Edwards v. Bishop, 4 N.Y. 61 (1850).
10 Call v. Phelps, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 507, 45 S.W. 1051 (1898) ; Westmoreland v.
Curbello, 58 N.M. 622, 274 P.2d 143 (1954); Bradshaw v. Holmes, 246 S.W.2d
296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Contra, Curtis v. Barber, 131 Iowa 400, 108 N.W.
755 (1906) (sheriff's deed).
"Rose v. Ware, 115 Ky. 420, 74 S.W. 188 (1903); Clapp v. Bromagham, 9
Cow. 530 (N.Y. 1827) ; Lloyd v. Mills, 68 W. Va. 241, 69 S.E. 1094 (1911).2 McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1903).
" Harriss v. Howard, 126 Ga. 325, 55 S.E. 59 (1906) ; Wallace v. McPherson,
187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50 (1949). But see Hicks v. Bullock, 96 N.C. 164,
1 S.E. 629 (1885), where land was left to a trustee to'receive the profits and pay
them over to one person during his life, and after his death to convey the legal
estate to certain remaindermen. It was held that one of the remaindermen could not
get a possession adverse to the trustee and his co-remaindermen by taking posses-
sion under a deed from the person entitled to receive the rents for life. Such
possession does not become adverse until after the death of the person entitled to
the rents for life; and even then, an adverse possession for twenty years by one
tenant in common is necessary to bar his cotenants.
"4Livingston v. Livingston, 210 Ala. 420, 98 So. 281 (1923); Harriss v.
Howard, 126 Ga. 325, 55 S.E. 59 (1906) ; King v. Hill, 141 Tex. 294, 172 S.W.2d
298 (1943).
1In Bailey v. Howell, 209 N.C. 712, 184 S.E. 476 (1936), it was held that a
mortgage executed on the entire tract by one tenant in common in possession was
not color of title as against the cotenants. One tenant in common listed the land
for taxes in her name and thereafter the land was sold for taxes and deed executed
by the sheriff to defendant; but the sheriff's deed was void as being without
authority of law. A few days after the execution of the sheriff's deed, defendant
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under a deed purporting to convey the whole and entry and possession
under such foreclosure deed constitute color of title.16 No cases have
been found which determine the question of whether or not a void deed
of gift may be color of title.17
BENJAMIN S. MARKS, JR.
Railway Labor Act-Representation of Racial Minority Groups in
Bargaining and Contract Administration Without Discrimination
In Conley v. Gibson,' petitioners, Negro members of the Brother-
hood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, were segregated into a separate
local union. They brought a class action for themselves and other
Negro employees similarly situated against the union, claiming rights
arising under the Railway Labor Act.2 The union had been designated
as the exclusive bargaining representative under the act.
The collective bargaining agreement which had been negotiated by
the union with the company contained among other provisions a uniform
seniority clause; and a summary dismissal of an employee without
cause would be a breach of the collective bargaining agreement which
normally would be challenged by the union through the grievance pro-
cedure.
In substance petitioners alleged that they were discharged by the
railroad in violation of the seniority agreement, ostensibly on the ground
that their jobs were being abolished. They alleged that in reality their
jobs were not abolished, but that the vacancies were immediately filled
with white men with the exception of a few Negroes who were rehired
for their old jobs with a loss of seniority. The company explained that
after abolishing petitioners' jobs it found it necessary to "create" certain
new positions. Petitioners alleged that the union failed to protest their
discharge, protect their jobs, and process their grievances as they would
have those of white employees, all "according to plan."
reconveyed the land to the tenant in common and took a mortgage back in himself.
Thereafter the mortgage was foreclosed and the property bid in by defendant. He
transferred the land to a stranger who subsequently reconveyed it to him. The
tenant in common listed the land for taxes and remained in possession of the
land throughout. The cotenants instituted partition proceedings and defendant
claimed sole seisin, basing his claim of title upon seven years adverse possession
under color of title.
" Dew v. Garner, 207 Ala. 353, 92 So. 647 (1922) ; Bradshaw v. Holmes, 246
S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 Pac.
289 (1908). But cf. Bailey v. Howell, supra note 15.
'The court raised the question in Justice v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d
122 (1953), but did not answer it since under the facts if it were color of title
it would have been destroyed when claimant was made a cotenant under a will
devising the property.
'355 U.S. 41 (1957).
144 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1952).
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The union interposed several jurisdictional objections. The most
important of these was that the National Railroad Adjustment Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over the disputes.3 But the Court pointed out that
the portion of the Railway Labor Act defining the jurisdiction of the
Board, by its own terms, only gives it jurisdiction over "disputes be-
tween an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers. ' '4
Here, the dispute was between employees and their bargaining agent
and not between employee and employerY
The Railway Labor Act provides that within an appropriate unit
the majority of employees may select the exclusive bargaining agent,0
whose statutory duty it then becomes to represent all of the employees
in the class or craft.7
On the merits the Court held that if the facts as alleged were true,
this was a flagrant violation of the union's statutory duty to bargain
collectively in favor of petitioners and to represent them fairly and with-
out hostile discrimination. Collective bargaining does not end with the
making of an agreement with the employer; it is a continuing process
involving day to day adjustments in the contract and the protection of
employee rights already secured by the agreement. The Court there-
fore reversed the lower courts' dismissal of the complaint and remanded
the case for further proceedings in the district court.
The unanimous decision in the Conley case was the culmination of
a long line of decisions dealing with racial discrimination in collective
' Other jurisdictional questions were passed upon. The union contended that
the Texas and New Orleans Railroad was an indispensable party defendant. The
Court, however, pointed out that the suit was solely by a group of employees
against their statutory bargaining representative and only incidentally concerned
the carrier. No relief was asked against the railroad and there was little prospect
that any would be granted which would bind it.
'Railway Labor Act § 3 First (i), 48 STAT. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First
(i) (1952).
' Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act confers jurisdiction on the National
Railroad Adjustment Board to hold hearings, make findings, and enter awards in
all disputes between carriers and their employees "growing out of grievances or out
of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions . . . ." 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
Where a dispute is between a carrier and its employees and does involve the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement the Court denies jurisdiction
to federal and state courts until the Board has interpreted the agreement, believing
that the Board is peculiarly familiar with the problems of interpreting a collective
bargaining agreement. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950);
Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
'Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, 300
U.S. 515 (1937).
'Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); cf. Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). The minority of employees in the unit is not allowed
by the act to select a collective bargaining representative of its own. Virginian Ry.
v. System Federation, No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, supra note 6; Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944). Cf. J. I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) ; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678 (1944); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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bargaining, beginning with Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R.' In that case
the exclusive bargaining representative for the railway firemen working
on southeastern railroads negotiated several clauses in the collective
bargaining agreements with the railroads, against their initial opposition,
which would have had the ultimate effect of excluding Negro firemen
from the service. One of these clauses was that only "promotable"
employees should be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or
permanent vacancies in established runs. Inasmuch as all railroads at
that time had a policy of not promoting Negroes to serve as engineers,
the provision affected, for the most part, only Negroes. The non-union
Negro firemen, thus discriminated against, brought a class action against
the union and the railroad alleging a breach of the duty imposed by
the Railway Labor Act.9
The Court's unanimous decision was that petitioners' complaint
stated facts which if proved would entitle them to the relief of a
declaratory judgment, damages, and an injunction against further dis-
crimination by the union on the basis of race. The union was held to
be under a duty to represent non-union members of the craft, at least
to the extent of not discriminating against them as such in making con-
tracts with the railroad.1 0 Concerning, the contract clauses the Court
said, "Here the discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrele-
vant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize
the bargaining representative to make such discriminations.""
To grasp the real significance of the holding in the Conley case it is
important to notice two differences between it and the Steele case. In
the latter case, the union bargained as exclusive representative with
the railroad for a collective agreement which was discriminatory on its
face and in operation.12 In the Conley case there was no such dis-
* 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
* "[T]he right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute
on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and
the policy which it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as un-
lawful the Brotherhood's conduct! ' Id. at 204.
" In deciding a companion case, Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), the Court merely adopted the reasoning
of the Steele case, holding that the right asserted by plaintiffs is derived from the
duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act on the union as exclusive bargaining
representative. Upon remand of the Tunstall case, petitioners recovered in the
district court. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Tunstall,
69 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 841 (1947).11323 U.S. at 203.
2 Unions may negotiate collective bargaining agreements which are discrim-
inatory in some respects, but such discriminations must not be based on color.
Such contracts may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft repre-
sented provided such differences are relevant to authorized purposes of the act,
such as differences in seniority, type of work performed, and the competence and
skill with which it is performed. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203
(1944). Much litigation has arisen where returning war veterans have been given
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criminatory contract; rather, it was administered in a discriminatory
manner. Secondly, in the Steele case the Negro petitioners were ex-
cluded entirely from membership in the union, while in the Conley
case they were union members, though segregated into a separate local.
In reaching a decision on the sufficiency of the complaint in the
Steele case the Court had to pass upon several jurisdictional problems
which apply equally to the situation in the Conley case. The most
important of these was that under the Railway Labor Act aggrieved
employees could file their own grievances with the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. 13 But, the Court pointed out that the Board has
consistently declined in over four hundred cases to hear grievance com-
plaints by individual members of a craft represented by a union. 14 "The
only way that an individual may prevail is by taking his case to the
union and causing the union to carry it through to the Board."15
Therefore, said the Court, there is -no administrative remedy available
which would be a condition precedent to equitable relief.10
During the next few years after Steele was decided, its doctrine was
supported in other cases with almost identical facts.17 The doctrine
higher seniority ratings than others who had worked for the company for some
time. See Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. 330 (1953) ; Hartley v. Brother-
hood of Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
"The Court also disposed of the following contentions: (1) The question was
not one of a jujrisdictional dispute determinable under the administrative scheme
set up by the act. Cf. Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943). (2) The question was not restricted by the act to voluntary settle-
ment by recourse to the traditional implements of mediation, conciliation, and
arbitration. Cf. General Comm. of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943). (3) No question of who
was entitled to represent the craft or who were members of it was involved, issues
which would have been relegated for settlement to the Mediation Board. Cf.
Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra. (4) There was no difficulty
as to the interpretation of the contract which by the act is committed to the juris-
diction of the Railroad Adjustment Board.
' dntinirtrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc No. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1941).15Ibid.
"It is fairly obvious why the Court would not want to limit petitioners to an
action before the Board even if it found that the Board had jurisdiction in such
cases. The Board's members are chosen by groups of carriers and the large
national unions. 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (a), (b), (c),(g) (1952). There are few procedural safeguards. There is no process for com-
pelling the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence, and no official
record is kept except the informal pleadings. Hearings are conducted without wit-
nesses. Adiiiinistrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1941). Finally, the statute provides no relief for a peti-
tioning party-be he individual, union, or carrier-against an erroneous order of
the Board. 48 STAT. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (in), (p) (1952).
" Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S.
232 (1949). In this case the Court held specifically that the anti-injunction pro-
visions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 20 U.S.C. §§ 101-15(1952), do not prohibit injunctions of the type which petitioners sought. "In Vir-
ginian R. Co. v. System Federation ... we held that the Norris-La Guardia Act
did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with positive
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was somewhat extended in Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v.
Howard.18 There, the Negroes discriminated against.were not within
the class of workers which the union had a statutory duty to represent,
i.e., they were not within the bargaining unit. The Negroes filed a
complaint similar to that in the Steele case. The union's contention
was that the act imposed no duty upon them. to bargain collectively for
persons not in their craft or class and that they had no statutory duty
to refrain from discriminating against persons whom they had no
duty to represent. The Court held that this was not a significant dis-
tinction. The case therefore means that unions protected by the act
must not use their power to negotiate collective bargaining agreements
which discriminate on the grounds of race or color regardless of the
classification of the victims. 19
It will be observed that a common feature of every case considered
thus far prior to Conley is that the unions had negotiated through collec-
tive bargaining a clause in a collective bargaining agreement which
was discriminatory on its face. It was after the decision in the
Howard case that those unions desiring to discriminate against Negro
mandates of the Railway Labor Act . . .enacted for the benefit and protection,
within a particular field, of the same groups whose rights are preserved by the
Norris-La Guardia Act. To depart from those views would be to strike from
labor's hands the sole judicial weapon it may employ to enforce such minority
rights as these petitioners assert and which we have held are now secured to them
by federal statute. To hold that this Act deprives labor of means of enforcing
bargaining rights specifically accorded by the Railway Labor Act would indeed be
to 'turn the blade inward."' Id. at 237. See also, Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R..t, 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Mitchell v. Gulf, M., & 0. R.R., 91 F. Supp.
175 (N.D. Ala. 1950). For later decisions see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
v. Mitchell, 190 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Central of Ga. R.R. v. Jones, 229 F.2d
648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
18343 U.S. 768 (1952).
'o Despite the fact that the case is so regarded, the Negro "train porters" were
only nominally in a different craft or class from the white employees. The bar-
gaining unit was made up of white brakemen. It is true that the company and
the union had always considered the Negroes as members of a different class
from the white brakemen for collective bargaining purposes and that' the Negroes
had been represented for bargaining by a separate union of their own choosing
but, in addition to performing the same duties as regular white brakemen, they
spent only about five percent of their time sweeping aisles and helping patrons on
and off trains. Thus, they were in reality brakemen.
The comments of Justice Minton, with whom Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Reed joined in dissenting, are of interest: "The majority reaches out to invalidate
the contract, not because the train porters are brakemen entitled to fair representa-
tion by the Brotherhood, but because they are Negroes who were discriminated
against by the carrier at the behest of the Brotherhood. I do not understand
that private parties may not discriminate on the ground of race. Neither a state
government nor the Federal Government may do so, but I know of no applicable
federal law which says that private parties may not. That is the whole problem
underlying the proposed Federal Fair Employment Practices Code. Of course,
this court by sheer power can say this case is Steele, or even lay down a code of
fair employment practices. But sheer power is not a substitute for legality. I do
not have to agree with the discrimination here indulged in to question the legality
of today's decision." Id. at 777.
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workers became more subtle in their approach. This subtlety led to a
serious conflict among the circuits.
Petitioners' complaint in Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R.2 0 did not allege,
either directly or indirectly, that the collective bargaining agreement by
its terms provided for discrimination against petitioners. But petitioners
did allege that the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with an undisclosed intention of administering it in a discriminatory
manner. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
stating that it was clear that the federal courts are not charged with the
duty of policing the parties in the performance of collective bargaining
agreements entered into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, pointing out that the National
Railroad Adjustment Board bad been established to afford relief for the
breach of collective bargaining agreements.21 "It is only when collective
bargaining agreements are unlawfully entered into or when the agree-
ments themselves are unlawful in terms or effect, that the federal courts
may act."22  The Third23 and Fifth2 4 Circuits quickly fell into line.
20 184 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951).21 The court cited the Railway Labor Act; Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R.,
339 U.S. 239 (1950); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).2 Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R., 184 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1950).
3 Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. dcnied, 346
U.S. 840 (1953). In this case we are dealing not with the Railway Labor Act
but with the National Labor Relations Act. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952). There would seem to be no reason why the doctrine
as enunciated in the line of railway cases from Steele to Conley would not pervade
the entire field of labor, embracing those unions and employers covered by the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. As under the Railway Labor Act,
the majority of the employees is entitled to select the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative whose statutory duty it becomes upon certification to repre-
sent not only the majority but all of the employees in the bargaining unit. Hughes
Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953) ; Larus and Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075
(1945). The minority of employees is not entitled to select a collective bargaining
representative of its own, and the company is not allowed to treat with such a
representative.
There has been almost no litigation involving this question outside of the
railway field. However, the Supreme Court apparently agrees with the above
conclusion in the one case in point which it has decided. In Syres v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), the Court reversed in a per curiam decisi6n,
which cited only the Steele, Tunstall, and Howard cases, a court of appeals
decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). In this case a Negro
local and a white local of the Oil Workers were certified as joint bargaining
representatives in a single unit. The two locals "amalgamated," forming a single
bargaining committee with an agreement that there should be but one line of
seniority. The committee, which was all white, made a contract providing for
tvo lines of seniority. The effect was to freeze the Negroes in their jobs. The
court of appeals, following Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, attempted to dis-
tinguish the Steele case, pointing out that here the petitioners were actually
members of the union whereas there plaintiffs were not union members and were
excluded from membership. The Supreme Court obviously did not feel that this
was a sufficient distinction. The court of appeals had pointed out in its opinion
that no administrative remedr was available from the National Labor Relations
Board.
A unique feature of the Williams case was that the Negro petitioners were
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The lines of conflict were clearly drawn, however, when the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Dillard v. Chesapeake &
0. R.R.25 There, petitioners were Negroes who had been working as
machinists' helpers and laborers, jobs requiring little skill. Some of
these workers were not represented by a labor union. All of the more
skilled crafts, however, were represented by unions which had negotiated
collective bargaining agreements with the company. These contracts
set up uniform rules for the promotion of company employees from one
class to another and within a class and were not discriminatory on their
face. The plaintiffs charged that the company, pursuant to union pres-
sure and solely on the ground of race, failed to promote them according
to the uniform rules. They alleged that they had been qualified,
eligible, and entitled for years to be upgraded to higher job classifica-
tions, but that instead white employees with less seniority and no more
competence were promoted ahead of them.
The court specifically indicated its disapproval of the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in the Hayes case. Speaking for the court, the late
Judge John J. Parker said, "It is immaterial that the unions in exert-
ing their power to discriminate against the Negro employees did not do
so by entering into a formal bargaining contract. It is the unlawful use
of power vested in the unions by the Railway Labor Act which gives
rise to the jurisdiction of the court to afford relief, not the particular
form which such abuse of power takes." 26  The court concluded that
it is just as unlawful to use the power of the bargaining organization
to prevent advancement of Negroes as .to use it to destroy their jobs.
Since some of the employees were not represented by the union, this
case is an extension of both the Howard and Steele cases.
This was followed by interesting developments in the Fifth Circuit
when the principal case of Conley v. Gibson arose. The district judge
actually members of the union. Petitioners were also members of the union in
the Hayes case, but the Ninth Circuit did not discuss that point at length. In
the Williams case the court held this to be a matter of some weight, pointing
out that the taxicab drivers' union derived its authority to bargain for petitioners
from their own consent and not from section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952), which declares that the
collective bargaining representative selected by a majority of the employees in the
unit is the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees therein. On this
basis no federal question was involved. The Supreme Court reviewed none of
these cases. The Court has since held, however, that the mere fact that petitioners
are members of the union is not a sufficient distinction; that a federal question is
still involved. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ; Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
- Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951). Airlines
are covered by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 49 STAT. 1189 (1936),
45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1952). See also Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1948).
2l199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir., 1952).
2 Id. at 951.
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dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint,27 and the circuit court affirmed in a
per curiam opinion.28  The Supreme Court granted certiorari." While
Conley v. Gibson was pending before the Supreme Court, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed itself in the case of Richardson v. Texas & N.O. R.R. 0
Here, the white and Negro workers had become segregated into two
groups, and by custom the Negroes had been discriminated against as
far as seniority was concerned. There was a contract clause, non-
discriminatory on its face, which merely stated that the current method
of assigning crews was satisfactory and that no change would be made
during the life of the contract. In holding that the union must not
discriminate in collective bargaining on the grounds of race the court
said, "Any other rule would permit a bargaining union and its railroad-
employer to practice or perpetliate jointly, through custom and under
an agreement innocuous in terms, that very abuse of the bargaining
representative's power of representation directly proscribed by the
Steele and Tunstall decisions."3 1
What then is and will be the effect of the Supreme Court's decision
in Conley v. Gibson? It resolves the conflict which had developed among
the circuits by specifically overruling the Hayes case from the Ninth
Circuit, and by following in effect the holdings of the Fourth Circuit
in the Dillard case and of the Fifth Circuit in the Richardson case.
This means that a union breaches its statutory duty imposed by the
Railway Labor Act when it uses its power derived from the act to dis-
criminate against a group of minority workers on the grounds of race
and color whether or not they be within the class of employees for
which the union has a statutory duty to bargain and whether or not
the union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with an employer
which is discriminatory on its face. All discriminatory action on the
part of labor unions which is based on race or color alone is forbidden.
But the case goes further than this. In the complaint petitioners
did not allege that the union procured their discharge. They rather
alleged that the union "according to plan" failed to represent them in
collective bargaining and to process their grievances as they would have
for a white employee discharged in a similar manner. It would seem that
the Court is not only'forbidding the union from taking discriminatory
action against any employees but is requiring the union to represent
all employees affirmatively and without discrimination in all respects, in-
cluding representation against unilateral discriminatory action of the
employer3 2  THOMAS W. WARLICK
2'138 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Tex. 1955). 28229 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1956).
"352 U.S. 818 (1957). 20242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).
,1 Id. at 234.
"Some states have gone much further in their holdings on this subject than
have the federal courts. Generally, there has been no attempt by the states to
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Statutes-Constitutionality of Local Laws
The case of Orange Speedway v. Clayton' held the session law2 which
banned racing in Orange County invalid. The court ruled that this
was a local act regulating trade in violation of the constitution.3
A case which, although distinguishable, reaches a different outcome is
State v. Chestnutt,4 which involved a broad regulation5 making Sunday
racing under any circumstances a crime.6 In the Orange Speedway case
the prohibition against promoting Sunday racing was coupled with in-
surance and permit requirements for weekday racing. Rather than a
prevent labor unions from restricting their membership on the basis of race if they
so desire. However, some states by statute have forbidden all discrimination by
labor unions on the basis of race, including restrictive membership clauses. See,
e.g., NEW YORK CmvuL RIGHTS LAW § 43; NEW YORK ExEcUTIVE LAW § 296(2).
It has been held generally in industrial states that unions which restricted their
membership to persons of a particular race could not enjoy the benefits of a
dosed or union shop contract, the closed shop being inconsonant with the closed
union. See, e.g., the California cases: Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal. 2d
595, 165 P.2d 901 (1946) ; Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) ; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721,
155 P.2d 329 (1944) ; Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P2d 343 (1944). Cf.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
In a novel decision the Supreme Court of Kansas held by judicial interpretation
that unions may not restrict their membership on grounds of race or color, if the
union serves as exclusive bargaining agent under a federal statute. In Betts v.
Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946), is found the familiar railway situation
of the Conley case where all employees, both Negro and white, were union mem-
bers, but where they were segregated into separate locals. Petitioners complained
that their lodge was under the jurisdiction of and represented by the white local
and that plaintiffs could not attend white local meetings, vote on election of officers
or selection of bargaining representatives, nor participate in the determination of
union policy.
Petitioners did not allege that there was a discriminatory collective bargaining
contract or that there had been any attempt on the part of the white local to dis-
criminate in any way, other than their segregation, against Negroes. They simply
complained that they were denied privileges of participation equal to those accorded
to white employees. The court pointed out that in performing its functions ag
statutory bargaining agent, a labor union is not to be regarded as a wholly private
association of individuals free from all constitutional and statutory' restraints to
which public agencies are subjected. They were unimpressed with the argument
that the Negroes, by voluntarily joining the union, had consented to place them-
selves within the regulations of the union. They held that petitibners' segregation
was arbitrary, fiaught with potential danger to their rights, and a violation'of their
individual rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment in that plaintiffs were deprived
of their liberty and property without due process of law. They pointed out that
a state court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to enforce the Constitution of
the United States.
1247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406 (1958).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 588.
'N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29 (1917). "The General Assembly shall not pass
any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . regulating labor, trade, mining,
or manufacturing . ... "
'241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 177.
0241 N.C. at 403, 85 S.E.2d at 299. "The General Assembly, exercising the
police power of the State, may legislate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the people; and Sunday observance statutes
and municipal ordinances derive their validity from this sphere of legislative power."
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sweeping and absolute prohibition of Sunday racing, it was directed
primarily at commercial racing. The court held that such a prohibition
amounts to a regulation of trade.
The court defined "trade" under the constitutional limitation as
"any employment or business engaged in for gain or profit."17  This is
trade in its broadest sense as applied in many tax cases.8 Only two
instances have been found where a local North Carolina act was held to
be a regulation of trade. In both cases there were other reasons for
denying the act's validity,9 and in one case10 the dissent argued for a
more strict interpretation of the words "regulating" and "trade." The
fact that "trade" is used in context with "labor," "mining," and "man-
ufacturing" in the constitutional limitation supports this argument. The
broad definition of "trade" applied by the court would include all these
items. Thus it would seem that "trade" in the amendment was intended
to" be used in the restricted sense, since otherwise there is unnecessary
duplication. A more appropriate definition of "trade" would be "the buy-
ing and selling, or exchanging, of commodities either by wholesale or by
retail.""- Under this definition, auto racing and other service industries
would not be included within the prohibition.
-The court's determination that this is a local act is in line with recent
decisions on the subject. However, the judicial history of article II,
section 29 of the constitution indicates a change in thought on the part
of our court. In early decisions, the court seemed eager to support the
constitutionality of questioned legislation, and a finding that an act
was unconstitutional came to be the exception rather than the rule.12
This resulted from the court's lack of a uniform definition of a local
act and a rather strict interpretation of the subject matter covered by
the prohibition.
IThe first case1  decided under the amendment held that an act
authorizing the issuance of bonds for road purposes in a township
7247 N.C, at 533, 101 S.E.2d at 410.
'Nesbitt v. Gill, 227 N.C. 174, 41 S.E.2d 646 (1947); Bickett v. State Tax
Comm'n, 177 N.C. 433, 99 S.E. 415 (1919); Smith v. Wilkins, 164 N.C. 136, 80
S.E. 168 (1913); Lenoir Drug Co. v. Town of Lenoir, 160 N.C. 571, 76 S.E.
480 (1912) ; State v. Hunt, 129 N.C. 686, 40 S.E. 216 (1901) ; State v. Worth,
116 N.C. 1007, 21 S.E. 204 (1895).
'Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954)(act also delegation of legislative power and grant of privilege and immunity) ;
State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939) (act also in conflict with general
licensing power and discrimination within class of real estate brokers).
10 State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 174, 1 S.E.2d 521, 528 (1939).
'AMzRicAx COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1283 (1954).
"E.g., Day v. Comm'rs, 191 N.C. 780, 133 S.E. 164 (1926) (act authorizing
bonds and tax for bridge invalid because it specified bridge at designated spot) ;
Armstrong v. Board of Comm'rs, 185 N.C. 405, 117 S.E. 388 (1923) (act author-
izing erection of tuberculosis hospital in Gaston County held invalid as local act
relating to health).
"Brown v. Road Comm'rs, 173 N.C. 598, 92 S.E. 502 (1917).
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and the levying of a tax to pay them was not unconstitutional because
it only provided the means for road construction. Such a tax measure
was not an authorization of road work within the meaning of the pro-
hibition. This decision was followed by a series of cases14 concerning
acts authorizing bonds and taxes for roads and bridges in the various
counties. 15 In each of them the court said that the questioned act was
only a tax measure giving the county the means with which to construct,
and was not "authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining,
or discontinuing of highways, streets or alleys . . . [nor] relating to
ferries or bridges"'16 as prohibited by the amendment. In addition, the
acts were held not to be local because they applied uniformly throughout
the county and the actual construction to be done would be at places
determined at the discretion of the county boards. As late as 1940 the
court held in Fletcher v. Collins17 that an act allowing Buncombe County
to organize any territory in the county into a school district upon
petition by ten per cent of the voters was not a prohibited local act
because the legislature left the determination of where the districts were
to be established to the discretion of the county board.
Within the past decade there has been a new approach by the court
in interpreting the amendment. Acts have been held to be "local" on the
basis of the area to which they applied without regard to the discretion
granted to the county, and the prohibited subject matter has not been
interpreted in such a narrow sense. The first indication of this came
in 1939 in State v. Dixon,'8 which held a real estate tax applicable to
only one third of the counties in the state to be a local law regulating
trade because it was "one operating only in a limited territory or speci-
fied locality."'19 The only reason given for this determination was that
under the theory of In re Harris"° the question of whether a law is local
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. No
attempt was made to distinguish those earlier cases2 ' which had held
"Road Comm'rs v. Bank, 181 N.C. 347, 107 S.E. 245 (1921); Board of
Comm'rs v. Pruden, 178 N.C. 394, 100 S.E. 695 (1919); Martin County v.
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 178 N.C. 26, 100 S.E. 134 (1919); Parvin v.
Board of Comm'rs, 177 N.C. 508, 99 S.E. 432 (1919) ; Mills v. Board of Comm'rs.
175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481 (1918).
1 The opinion of at least one member of the court as to "the importance of
the decision of the Court in forwarding the good-roads movement of the State"
is illustrated by State v. Kelly, 186 N.C. 365, 376, 119 S.E. 755, 76l (1923).
" N.C. ColsT. art. II, § 29 (1917).
'218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (1940).
18 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939).
20 Id. at 165, 1 S.E.2d at 523.
20 183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425 (1922) (act applicable to 56 of 100 counties held
to be a general law).
21 Fletcher v. Collins, 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (1940) ; Board of Comm'rs v.
Pruden, 178 N.C. 394, 100 S.E. 695 (1919) ; Parvin v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 N.C.
508, 99 S.E. 432 (1919); Mills v. Board of Comm'rs, 175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481
(1918).
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acts which applied to only one county in the state to be general laws
rather than local ones.
Dixon was followed in 1940 by a decision22 holding an act setting
up a county pfiysician and quarantine officer in Madison County to be
of a local nature pertaining to health and sanitation and therefore un-
constitutional. Within the past eight years, the court has held invalid
acts allowing Winston-Salem and Forsyth County to consolidate their
public health agencies and departments,2 3 prohibiting a county board
of education from expending more than $2,000 for extending water or
sewer sytsems to a new school,24 allowing construction and operation
of toll roads and bridges in a five county area,2 r and setting up a racing
commission in Morehead City.26 All of these were found to be invalid
under article 2, section 29 because they were local acts applicable only
in a limited territory and were within the subject matter in which such
local legislation is prohibited. It is interesting to note that the court
relied on these recent decisions to support its position in the present
case even though the amendment has been in effect since 1917. None of
these cases attempts to distinguish the earlier cases with which they
would appear to conflict.
In analyzing the principal case, one arrives at two conclusions. The
first is that Orange County could successfully prevent Sunday racing
by having the legislature pass an act similar to that passed for Wake
County invoking the state police power to enforce such a ban. The
second, and more important conclusion is that the court appears to have
settled upon a more definite interpretation of this amendment. The
cases decided since 1940 have been substantially uniform in holding that
an act is local if it is applicable only to a limited area and the restricted
subject matter has been broadened to include many areas which were
formerly excluded. We can no doubt look forward to more decisions
invalidating acts within this area.2 7
LAURENCE A. CoBB
Taxation-Income Tax-Determination of Whether Corporate
Withdrawals Constitute Loans or Dividends
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code defines the term "dividend" as
"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its stockholders
" Sams v. Board of Comm'rs, 217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d 540 (1940).
"Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 65 S.E.2d 313 (1951).2 Lamb v. Board of Educ., 235 N.C. 377, 70 S.E.2d 201 (1952).
"5 Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310
(1953).
"Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954).
" For a detailed discussion of the problem of local, private, and special legisla-
tion, see Report of the Commissiom on Public-Local and Private Legislation,
Popular Government, Feb.-March, 1949.
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-(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913, or (2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (com-
puted as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason
of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to
the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was
made."'
It is elementary that a dividend is taxable as income to the recipient,
while a loan carries no tax consequences. In determining the factual
question 2 of whether a particular withdrawal is a loan or a taxable
dividend, the intent of the parties is the most important factor.3 In de-
termining this question there is no set rule of thumb or standard avail-
able. However, in attempting to get at the substance of the transaction
the courts usually rely on various well established criteria. An analysis
of the criteria used is necessary in order to evaluate a fact situation and
deduce with a reasonable degree of certainty the tax treatment that will
be accorded it.
1. Purpose of the Withdrawal. Whether or not a withdrawal is used
for a legitimate business purpose is usually important in the court's
determination of whether a withdrawal is a loan or a dividend. A legiti-
mate business purpose has been found in the transferring of an in-
debtedness from an outside source to the taxpayer's corporation 4 or for
acquisition of stock in a closely held corporation.5 Where the loan was
used to purchase a farm for the exclusive use of the stockholder6 or
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3i6(a). The 1939 code contained substantially
the same provision. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(a), 52 STAT. 496.
-Victor Shaken, 21 T.C. 785 (1954); Al Goodman, Inc., 23 T.C. 288 (1954);
Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562 (1952). In William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem:
Dec. 57180 at 686-57, the court stated: "The question of whether the amount with-
drawn by the petitioner from the corporation was a dividend or a loan to him
is one of fact, to be determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances, and
particularly with reference to petitioner's intent at the time of the transaction."3In Harry E. Wiese, 35 B.T.A. 701 (1937), aff'd, 93 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938), where the taxpayer was the sole stockholder
the court of appeals said: "The significant fact in the present case was the intent
of the petitioner when he took the money, whether he took it for permanent
use in lieu of dividends or whether he was then only borrowing." 93 F.2d at 923.
Accord, Anketell Lumber & Coal Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 210, 1 F. Supp.
724 (1932) ; Trinchera Timber Co., 13 B.T.A. 934 (1928). Where there was an
intent to repay, the withdrawls were held to be loans. A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 157020; Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57014; Carl L.
White, 17 T.C. 1562 (1952); Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609 (1941); George S.
Groves, 38 B.T.A. 727 (1938); Moses W. Taitoute, 38 B.T.A. 32 (1938); Gomez
v. Johnson, 8 B.T.A. 52 (1927).
'William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mern. Dec. 57180. The sole stockholder
borrowed money from the corporation to pay off a debt that he incurred in financing
the corporation and gave a note for the amount to the corporation. The court
held there was a genuine intent to repay a valid loan even though later he was
unable to repay and redeemed his stock for the cancellation of the debt.
'Isadora Benjamin Estate, 28 T.C. - (1957).
0 Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 11 57129. There were two stockholders
who made withdrawals from the corporation in the exact proportion to their hold-
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merely to provide for his personal living expenses7 the court found no
legitimate business purpose and held the withdrawals to be dividends.
However, the fact that a withdrawal is for personal use is not always
conclusive.8
2. Formality of a Promissory Note. The giving of a promissory note
by the stockholder who makes the withdrawal is often considered by the
courts as evidence that the withdrawal was intended to be a loan.0 But
it has been held that no note was necessary where other factors justified
a finding that the parties intended to treat the withdrawal as a loan.10
In other cases the formality of a note was ignored and the substance of
the transaction merited the holding that the withdrawals were divi-
dends."1
3. Other Formalities of the Transaction. ,The fact that a dividend
is not formally declared has no effect on the question of whether the
withdrawal will be treated as a dividend for the obvious reason that the
very point at issue is whether the withdrawal is to be deemed a "con-
structive dividend," i.e., one not actually declared by the corporation.' 2
Even if it is illegal under state law for a stockholder or officer to borrow
from the corporation it may still be considered a valid loan for tax
purposes.'" It is damaging to the stockholder's position if his with-
drawals are not treated as capital assets on the corporation's books.' 4 On
the other hand if they are treated as assets on the corporation's books,
it seems to be influential in determining that the withdrawal is a loan.1
4. Repayment of .the Withdrawal. Where a withdrawal has been
partially or wholly repaid, it is in favor of the taxpayer's position that
it was a bona fide loan.' If there has been no repayment, it is evidence
ings for the purchase of farms for personal use. Even though a note was given
and was carried on the books as a "Note Receivable," the withdrawals were held
to be dividends.
"Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255. See also Minnie
F. Lasker, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52012; George P. Marshall, 32 B.T.A. 956
(1935).
8 A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020 (withdrawals used for tax-
payer's personal benefit); Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1157014
(withdrawals used to pay off gambling debts).
'William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Victor Shaken, 21
T.C. 785 (1954) ; Corporate Investment, Co., 40 B.T.A. 1156 (1939) ; Herman M.
Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212 (1936).
"A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57020; H. C. Thorman, P-H 1953
T.C. Mem. Dec. 53294.
" Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1157129; Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A.
228 (1941); Daniel Hunt, Sr., 6 B.T.A. 558 (1923).
"Gene 0. Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57129; Fred C. Niederkrome,
P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. f156255; Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
" Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941).
" Minnie F. Lasker, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. f" 52012.
"William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57180; John Hamilton Per-
kins, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57128; Frank W. Sharp, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem.
Dec. 1 53255.
18 Roy J. Kinner, 36 B.T.A. 153 (1937).
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that the purported loan was actually a dividend.' 7 However, the court
will ignore the fact of repayment where it was made after the taxpayer
learned of the government's intention to treat the withdrawal as a
dividend.' 8 The fact that the taxpayer has a running account and the
amount varies from time to time will usually be to his advantage, 19 and
even where withdrawals are used to pay personal gambling debts the
periodical reduction of the balance may be important in deciding that
they are loans.
20
5. Payment of Interest. When the stockholder making the with-
drawal is charged interest, and especially where he pays substantial in-
terest, this will be instrumental in the court's finding that there was an
intent that the withdrawal be a loan.21  It has been considered that
where there was no interest this was a factor that pointed toward a
finding that the withdrawals were dividends.22  There are some cases,
however, where other factors justified calling the withdrawal a loan
even though no interest was charged.
23
6. Withdrawals in Ratio to Stockholdings. Where the withdrawals
made by the stockholders were in proportion to the amount of stock
that each stockholder owned, it was considered evidence of a constructive
dividend.2 4 Where the withdrawals were not in proportion to holdings,
the court relied on this in deciding that they were loans instead of divi-
dends.2 5 However, in other cases the courts have said that there is no
need that the loans be proportionate to the shares held or even that all
the stockholders participate in order for them to be considered a divi-
dend.2 6 If the amount of withdrawals varies annually with the earnings
Republic Nat!l Bank, 57-1 U.S.T.C. 9511; A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 1 57020.
11 Regensberg vi Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944). For cases where
solvency of the taxpayer was considered in favor of the taxpayer, see A. J. Dalton,
P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020; Al Goodman, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 288 (1954);
Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 242 (1941) ; Moses W. Faitoute, 38 B.T.A. (1938).
But see Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255, where $20,000
was borrowed from 1945 to 1956 and never repaid, and the taxpayer was always in
a position to repay. The "loan" was held to be a dividend.
" M. Jack Crispin, 32 B.T.A. 151 (1935).
" Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57014.
"William D. Bryan, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Al Goodman, Inc.,
23 T.C. 288 (1954) ; Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941) ; George S. Groves,
38 B.T.A. 727 (1938); Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212 (1936).
"Fred C. Niederkrome, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56255.
"A. J. Dalton, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157020; Walter Freeman, P-H
1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57014.
"'Chattanooga Sav. Bank v. Bunner, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1927); Gene 0.
Clark, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 157129; R. E. Nelson, 19 T.C. 575 (1952).
"Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941); Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A.
212 (1936); Kate C. Ryan, 2 B.T.A. 1130 (1925).
"
8 Hub Cloak and Suit Co., P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 56196. In Henry
F. Mitchell, 16 B.T.A. 1297 (1929), withdrawals were made by all of the share-
holders except one who did not participate.
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and surplus the court will consider this as evidence tending to show that
they should be treated as dividends.2 7
It appears from the more recent cases that there may be a slight
trend in favor of the taxpayer in deciding whether a particular with-
drawal will be considered a dividend or a loan. An example of the
older and more restrictive attitude of the courts is Ben R. Meyer.28
The taxpayer there made withdrawals from a subsidiary of the parent
corporation in which he was a stockholder, gave a note bearing four
percent interest, and made some repayments. When the subsidiary be-
came insolvent, he set up a trust to repay the withdrawals. In holding
that the withdrawals constituted dividends, the court seemed to rely
strongly on the fact that the withdrawals were used for personal living
expenses and that the stockholders were insolvent. However, in the
more current case of A. J. Dalton2 the withdrawals were for personal
use, no note was given, no interest was charged, and the taxpayer had
insufficient assets to repay at the time; nevertheless the court found
there was a bona fide intent to borrow and an obligation to repay and
held that the withdrawals were loans. Similarly in the John Hamilton
Perkins"0 case there were two stockholders each owning fifty percent
of the stock. They "borrowed" the money to pay off their personal
debts, later executing their notes but paying no interest. Perkins bought
out the other shareholder's stock after the shareholder had repaid the
corporation the amount he had "borrowed." He then liquidated the
corporation and treated the outstanding note as part of his "liquidating
dividend." The entire transaction took only about two years, but the
court found that the withdrawal was a valid loan.
If there is any reason for the trend of the decisions, it is probably
because the courts recognize the real business purpose and financial
advantage in borrowing from one's own corporation rather than recog-
nized lending institutions.3' The conclusion that the taxpayer's posi-
tion is being upheld should not lull any prospective debtor into a sense
"7See Albert Bittens, 2 B.T.A. 535 (1925), where the court stated that the
withdrawals had no relation to earnings or surplus and held them to be loans
rather than dividends. See also C. W. Murchison, 32 B.T.A. 32 (1935), where
the taxpayer was sole owner of the corporation and the withdrawals varied in
accordance with the net earnings. Held, dividends. But see Walter Freeman,
P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57014, at 57-63, where the withdrawals were sub-
stantially the same as the current income or accumulated earnings and profits.
The court nevertheless found that they were not dividends, stating that the tax-
payer repaid part of the withdrawals and that "after considering all of the evi-
dence we have concluded that the withdrawals were intended as loans ..
2845 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
2 P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57020.
"0 P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 57128. See also William D. Bryan, P-H 1957
T.C. Mem. Dec. 157180; Louis Coutemanche, Jr., 53-1 U.S.T.C. 9303 (1953),
"' Isadora Benjamin Estate, 28 T.C. - (1957); William D. Bryan, P-H 1957
T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f 57180.
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of security, because the courts are still prone to look through the form
of a transaction to its real substance. The taxpayer would be well ad-
vised to consider carefully the above mentioned factors which influence
the courts in deciding cases. No one factor is usually conclusive in
deciding a case, but certainly the more consideration the stockholder




A recent North Carolina case' involving the doctrine of "last clear
chance" seems to have been decided contrary to a long line of unbroken
precedents. The case was this:
The defendant was driving down an unpaved public road at eight-
thirty p.m. The evidence favorable to the plaintiff showed the road at
the place in question was straight and virtually level for a distance of two
to three hundred feet, and that there were no obstructions to vision.
The plaintiff was lying in the road asleep, between and parallel to two
ruts which were in the road. The defendant approached the plaintiff
with his lights on low beam and did not see him until approximately
twenty-five feet away. He first thought the plaintiff's body was a box
or the like, and did not recognize it as a human being until five or six
feet away. The defendant's car passed over the plaintiff, straddling him
with its wheels, but the oil pan on the car struck the plaintiff in passing,
inflicting serious injuries. The defendant stopped twenty-five feet
beyond the place where the plaintiff was lying.
The defendant's motion for nonsuit at the trial below was granted,
and on appeal it was affirmed, the court holding in a four to three de-
cision that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable on the facts.
It is proposed in this Note to look briefly at the background of the
doctrine of last clear chance, after which an attempt will be made to
deduce from the North Carolina cases the principles underlying the law
of last clear chance in North Carolina. Finally, the principal case will
be examined in the light of these principles.
The doctrine of last clear chance is well-established in North Caro-
lina, as in most common law jurisdictions. 2 Although it is stated
'Barnes v. Homey, 247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E.2d 315 (1957).
'Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524, 80 S.E.2d 150 (1954) ; Newbemn v.
Leary, 215 N.C. 134, 1 S.E.2d 384 (1939); Triplett v. Southern Ry., 205 N.C. 113.
170 S.E. 146 (1933) ; Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N.C. 404, 163 S.E. 122
(1932) ; Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 167 N.C. 533, 83 S.E. 835 (1914);
Sawyer v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 24, 58 S.E. 598 (1907);
Lassiter v. Raleigh & G. R.R., 133 N.C. 244, 45 S.E. 570 (1903) ; Bogan v. Caro-
lina Cent. R.R., 129 N.C. 154, 39 S.E. 808 (1901) ; Pickett v. Wilmington & W.
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differently in different jurisdictions, it may be said generally that it is
that principle which allows recovery to a plaintiff who has been con-
tributorily negligent in bringing about his injury, when the defendant,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence and his own prior negligence,
could still have averted the plaintiff's injury through the exercise of due
care.
3
The doctrine is generally considered to be an application of proximate
cause.4  The argument is that, although both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant have been guilty of negligence, the plaintiff's negligence has cul-
minated, leaving him in a perilous position, and that the defendant then,
by the exercise of due care, could still have avoided the injury. Hence,
it is argued that the defendant's subsequent negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, and the plaintiff is not barred from recovering
by his prior negligence.
The harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence is generally
credited with bringing about the adoption of the doctrine of last clear
chance.5 This doctrine has also been characterized by a leading
authority6 as a "way-station" in the transition from contributory negli-
gence to comparative negligence. Whatever its past and its future, it
must be conceded that its present effect, by making it possible for neg-
ligent plaintiffs to recover, is to shift the total burden of the loss from
an injury from a plaintiff who formerly was barred by contributory neg-
ligence, to the defendant who is now held liable under the doctrine of last
clear chance.
North Carolina has a long line of cases discussing and applying the
doctrine.7 For the sake of convenience of discussion and a better under-
standing of the North Carolina law of last clear chance, they will be
divided into four categories. They are :8
I. The peril of the plaintiff is actually discovered by the defendant;
the plaintiff is physically unable to prevent his injury through the
exercise of due care.
II. The peril of the plaintiff is actually discovered by the defend-
ant; the plaintiff is physically able to prevent his injury through
the exercise of due care.
R.R., 117 N.C. 616, 23 S.E. 264 (1895); Deans v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 107
N.C. 686, 12 S.E. 77 (1890) ; PROSsE, TORT S § 52 (2d ed. 1955) ; Note, 5 N.C.L.
REv. 58 (1927).
38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 215 (1941).
'Deans v. Wilmington & W. M.R., 107 N.C. 686, 12 S.E. 77 (1890); Annot.,
92 A.L.R. 47 (1934).
5 PgOSSER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
'Ibid.
Cases cited note 2 swpra.
'Various divisions of the cases are encountered in this field; the one employed
here is adopted from 38 Am. JuR., Negligence §§ 221-24 (1941), and Annot.,
92 A.L.R. 47 (1934).
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III. The peril of the plaintiff is not actually discovered by the
defendant, but should have been; the plaintiff is physically unable
to prevent his injury through the exercise of due care.
IV. The peril of the plaintiff is not actually discovered by the de-
fendant, but should have been; the plaintiff is physically able to
prevent his injury through the exercise of due care.9
Category I. In this situation, the plaintiff typically has negligently
placed himself in a perilous position, such as on a railroad trestle, from
which he cannot escape through the exercise of due care and the
means at his disposal. The defendant, who is also guilty of some prior
negligence, has discovered the apparent peril of the plaintiff, but negli-
gently fails to take any action to avoid injury to him. The defendant
runs over the plaintiff, and injures him.
Prior to the defendant's discovery of the plaintiff's perilous situation,
both parties had been guilty of negligence; however, after the defendant's
discovery of the plaintiff's peril, the plaintiff did nothing further to con-
tribute to his injury, but was simply powerless to avoid it. The de-
fendant, on the other hand, still had a chance-that is, the last clear
chance-to avert the accident, but failed to do so, and for his negligence
in this respect he is held liable.
The cases in this category seem to be sound in result and in reason-
ing, and to be in conformity with established views on proximate cause.
North Carolina allows recovery in this situation, "0 and in so doing it is
in accord with virtually all jurisdictions.'
Category II. Cases in this category usually arise under the following
type of fact situation: The plaintiff is standing on the railroad track,
obviously oblivious to his surroundings. The defendant is the engineer
of an approaching train, and is guilty of some prior negligence; he sees
the plaintiff, but negligently fails to take any action to avoid an accident.
The defendant runs over the plaintiff and injures hinf.
In this situation, it is clear that both parties have been negligent; it
is also clear that, despite their prior negligentce, both parties could have
' In all of these hypothetical situations, it is assumed that the plaintiff's peril
would be apparent to an ordinary, reasonable, prudent man, and that the defendant
could, through the exercise of due care, and with the means then at his disposal,
avert the accident at the time he discovers (or should discover) the plaintiff's
peril. Such is the law in North Carolina. Irby v. Southern Ry., 246 N.C. 384, 98
S.E.2d 349 (1957) (last clear chance inapplicable; no evidence the defendant could
have stopped after he should have discovered the peril of the plaintiff) ; Lemings
v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 499, 191 S.E. 39 (1937) (last clear chance inapplicable;
peril of the plaintiff was not apparent) ; cases cited note 2 supra. The preceding
case is noted in 16 N.C.L. REv. 50 (1938) in relation to other cases dealing with
persons who were hit by trains while sitting on the end of a cross-tie. The prin-
cipal difficulty in these cases seems to be the aonvarency of the peril of such a person.
10 Newbern v. Leary, 215 N.C. 134, 1 S.E.2d 384 (1939).
X'Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 149 (1934), supplemented by 119 A.L.R. 1041 (1939),
and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947).
19581
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
avoided the accident through the exercise of due care. Strictly speak-
ing, it may well be that as a matter of actual fact in a case such as the
example above, the plaintiff would have the "last clear chance"; that is,
it might have been possible for the plaintiff to have avoided the accident
even after it was no longer possible for the defendant to do so. For this
reason, some question is frequently raised as to whether it is consistent
with established theories of proximate cause to hold the defendant liable
in this situation.12 It would seem, however, that the plaintiff's actions
in putting himself in a position of danger were a remote or incidental
cause of the accident, and that the negligence of the defendant in not
taking steps to avoid the accident after having perceived the situation
was the efficient, substantial cause of the injury.'3
The courts overwhelmingly hold the defendant liable in these cases,' 4
albeit, as observed by Prosser,' 5 frequently without stopping to inquire as
to the consistency of so doing with established theories of proximate
cause. North Carolina allows the plaintiff to recover in this situation in
accord with the majority view.16
Category III. A fact situation which is typical of this category of
cases is one where the plaintiff is unconscious on the railroad track; the
12 Prosser, for instance, says that holding the defendant liable in this situation
on the theory of proximate cause is a mere "fiction." PROSSER, TORTS § 52 (2d
ed. 1955). Continuing, he says, "In -such a, case, the negligence of the plaintiff
undoubtedly has been a cause, and a substantial and important one, of his own
damage, and it cannot be said that injury through the defendant's negligence was
not fully within the risk which the plaintiff has created." Ibid. Compare the
same author on the subject of contributory negligence: "The accepted view now
is that the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care for his own safety does
not bar his recovery unless his injury results from the particular risk to- which his
conduct has exposed him." Id. § 51. Quaere whether the risk that the driver of
an approaching automobile will not take action to avoid injury to the plaintiff
after he observes his obliviousness is within the risk created by one who crosses the
street without looking.
13 "The liability of defendant, under'the docfrine'6f the last clear chance, did
not depend upon the 'cessation or culmination of plaintiffls negligence.'. What is
meant by the quoted expression, which is used in the instruction, we suppose to be
that plaintiff's negligence must have spent its force, or have become dormant or
inactive. But this-was not necessary to constitute the defendant's negligence.the
proximate cause of the injury. The very fact that the plaintiff, in the presence of
danger, continued to be negligent, and in- apparent ignorance of the danger with
reference to the car, but increased the duty of the defendant's motorman to be on
his guard and to adjust his conduct to that situation by lessening the speed of the
car, bringing it under control and generally placing himself in a state of readiness to
stop, should it be necessary to do so." Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 167 N.C.
533. 544, 83 S.E. 835. 840 (1914). Continuing, the court quotes from Ins. Co. v.
Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 130 (1877) : "'The causes that are merely incidental or instru-
ments of a superior or controlling agency are not the proximate causes and the
responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the result.'" Accord,
especially as to the special duty raised by knowledge of the situation, Terre Haute,
I. & E. Traction Co. v. Stevenson, 189 Ind. 100, 123 N.E. 785 (1919).
"' Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 149 (1934), supplentned by 119 A.L.R. 1041 (1939),
and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947).
1 5 PROSSER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
1 Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 167 N.C. 533, 83 S.E. 835 (1914).
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defendant engineer should have discovered the plaintiff in time to avoid
injury to him, but did not. The plaintiff is run over by the defendant
and injured.
In these cases the plaintiff has been negligent in allowing himself
to get into such a position of peril, and the defendant has been negligent
in failing to maintain a lookout ;17 thus when the defendant arrives on the
scene both parties have been guilty of negligence. However, at this time
the plaintiff's negligence has culminated, and has left him in a position of
peril from which he cannot, through the exercise of due care, extricate
himself in time to avert the injury. It is assumed, on the other hand,
that there is a period of time during which the defendant could have
averted the accident after he should, in the exercise of reasonable care,
have discovered the plaintiff; and, therefore, it is reasoned that the de-
fendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and should be
held liable therefor. This view seems to be in accord with established
doctrines of proximate cause, for it appears that the defendant's neg-
ligence in not availing himself of his opportunity to avoid injury to the
plaintiff is really the efficient cause of the injury.
The North Carolina cases in this category have been uniform in
allowing the plaintiff to recover under the doctrine of last clear chance. 18
In other jurisdictions, however, there is a wide diversity in the language
of the cases, and some diversity in the holdings.'9 Prosser says the
1 7 
"The law, as settled by two lines of authorities here, imposes upon the engi-
neer of a moving train the duty of reasonable care in observing the track, and if
by reason of his omission to look out for cows, horses and hogs he fails to see a
drunken man or a reckless boy asleep on the track, it cannot be denied that he is
guilty of a dereliction of duty .... We are of the opinion that, when by the
exercise of ordinary care an engineer can see'that a human being is lying apparently
helpless from any cause on the track in front of his engine, in time to stop the
train by the use of the appliances at his command and without peril to the safety
of persons on the train, the company is liable for any injury resulting from his
failure to perform his duty. If. it is the settled law of North Carolina (as we
have shown) that it is the duty of an engineer on a moving train to maintain a
reasonably vigilant outlook along the track in.his front, then the failure to do so
is an omission of a legal duty." Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 117 N.C. 616,
636-37, 23 S.E. 264, 267 (1895). The duty of the driver of an automobile is laid
down in Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 400, 11 S.E.2d 326,
332 (1940) : "It is a general rule of law, even in the absence of statutory require-
ments, that the operator of a motor vehicle must exercise ordinary care, that is,
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under
similar circumstances. In the exercise of such duty it is incumbent upon the
operator of a motor vehicle to keep same under control, and to keep a reasonably
careful lookout, so as to avoid collision with persons and vehicles upon the high-
way."
"8 Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524, 80 S.E.2d 150 (1954) ; Sawyer
v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 24, 58 S.E. 598 (1907) ; Bogan v. Caro-
lina Cent. R.R., 129 N.C. 154, 39 S.E. 808 (1901); Pickett v. Wilmington &
W. R.R., 117 N.C. 616, 23 S.E. 264 (1895); Deans v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 107
N.C. 686, 12 S.E. 77 (1890).
"
9 For an example of a case allowing recovery in this situation, see Porto Rico
Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Miranda, 62 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289
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North Carolina view is the "strong minority, '20 while another authority2'
concludes that where the fact situation of this category is actually pre-
sented, the majority of the courts allows recovery under the doctrine
of last clear chance.
Category IV. The following is a situation typical of the cases in this
category: The plaintiff is standing on the railroad track, obviously
oblivious to his surroundings. The defendant engineer approaches with-
out maintaining a proper lookout, and, though he should in the exercise
of reasonable care discover the plaintiff, he does not. The defendant
runs over the plaintiff and injures him.
In this situation neither party has discovered the danger (though both
are negligent in failing to do so), and either party could prevent the
injury simply through the exercise of due care. Furthermore, it cannot
be said that the plaintiff's negligence has culminated in this situation;
it is still an active, continuing thing. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, either
on the basis of time sequence, 22 or as the substantial causative factor.
Accordingly, to hold the defendantliable in a case of this type amounts
to a departure from the theory of proximate cause; it is an imposition of
liability on the defendant for injuring a plaintiff whose peril he should
have discovered in time to avoid the injury, regardless of the contrib-
utory negligence of the plaintiff.
North Carolina again allows recovery to the plaintiff in cases falling
in this category. 23 This places North Carolina in what is considered the
decided minority upon this set of facts.2 4
Thus, it appears that many courts do not allow the application of the
doctrine of last clear chance unless the plaintiff is actually discovered,
and the great majority of courts does not allow it if, in addition, the
plaintiff is not helpless. North Carolina has allowed recovery in all
cases where there is: (1) a person in apparent peril; (2) ability to avoid
U.S. 731 (1933). For an example of a case denying recovery in this situation,
see Hayman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 77 Ohio App. 135, 62 N.E.2d 724 (1945).
"0 PROSSER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 149 (1934), sipplemenzted by 119 A.L.R. 1041 (1939),
and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947).
"' As noted earlier under the second category, where the plaintiff is merely
oblivious to the approach of a train, for example, experience tells us that the
plaintiff actually has an opportunity to avoid the accident which is subsequent
to the last opportunity of the defendant.
"
3Triplett v. Southern Ry., 205 N.C. 113, 170 S.E. 146 (1933); Caudle v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N.C. 404, 163 S.E. 122 (1932); Ingle v. Asheville
Power and Light Co., 172 N.C. 751, 90 S.E. 953 (1916) ; Lassiter v. Raleigh &
G. R.R., 133 N.C. 244, 45 S.E. 570 (1903); Wheeler v. Gibbon, 126 N.C. 811, 36
S.E. 277 (1900).
2438 Am. JUR., Negligence § 224 (1941); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 149 (1934),
suzpplemented by 119 A.L.R. 1041 (1939), and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947). For an
example of a case following the majority view, see Allnutt v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 8 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1925).
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injury to the person after he should, in the exercise of reasonable care,
have been discovered; and (3) a negligent breach of the duty to discover
resulting in injury to the plaintiff.
The court held in the principal case of Barnes v. Horney25 that
judgment of nonsuit was proper because "the evidence in this case is
insufficient to show the defendant had the opportunity to avoid the
injury after he discovered, or should have discovered, the plaintiff's
perilous position." 26  Looking at the facts again, it appears that the
defendant did not discover the plaintiff until he was only twenty or
twenty-five feet away, and that he did not recognize the true situation
until he was only five or six feet away. It further appears that the de-
fendant was traveling thirty miles per hour, and that he was able to stop
his car within twenty-five feet after passing the plaintiff. Thus, even
assuming that the defendant started braking his car when he first saw
the object at a distance of twenty-five feet, he still was able to stop in a
maximum of fifty feet.
Obviously, the defendant did not have time to avert the ccident
after he actually discovered'and appreciated the plaintiff's peril. Quite
as obviously, had he discovered and appreciated the peril before reaching
a point fifty feet from the plaintiff he could have averted the accident.
Should the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered
and appreciated the plaintiff's peril before reaching a point fifty feet from
him?
It is generally recognized in North Carolina that there is a duty
to maintain a lookout while driving.27  G.S. § 20-12 9 (a) 28 and G.S.
§ 20-131(a) 2 provide that the. driver of an automobile shall maintain
his headlights so that he can see a person at least two hundred feet
ahead. There was evidence that the point where the plaintiff was lying
could be seen for two hundred feet. Conceding, arguendo, that it may
not have been possible for the defendant to have seen the plaintiff in
bis prone position for two' hundred feet, it would seem to have been
at least a question for the jury whether or not the defendant should, in
the exercise of reasonable care, have seen the plaintiff before reaching a
point fifty feet from him.30
2-247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E.2d 315 (1957).
26 Id. at 499, 101 S.E.2d at 317. See note 17 supra.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(a) (Supp. 1957).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-131(a) (Supp. 1957).
"0 "Men of fair and reasonable minds might have drawn different conclusions
from the evidence in this case, although there is no material conflict between the
testimony of the witnesses examined, and, therefore, the jury should have been
allowed to determine whether the engineer might have ascertained, by keeping a
proper lookout, the real condition of the deceased .... and by timely exercise have
saved him harmless . . . ." Deans v. Wilmington & W. R.R.. 107 N.C. 686, 694,
12 S.E. 77, 80 (1890). See Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524, 80 S.E.2d
150 (1954), a case with facts almost identical with those of the principal case,
where the court allowed recovery on the theory of last clear chance.
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It appears that the facts of the principal case bring it clearly within
Category III discussed above; vi., the peril of the plaintiff was not
actually discovered by the defendant, but should have been; the plaintiff
was physically unable to prevent his injury through the exercise of due
care. That being the case, both the weight of precedents and the sounder
reasoning would seem to have required a reversal of the nonsuit which
was granted below. The weight to be given to the contrary result,
considering the court's orthodox statement of the rule,3' must await
further decisions.
LUKE R. CORBETT
Torts-Physicians and Surgeons-Liability for Signing a Certificate
of Insanity Without Proper Examination of the Alleged Lunatic
In Bailey v. McGill' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
two physicians in signing certificates of insanity under G.S. § 122-432
were absolutely immune from civil liability to an alleged mentally dis-
ordered plaintiff.3 The rationale of the court was that the defendant
physicians were protected by the absolute privilege given to witnesses for
statements made by them in a judicial proceeding.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant physicians did not make an
3 "Liability on the new act arises after the defendant has had sufficient op-
portunity, in the exercise of ordinary care, to discover and to appreciate the plain-
tiff's perilous position in time to avoid injuring him." 247 N.C. at 498, 101 S.E.2d
at 317.
1247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-43 (1952). This statute provides: "When an affidavit
and request for examination of an alleged mentally disordered person has been
made... the clerk of the superior court . . . shall direct two physicians .. . to
examine the alleged mentally disordered person . . . to determine if a state of
mental disorder exists and if it warrants commitment to one of the State hospitals
or institutions for the mentally disordered. If the said physicians are satisfied
that the -alleged mentally disordered person should be committed for observation
and admission into a hospital for the mentally disordered, they shall sign an
affidavit to that effect . .. .
The institution of the lunacy proceeding is provided for by N.C. GEN. STAr.§ 122-42 (1952) : "When it appears that a person is suffering from some mental
disorder and is in need of observation or admission in a State hospital, some
reliable person having knowledge of the facts shall make before the clerk of the
superior court of the county in which alleged mentally disordered person is or
resides,. . . an affidavit that the alleged mentally disordered person is in need of
observation or admission in a hospital for the mentally disordered ...."
' The court held as to a third defendant physician that the plaintiff had stated
a cause of action for abuse of process under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-42 (1952), be-
cause it was alleged that this physician through ill will and malice toward the
plaintiff persuaded the plaintiff's parents to institute the lunacy proceeding and
state that plaintiff was suffering from a mental disorder and was in need of
observation and admission to a mental institution. However, on retrial of the
issue in the Cleveland County Superior Court the case against this physician was
dismissed after the close of plaintiff's evidence, evidently on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. It is not known whether an appeal was
taken from this decision.
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examination of him as required by G.S. § 122-43; or if an examina-
tion were made, it was a hasty and superficial one and not a bona fide
examination as required by the statute. As a result of these certificates
of insanity and this allegedly wrongful and negligent conduct on the
part of the defendants, plaintiff was committed to the State Hospital
for the Insane by the Clerk of the Superior Court of Cleveland County
and forced to remain there for thirty days, at the end of which time it
was concluded that he was not insane and never had been. For his
humiliation in becoming known as a mental case, plaintiff demanded
both compensatory and punitive damages. The supreme court held that
the trial judge correctly sustained the defendants' demurrer for failure
to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff conceded that the allegations in his complaint did not set
out a cause of action for malicious prosecution, 4 abuse of process, or
false imprisonment;8 however, he maintained that he had stated a cause
of action for "a false certificate of insanity made by two of the de-
fendants," and another cause of action for "a certificate of insanity
negligently made without proper and ordinary care and prudence, and
without due examination and inquiry and proof."' 7 But the court, with-
out stating its reason, rejected this contention, and said, "The nature of
his allegations and charge against these two physicians would seem to
be that of libel."" The court then proceeded to hold that the defendants
were witnesses in a proceeding of a judicial nature before an officer
clothed with judicial powers and were therefore absolutely privileged,
because "a defamatory statement made by a witness in the due course of
a judicial proceeding, which is material to the inquiry, is absolutely privi-
leged, and cannot be made the basis of an action for libel or slander, even
though the testimony is given with express malice and knowledge of
its falsity." The construction of G.S. § 122-46,10 which gives the clerk
" Barnette v. Woody, 242 N.C. 424, 431, 88 S.E.2d 223, 227 (1955), where the
court said "the plaintiff must prove malice, want of probable cause and termination
of the prosecution or proceeding in plaintiff's favor." Accord, Fisher v. Payne,
93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) ; Brandt v. Brandt, 286 Ill. App. 151, 3 N.E.2d
96 (1936).
'Barnette v. Woody, supra note 4; Ledford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193
S.E. 722 (1937). There was no allegation that the defendants had an ulterior
purpose or that they committed an act in the use of the process not proper in the
regular prosecution of the proceeding.
' Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927); Ussery v. Haynes, 344
Mo. 530, 127 S.W.2d 410 (1939); Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445(1941). It was not alleged that the commitment was without lawful authority.
But see Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899), where two physicians
were held liable for false imprisonment in a lunacy proceeding; however, the
proceeding was not held to be judicial in nature and the court did not discuss the
elements of false imprisonment.
7247 N.C. at 290, 100 S.E.2d at 860.
8 Id. at 293, 100 S.E.2d at .866.
°Id. at 293, 100 S.E.2d at 866. Accord, Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80
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of the superior court the judicial authority to hold a hearing, to examine
the certificates and affidavits of the physicians and any proper witnesses,
and to commit the alleged mentally disordered person to a mental in-
stitution, was the foundation upon which the application of the witness
privilege rule rested. Examining the certificates of the physicians sub-
mitted pursuant to G.S. § 122-43 was necessary to the performance of
this judicial authority; therefore, the physicians were deemed to be
witnesses before a judicial hearing and were absolutely privileged in
their testimony. The court said the defendants "were not engaged in the
ordinary practice of their profession. Their role and function in ex-
amining the plaintiff and signing the affidavits in respect to his mental
condition are those of witnesses."'"
In holding the defendants' affidavits absolutely privileged, the court
placed North Carolina in accord with the weight of authority in this
area.12  Since insanity is often hard to determine with certainty, public
policy and the administration of the law require that the certifying
physician b6 protected rather than the injured plaintiff who has been
negligently committed to a mental institution as a lunatic.'3 The courts
feel that public policy requires that the witness physician be allowed
to testify without fear of being sued by one whose interests may be
adversely affected by his testimony.14 It would tend to extend litigation
if the matter could be reexamined in a new action, thereby causing multi-
plicity of suits.15
In addition to public policy, some courts say that the plaintiff can
S.E.2d 248 (1954) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 588 (1938).
The witness privilege rule applies to affidavits submitted to the court as well
as to testimony given orally in court. Perry v. Perry, 153 N.C. 266, 69 S.E. 130
(1910).10 N.C. GEm. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1957).
111247 N.C. at 292, 100 S.E.2d at 866. Accord, Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 128 A.2d
218 (Me. 1956) ; Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900).
" Fisher v. -Payne, 93 Fla: 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (absolute privilege as to
affidavit); Corcoran v. Jerrel, 185 Iowa 532, 170 N.W. 776 (1919) (absolute
privilege as to oral testimony); Dunbar v. Greenlaw, supra note 11 (absolute
privilege) ; Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953) (absolute
privilege as to affidavit); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954)
(absolute privilege, but negligent examination not alleged). Cf. Niven v. Bolan,
supra note 11 (conditional privilege); Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. (NY) 461
(1860) (conditional privilege).
13 Brandt v. Brandt, 286 Ill. App. 151, 3 N.E.2d 96 (1936) ; Dunbar v. Green-
law, mpra note 11; Niven v. Bolan, supra note 11.
1 Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11, 14, 58 N.E. 282, 283 (1900), where the
court said: "It is more important that the administration of the law in the manner
provided should not be obstructed by the fears of physicians that they may render
themselves liable to suit than it is that the person certified by them to be insane,
or a diposomaniac, or inebriate should be a right of action in case it turns out
that the certificate ought not to have been given." See Mezullo v. Maletz, 331
Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953); Godette v. Gaskill, 151 N.C. 51, 65 S.E.2d
612 (1909).
" Niven v. Bolan, mspra note 14; Godette v. Gaskill, mtpra note 14.
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get redress in a criminal court if the physician commits perjury.'6 Some
of the cases mention state statutes which provide for criminal punish-
ment if the plaintiff is wrongfully committed as a result of a conspiracy
between the physician and a third person.17
Some other opinions join with the majority view and hold the
physician not liable because there was no proximate cause between the
examination of the plaintiff, the signing of the certificate of insanity, and
commitment by the officer with such authority.' These cases proceed
on the reasoning that the committing authority could commit the alleged
lunatic even though it did not rely on the affidavits of the physicians;
therefore, it cannot be said that the affidavits of the physician caused
the wrongful commitment.19 The commitment was the sole act of the
committing authority.20 However, this reasoning has been criticized
and said to be contrary to the theory of proximate cause as set out in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.2 ' by Judge Cardozo.2 2
There is a very persuasive minority view2 3 which imposes liability
on the physician on the ground that in examining the plaintiff he has
assumed a statutory duty to use ordinary care and will be liable to the
plaintiff for any breach of the duty.24 This view is led by the English
decisions; however, the commitment statutes in these cases were less
protective of the alleged lunatic and therefore there was more reason
to hold the physician responsible.25 The only American decision follow-
1" Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 128 A.2d 218 (Me. 1956) ; Godette v. Gaskill, supra note
14 (dictum) at 52, 65 S.E. at 613.
" Dunbar v. Greenlaw, supra note 16; Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118
N.E.2d 356 (1953); Niven v. Bolan, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E.2d 282 (1900).
18 Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1953) ; Force v. Probasco,
43 N.J.L. 539 (1881) ; Everett v. Griffiths, [1920] 3 K.B. 163, 1 A.C. 631 (1921)(distinguished in Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402) ; Brady v. Collom, 68 R.I.
299, 301, 27 A.2d 311, 312 (1942) (dictum).
'
0 Ibid.
10 Mezullo v. Maletz, supra note 18.
21248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2"2Notes, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 493 (1954), 23 U. CIN. L. REv. 525 (1954).
"Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1888) ; Springer v. Steiner,
91 Ore. 100, 178 Pac. 592 (1919) (action for false imprisonment not allowed be-
cause plaintiff did not show lack of good faith on part of the physician.) ; Williams
v. Le Bar, 149 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 525 (1891) (but no recovery allowed because the
physician made a mere error in judgment) ; Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402;
Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337, 176 Eng. Rep. 151 (Q.B. 1862) ; Miller v. West,
165 Md. 245, 247, 167 At. 696, 697 (1933) (dictum). See also Pennell v. Cum-
mings, 75 Me. 163 (1883).
" Ayers v. Russell, supra note 23 at -, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341, where the court
said: "Their [the physicians] duty must be measured by the trust which the
statute reposes in them, and by the consequences flowing from its improper per-
formance. They assumed the duty by accepting the trust. They are not judicial
officers, but medical experts. They . . . are chargeable with that negligence which
attaches to a professional expert who does not use the care and skill which his
profession, per se, implies that he will bring to his professional work."
2" Harnett v. Fisher, [1927] 1 K.B. 402; Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337, 176
Eng. Rep. 151 (Q.B. 1862).
In Hall v. Semple, supra, the alleged lunatic could be committed to a mental
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ing this view imposed liability on the theory that the privilege should
apply only after the physician has exercised ordinary care in examining
the plaintiff :26 "Their privilege is that, so long as they do their duty with
the care and skill the statute presumes and requires, they are not re-
sponsible to the plaintiff for the consequences, however harsh they may
be; for in such a case the law afflicts the plaintiff, but when they do not
use such care and skill it is their personal negligence which afflicts
him." 27 This type of reasoning separates the testimony or affidavit of
the physician from the examination. The testimony is privileged, but
the physician is held liable for ordinary negligence in the examination.
Under these decisions, the plaintiff is not only given redress at law, but
he is less likely to receive a cursory examination, thereby reducing the
likelihood of a sane person's being committed to an institution.28
In answer to the majority view that public policy requires that the
physician be protected, the language of the court in Bacon v. Bacon
29
appears to be a pertinent reply:
A sad, silent, and fragile little lady, now beyond middle life,
wrongfully declared a lunatic, and that of the most repulsive style,
shut up in a mad house .... and with a stigma branded upon her
name and character which verdicts of juries and judgments of
courts may never wholly efface, and with endurance of such shame,
humiliation, and crucifixion of soul as happily does not often fall
to woman's lot, has appealed to the courts for redress of her
wrongs, and we do not feel authorized to take from her the poor
fruits of her victory.30
The suit was one for false imprisonment and the court does not consider
the witness privilege rule, but the language of the court seems to offer
a persuasive argument for balancing public policy in favor of the alleged
lunatic.
In the principal case, there does not seem to be any doubt that the
lunacy proceeding conducted by the clerk of the superior court was
a judicial proceeding.3 ' It reasonably follows that the role and function
institution on the basis of the physician's certificate alone. His case was not re-
viewed by legal authorities until after the commitment. In Harnett v. Fisher,
supra, however, a relative of the plaintiff made the petition, a physician signed
the certificate, and the justice appointed for that purpose to perform the duty made
the reception order. This procedure is more similar to the North Carolina
statutes.
Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1888).
Id. at -, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341.28 Note, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 493 (1954).
" 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899).
30 Id. at 472, 24 So. at 971.
" Corcoran v. Jerrell, 185 Iowa 532, 170 N.W. 776 (1919) ; Perkins v. Mitchell,
31 Barb. (N.Y.) 461 (1860); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248
(1954); Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445 (1941); 33 Am. JuR.,
Libel and Slander § 148 (1941) ; 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 104(h) (1948).
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of the physicians in examining the plaintiff and signing the certificates
of insanity expressing their opinion as to the mental condition of the
plaintiff were those of witnesses. But although the law protects the
physician for what he says in the course of a judicial proceeding, the
common law also imposes a duty upon him to use due care in the
practice of his profession.3 2 Surely, the legislature did not intend to
clothe the physician with authority to examine the plaintiff as to his
mental condition and recommend that he be committed to a mental
institution and at the same time abolish this common law duty he owed
to the plaintiff to use due care in examining him. It would appear to
be more logical to say that the legislature intended to supplement the
common law duty with a statutory duty to exercise due care in examining
the plaintiff. The defendants should be privileged in whatever they
testified to in the lunacy proceeding, but the duty to examine properly
the plaintiff under G.S. § 122-43 should be an entirely separable role
and function to be performed by them, not as witnesses, but as men
of professional skill who are required to use due care in examining the
plaintiff as a patient. It is therefore submitted that, although the plain-
tiff did not state a cause of action for signing a libelous certificate of
insanity, he did state a cause of action for negligence in preparing the
certificate of insanity without first properly examining the plaintiff as
to his mental condition.
By allowing a cause of action for negligence the court could have
balanced the interests between the plaintiff and the defendants. The
physicians would be allowed to testify freely at the hearing before
the clerk of the superior court without fear of a vexatious law suit from
a dissatisfied party, but the court would impose upon them a statutory
and professional duty of exercising ordinary care and skill in examining
the plaintiff, thereby rendering it more likely that the plaintiff would
not be confined in a mental institution without first being properly
examined as to his mental condition. The end result is compliance
with the legal maxim that "for every wrong there is a remedy."
THOMAS S. BENNETT
"Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942) ; Parkell v. Fitzporter,
301 Mo. 217, 256 S.W. 239 (1923y; Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183(1940) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955) ; 41 A%. JuR., Physicians and Surgeons
§§ 73, 79 (1942) ; 70 C.J.S., Physicans and Surgeons § 36 (1951).
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